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Cover
The cover image shows USN aircraft car-
riers under way in the Indian Ocean in 
1980. Front to back are USS Kitty Hawk 
(CV 63), USS Midway (CV 41), and 
the nuclear-powered USS Nimitz (CVN 
68), in company with escort ships. In 
“Aircraft Carriers: Missions, Survivabil-
ity, Size, Cost, Numbers,” former Navy 
Secretary John F. Lehman and Steven 
Wills make a case that Midway—whose 
career stretched from 1945 to 1991—still 
represents a viable, and in many ways a 
superior, model for producing multiple 
carriers that should be added to the Nim-
itz and Ford mix to perform the crucial 
missions and functions of which aircraft 
carriers alone are capable.
Source: Courtesy of Naval History and 
Heritage Command
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FROM THE EDITORS
The future of the aircraft carrier in the evolving security environment has been 
a perennial topic of debate within and beyond the U�S� Navy� At a time of con-
tinuing uncertainty regarding the Navy’s future force structure, this very much 
remains the case� Unfortunately, this debate often fails to transcend familiar talk-
ing points� John F� Lehman Jr�, in “Aircraft Carriers: Missions, Survivability, Size, 
Cost, Numbers,” provides an informed and succinct overview of this subject, fo-
cusing particularly on the fraught issue of carrier vulnerability and the argument 
for resuscitating a Midway-class medium carrier� John F� Lehman Jr� is a former 
Secretary of the Navy�
This year is the hundredth anniversary of the Washington Naval Con-
ference of 1921� As Sam J� Tangredi points out in “Sizing the Carriers: A 
Brief History of Alternatives,” it is more than a little ironic that it was an 
arms-control agreement that provided the impetus for the construction of 
America’s largest warships� He goes on to survey the history of the prewar 
experimentation with various carrier concepts, and then the World War II 
experience, with its rapid creation of quick-to-build smaller carriers (CVLs 
and CVEs) for limited missions such as antisubmarine warfare� While after 
the war interest continued in small carriers equipped with V/STOL aircraft, 
he concludes that the case for reliance on large (CV or “fleet”) carriers re-
mains persuasive� Sam J� Tangredi holds the Leidos Chair of Future Warfare 
Studies at the Naval War College�
One of the most important naval developments in recent years is the so-called 
AUKUS agreement among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
designed to improve collaboration on a range of cutting-edge military technolo-
gies� The centerpiece of this new alignment will be the acquisition of nuclear 
submarine-propulsion technology by the Australians� A predictable effect of 
this development is that other countries in the region may take a second look at 
moving to nuclear propulsion in their own submarine fleets� In fact, a debate on 
this subject has been ongoing for some years in the Republic of Korea� In “Seoul’s 
Misguided Desire for a Nuclear Submarine,” James Campbell takes a close look at 
the many obstacles to be overcome by the South Koreans or any other nation in 
pursuing this option� He argues that Seoul would be better advised to invest the 
enormous anticipated costs of such a program in alternative ASW capabilities, 
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including additional modern diesel submarines� James Campbell is a production 
manager at the U�S� Naval Sea Systems Command�
In “Jomini and Naval Special Operations Forces: An Applied-Competition Ap-
proach to Russia,” Kevin Stringer appeals to the authority of the distinctly nonnaval 
nineteenth-century strategist Antoine-Henri Jomini to make a provocative case 
for a new approach to deterring and countering Russian pressures against NATO 
Europe in the so-called gray zone of subviolent conflict—and as a preparation for 
potential escalation of this conflict� The approach focuses on what would seem to 
be a novel role for naval special operations forces� Colonel Kevin D� Stringer, USA, 
currently serves on the faculty of the U�S� Army War College�
All navalist writing is vulnerable to the fallacy that maritime power is the royal 
road to geopolitical success� In “The Limits of Sea Power,” Jakub Grygiel makes a 
wide-ranging argument cautioning against this fallacy and also suggesting ways 
in which the limits he describes at least can be mitigated� Jakob Grygiel is a pro-
fessor of politics at the Catholic University of America�
The relative military value of, as well as the relationship between, surface and 
subsurface naval forces remains a fundamental issue for modern navies� Regarding 
the two world wars of the last century, the conventional wisdom seems to accept 
that the U-boat threat was the potentially decisive element of German sea power, 
yet one to which the Germans themselves failed to give adequate priority in their 
overall strategic planning for the employment of naval forces� In “‘To Die Gallantly’? 
The Role of the Surface Fleet in German Naval Strategy, 1919–41,” Peter Hooker 
challenges this view� Emphasizing that Germany’s naval leadership well understood 
the limitations of U-boat technology and armament and rightly judged that the 
submarine force by itself could win neither war, he argues that the navy’s commit-
ment to rebuilding a serious surface fleet in the run-up to World War II was sensible 
in itself and that the resultant fleet in fact proved a much more significant threat to 
British maritime dominance in the first years of the war than generally is believed� 
Peter Hooker is a PhD candidate at the University of Newcastle, Australia�
With John D� Moore’s “Letter from Port Moresby,” we revive a onetime feature 
of this journal and invite similar contributions from others in the future� This 
piece is particularly timely in light of the recently announced AUKUS agreement, 
mentioned above� It is rather remarkable that so little attention is paid regularly 
to Papua New Guinea, located on an island that is one of the largest and perhaps 
the most interesting in the world, in both human and environmental terms, not 
to mention that it provided the stage for General Douglas MacArthur’s virtuoso 
performance in his “island-hopping” campaign of the Pacific War� Noteworthy 
are Moore’s brief discussion of U�S�-Australian interest in developing military 
facilities on Manus Island and his flagging of Chinese attempts at political-
economic penetration of the country�
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
AS WE HAVE DISCUSSED in previous issues of the Naval War Col-
lege Review, the College’s efforts to mitigate the impact of the 
worldwide COVID-19 pandemic resulted in significant modifications to College 
procedures during the latter half of academic year 2019–20 and all of academic 
year 2020–21� By embracing alternative teaching methodologies and using vir-
tual and hybrid learning technologies, the College continued to carry out its 
assigned missions in a manner that was both safe and effective� The implementa-
tion of College-wide in-person and teleworking initiatives protected the health of 
the College community during this unprecedented period� We are happy to note 
that educational outcomes, as measured by course-completion and graduation 
rates, met or exceeded prepandemic levels�
During the lengthy pandemic lockdown period, the College’s senior leaders 
conducted an intensive analysis of all aspects of the College’s operations to iden-
tify gaps, challenges, and future opportunities� The recently published 2022–2027 
Strategic Plan represents the culmination of these analyses, and it serves as a way 
ahead as the College anticipates a return to normal public-health conditions for the 
2021–22 academic year and beyond� The full text of the plan can be found on our 
website at www�usnwc�edu, but I’d like to share with you now its broad outlines�
The plan begins by identifying the College’s overall vision, documenting our 
assigned missions, and specifying the primary lines of effort that will be used to 
achieve the goals and outcomes we seek� It also delineates the College’s values and 
identifies a series of operational objectives to be pursued� By design, this plan is 
not prescriptive, but rather is meant to chart a course toward the end points we 
see as vital to the Navy, the Department of Defense, and the security and prosper-
ity of the United States of America and its allies�
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Our Guiding Vision: We inform today’s decision makers and educate tomorrow’s 
leaders�
We provide today’s decision makers and tomorrow’s leaders with educational 
experiences and learning opportunities that develop their ability to anticipate 
and prepare strategically for the future, strengthen the foundations of peace, and 
create a decisive war-fighting advantage�
Our Mission: We deliver excellence in education, research, and outreach�
In today’s dynamic security environment, even if numerical and technological 
superiority could be achieved, it would not be enough to ensure victory over the 
array of potential adversaries� Our national-security leaders also must possess 
the mental strength and flexibility to outthink our competitors in all domains of 
engagement� At the Naval War College, we expand the intellectual engagement 
of naval, joint, interagency, and international leaders and warriors to achieve that 
cognitive advantage� We value the broad and relevant experience of our faculty 
and staff and are committed to investing in the professional development of all 
members of our diverse team� We embrace innovative education-delivery meth-
ods� We are responsive to the support needs of our students, faculty, and staff and 
the requirement for sustaining and investing in our infrastructure� In our historic 
facilities in Newport, Rhode Island, and in numerous locations around the globe, 
we deliver excellence in education, research, and outreach and are committed 
to building enduring relationships with our alumni, partners, and stakeholders�
Our Values: In implementing the strategic plan, the Naval War College team pur-
sues a series of operational objectives and conducts day-to-day activities that are 
consistent with the following values:
• We embrace diversity, inclusiveness, and open communication to foster a 
creative, collaborative, and high-performing team that treats all people with 
professionalism, dignity, and respect�
• Our respect for the expansive range of ideas, experiences, and scholarship 
within our community underpins our commitment to academic freedom�
• We are agile, responsive, and innovative in addressing emergent issues and 
changes in tasking and the external operating environment�
• We are committed to continually measuring and improving the quality of 
service provided to our stakeholders� 
The Lines of Effort We Will Pursue: The Naval War College creates an enduring 
strategic advantage by excelling in the execution of educational, research-and-
analysis, and outreach initiatives� We do so by performing the following:
• Delivering an education that integrates rigorous and relevant curricula and 
world-class research and analysis� Our in-residence and distance-learning 
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modes align with our students’ learning requirements and their full-time 
or part-time availability to engage in scholarly pursuits� We expand our 
students’ capacity for strategically minded critical thinking, ethical decision-
making, and creative problem solving�
• Engaging in cutting-edge research and analysis of concepts, plans, and 
mature and emerging technologies� Our data-driven approach to develop-
ing, testing, and validating concepts strengthens cognitive power in the face 
of uncertainty and complexity� Our interdisciplinary environment attracts 
scholars and experts from across the military, the rest of government, 
academia, and private industry, and promotes original and applied research 
for scholarly publication, policy and doctrine review, and advancement of 
knowledge in the profession of arms�
• Conducting outreach and engaging with naval, joint, interagency, and inter-
national alumni, partners, and stakeholders to incorporate diverse perspec-
tives, foster a network of enduring partners, build partner capability and 
capacity, and enhance interoperability�
The impetus for all we do is derived from the five mission areas the Chief of 
Naval Operations has assigned to the Naval War College� These are as follows: 
• Educate and develop leaders
• Support defining the future Navy and associated roles and missions
• Support the Navy in an era of great-power competition
• Strengthen global maritime partnerships
• Promote ethical leadership across the force
The College will accomplish these missions by achieving a series of mutually 
reinforcing objectives that involve refining the services and products we currently 
provide, innovating new services or products, and enabling increased organiza-
tional performance by enhancing internal functions and business processes� Spe-
cific responsibilities, metrics, targets, and milestones will be published separately 
in an NWC Strategy Implementation Framework document� Using this iterative 
framework, we will assess progress toward achievement of each operational objec-
tive on a quarterly basis� We believe that successful implementation of this strate-
gic plan requires achieving specific, measurable, relevant, and time-bound results� 
I will update you periodically on our progress toward achieving each objective�
All of us should remember the advice of noted author, educator, and manage-
ment consultant Peter Drucker, who notes, “Plans are only good intentions unless 
they immediately degenerate into hard work�” I am confident that all of us at the 
Naval War College are ready to commence the hard work necessary to translate 
intentions into accomplishments�
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This strategy was developed during the COVID pandemic and is being pub-
lished as many members of our campus community are returning to regular 
classroom and office work after more than a year of disruption� Plans made in 
fiscal year 2020 (FY20) were overtaken by the COVID response� FY21 was a 
transitional year, with remarkable outcomes across our three lines of effort as our 
proficiency and productivity peaked in the virtual realm� As we exit the COVID en-
vironment, we take on the difficult work of rebuilding routines, refining practices 
that worked for us in the past, and innovating around new ideas and opportuni-
ties exposed through our experimentation with new technologies and changes in 
the global security environment�
We are called to consider the implications of great-power competition as we 
approach our important work with a sense of urgency� We face FY22 and beyond 
with optimism and renewed commitment to our values and mission� It is an hon-
or to serve with each and every member of this vibrant Naval War College com-
munity, which carries such a deep legacy of service to our Navy and our nation�
SHOSHANA S� CHATFIELD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Missions, Survivability, Size, Cost, Numbers
John F. Lehman, with Steven Wills
 The aircraft carrier, as employed by the United States and other nations, has been controversial since its operational introduction just over a century ago, 
with the commissioning of HMS Argus into the Royal Navy on 16 September 
1918�1 At that time and ever since, the carrier has faced intense criticism from 
rival services and political opponents� The arguments have not changed in that 
whole time� Critics believe carriers to be too expensive and too vulnerable� These 
arguments are raised anew in times of peace—then in every war the carrier’s de-
cisive use in combat ends the discussion for the next decade or so�
In 1949, the Truman administration ordered the decommissioning of all 
but seven of the Navy’s carriers and the dismantling of the first supercarrier, 
USS United States, then under construction� The outraged Secretary of the 
Navy (SECNAV), John L� Sullivan, who was not even consulted, resigned im-
mediately in protest�2 In what followed, known as the “Revolt of the Admirals,” 
many admirals and captains lobbied and testified against the administration, 
and many were fired as a result� Led by the future Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) Admiral Arleigh A� Burke, the Navy fought against efforts by Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF) Louis A� Johnson and Air Force Secretary W� Stuart 
Symington to go even further: giving the Air Force all Navy and Marine avia-
tion� Burke survived an attempt to retire him as a captain, but the Navy’s future 
carrier programs seemed at best to be navigating in shoal water at the end of 
the 1940s�3
However, the Navy’s flattops soon got a chance to prove their worth in the 
emerging Cold War world� Secretary of State Dean G� Acheson provided to Con-
gress a survey of vital American interests in the Pacific that excluded Korea� That 
exclusion, combined with the dramatic disarmament of the U�S� Navy, provided 
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an irresistible temptation to the Soviet Union and China, and on 25 June 1950 
North Korea attacked South Korea� That, of course, brought about a sudden 
and complete end to the Truman administration’s naval disarmament� Since 
the invasion captured all air force bases in South Korea, carrier-based aviation, 
in the form of strike groups from USS Valley Forge (CV 45) and its Royal Navy 
counterpart in the western Pacific, HMS Triumph, went into action against North 
Korean forces on 3 July 1950—providing the only available tactical air support to 
the fight� Eighty-six U�S� and forty British carrier aircraft provided the primary 
air component of United Nations forces opposing the North Korean offensive� 
Carriers quickly proved their worth, and—with no more than four fleet carri-
ers ever deployed to Korea—the Navy flew 276,000 combat sorties (only seven 
thousand short of its total for World War II) and dropped 177,000 tons of bombs 
(74,000 tons more than the service had dropped in all of World War II) during 
the conflict�4
President Harry S� Truman sent an emergency bill to Congress trebling the de-
fense budget and canceling the retirement of aircraft carriers, and a few months 
later he fired Johnson as SECDEF� The House Armed Services Committee and 
its chairman, Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), hailed the value of carrier 
aviation, and the first supercarrier, USS Forrestal (CV 59), was authorized in July 
1951�5 The dramatic role that carrier air played in Korea ended criticism of flat-
tops for the next twenty years�
President Truman and his successors often had occasion to utter the words 
“Where is the nearest carrier?” I myself first heard the question—more like a 
demand—from President Richard M� Nixon on 15 April 1969, when I worked for 
Henry A� Kissinger, then the assistant to the president for national security affairs 
(i�e�, national security advisor)�6 That day North Korea shot down a Navy EC-121 
reconnaissance plane over international waters, killing thirty-one sailors�7 There 
was no carrier in the theater, and we did nothing�
The election of Jimmy Carter to the U�S� presidency in 1976 started a new 
carrier battle less than two years later—with the same, now sixty-year-old, ar-
guments� President Carter, a former submariner, was opposed to building any 
more fleet carriers, and he intended to phase them out of the naval order of 
battle� Congress, however, added another two-billion-dollar Nimitz-class carrier 
to the president’s 1978 budget� In an unprecedented move, Carter vetoed the 
fiscal year 1979 (FY-79) defense bill because it included the carrier� However, 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian takeover of the U�S� embassy 
soon after settled the issue� With the effort augmented by the presence in the 
Navy Senate office of Captain (and future U�S� senator) John S� McCain III, 
the fourth Nimitz carrier was authorized by Congress and signed into law by 
President Carter�8
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It was not long after the passage of this legislation that I, as the new SECNAV, 
had the keen pleasure of naming that carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71)� 
The contract also became the first that I signed under the new, competitive, fixed-
price-procurement philosophy of the Reagan administration� (Roosevelt came in 
early and under budget�)9
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION:  
HIGH-WATER MARK OF THE CARRIER FORCE
The U�S� Navy reached a high point of fifteen carriers and 594 total ships in 1987, 
a growth of 74 ships from the end of the Carter administration owing to the 600-
Ship Navy initiative spearheaded by President Ronald W� Reagan� Two-carrier 
block buys—a process in which multiple ships of a single class are purchased 
in one year, yielding significant cost savings—were executed in the FY-83 and 
FY-88 budgets�10 This feat had not been accomplished with fleet carriers since 
the Second World War� The development of the six-hundred-ship force came 
directly from the specific requirements to carry out the new Forward Maritime 
Strategy—the ultimate realization of the Reagan administration’s determination 
to achieve unquestioned command of the seas�11
The Navy lost no time in carrying out the new strategy� Seven months after 
Reagan’s inauguration, eighty-three ships, including four carriers (two supercar-
riers, one vertical and/or short takeoff and landing [i�e�, V/STOL] carrier, and 
one helicopter carrier), hidden by sophisticated cover-and-deception technology, 
raced north into the Norwegian Sea� The first the Soviets knew they were there 
was when USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) sent four F-14s, four A-6s, and 
four KA-6 tankers one thousand miles to fly at 550 knots through a Soviet exer-
cise thirteen miles off Murmansk�12 The Soviets were flabbergasted and never re-
ally recovered their previous confidence in their ability to defend their homeland 
from U�S� naval attack�
Every year thereafter, U�S�-led allied fleets carried out realistic training ex-
ercises in those seas—seas where they would fight if the Soviets attacked� Each 
exercise refined and improved tactics that incorporated the newest technology� 
By 1985, the carriers were operating in Norwegian fjords and among Norwegian 
Sea archipelagoes, making enemy targeting next to impossible�13
Soviet chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergey F� Akhromeyev visited the 
United States in July 1988 as part of Soviet leader Mikhail S� Gorbachev’s desire 
to reduce tensions with the West� Akhromeyev flew out to the carrier Theodore 
Roosevelt and observed a demonstration of the carrier air wing’s capabilities� 
During the visit, Akhromeyev presented a global map to U�S� Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J� Crowe Jr� that incorporated symbols 
detailing a ring of American naval bases and deployed submarines and aircraft 
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carriers surrounding the Eurasian continent, and specifically the Soviet home-
land� Akhromeyev told Crowe, “Your navy and bases surround my country and 
threaten the security of the Soviet Union�”14 The union of the Forward Maritime 
Strategy and the six-hundred-ship Navy was the core of the Reagan administra-
tion’s military and naval rearmament plans that were crucial to deterrence—and 
ultimately to victory in the Cold War�
The Soviet Navy and Air Force came to realize that they could not cope� In 
1986, the Soviet General Staff sent a démarche to the Politburo, urgently request-
ing a tripling of the budgets 
for the Northern Fleet and 
Northern Air Force; other-
wise, they believed that in the 
event of war they could not 
defend the country’s northern 
flank for more than a week� This hit the Politburo like a thunderclap and was a 
major factor contributing to the Soviet collapse�15
As occurred after previous conflicts, Cold War victory brought an overreac-
tion in disarmament� The fleet was reduced by one-third, with the number of 
carriers cut from fifteen to twelve�16
CARRIERS: MISSIONS AND COSTS
To build the force of fifteen carriers in the ’80s, we froze the design of the Nimitz 
class and built five more of them on fixed-price contracts that varied only in the 
steady introduction of ever-improving weapons technology�17 However, passage 
of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms in 1986 took decisions on new weapons away 
from the services, transferring them to the significantly enlarged Department of 
Defense (DoD) bureaucracy�18 Under this new joint system, it was decided that 
the Navy should have a new carrier design�19
Given the Ford’s exorbitant and still-growing price tag, many have advocated 
a return to smaller carriers� We will examine such options later in this article�
The new administration of President Donald J� Trump called for an increase 
in the fleet to 355 ships, including twelve aircraft carriers� The FY-17 budget spe-
cifically required the Navy to maintain at least eleven aircraft carriers and nine 
carrier air wings, and the same legislation endorsed the 355-ship, twelve-carrier 
goals�20
Yet challenges to these goals have continued� There was a dip to ten carriers 
in December 2012 when Enterprise was retired, and, surprisingly, the Trump De-
fense Department requested only five new combatant ships and two tugboats in 
the FY-21 budget�21 Presidents now often must be disappointed when in a crisis 
they ask, “Where are the carriers?”
Critics believe carriers to be too expensive and 
too vulnerable . . . in times of peace—then in 
every war the carrier’s decisive use in combat 
ends the discussion for the next decade or so.
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The F-18Es and the F-35s are all effective fleet-air-defense fighters� The con-
tinuously upgraded Aegis antiair system is now the standard for USN cruisers and 
destroyers (and soon for the FFG-62 frigate) that serve as the carrier’s partners in 
providing air superiority� While these surface combatants are highly effective in 
shooting down enemy aircraft and ballistic, supersonic, and hypersonic missiles, 
they and the Army transports, tankers, merchant ships, and amphibious-warfare 
vessels they escort cannot survive for long without air cover; they must have 
fighter cover twenty-four hours a day� The majority of the earth’s surface is out 
of range for land-based fighters, so they cannot provide the around-the-clock 
coverage needed� Only carrier air wings can provide that capability�
As was the case in the 1970s and ’80s with the rise of the Soviet Navy, there is 
no lack of operational-level-of-war missions for the individual carrier strike group 
and the multiflattop carrier battle force in the new age of great-power competition� 
The emergence of a Chinese carrier force—now consisting of three vessels, with 
the potential for up to six by the 2030s—suggests the potential for carrier duels in 
blue water that may be reminiscent of the great Pacific War of the 1940s�22
CARRIER STATISTICS SINCE 1942
Sources: Lehman, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices, p. 8; Eric Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World: Their Ships, Aircraft, 
and Systems, 16th–19th eds. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013–); Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence 
on World Events, vol. 2, 1946–2006, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008).











Cost When  
Purchased  
(2019 dollars)
Essex 1942 27,100 872 147 3,170 $68–$78 million  
($1 billion)
Midway 1945 45,000 968 136 3,960 $85�6 million in 1945 
($1�2 billion)
Forrestal 1955 60,000 1,039 252 4,100 $217 million in 1952 
($3�13 billion)
Kitty Hawk 1961 64,000 1,072 252 4,600 $400 million in 1961 
($3�4 billion)
Enterprise 1961 75,000 1,125 252 4,600 $451 million in 1960 
($4�11 billion)








2014 44,971 844 108 1,200 $3�4 billion in 2014 dollars
Ford 2017 100,000 1,106 256 4,660 $13�3 billion in 2017  
(still rising)
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Like during the Cold War under the 1980s Maritime Strategy, the carrier’s first 
mission might be warfare at sea against enemy surface, subsurface, and aviation 
units� For example, attriting Chinese surface and air forces could enhance the 
implementation of guerre de course (targeting Chinese global commerce) and 
could include sea-based aviation strikes against Chinese infrastructure and ports, 
mining of ports and sea-lanes, and the closing of straits to Chinese merchant and 
naval shipping� Carrier-based aviation enforcing blockades likely would serve as 
the backbone of global horizontal-escalation operations against overseas Chinese 
military and commercial installations� Such a capability greatly strengthens de-
terrence, as University of Pennsylvania scholar Fiona Cunningham suggests: “[A] 
blockade would cripple China’s economy, deny its leaders access to key resources 
needed to fight the war, and ultimately compel its leaders to negotiate an end to 
the conflict� Like deep strikes on the Chinese mainland, the prospect of a block-
ade could deter China from starting a conflict�”23
The Russian Federation Navy represents a mere shadow of the former Soviet 
fleet, but it possesses modern submarines and missiles that can threaten Western 
targets afloat and ashore�24 What is similar to the Cold War situation is that the 
Russian General Staff greatly fears the power of a U�S� “aerospace blitzkrieg,” led 
MAXIMUM MISSILE RANGES IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Source: U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018 (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018).
26
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/1
 L E H M A N  2 1
in large part by carrier-based aircraft and their weapons�25 Russia’s strategic geog-
raphy is even worse than that of its Soviet predecessor state� Russian naval forces 
remain divided by vast geographic distances, often spanning areas that are de-
void of useful land bases for aircraft, yet much of Russia’s long-range response to 
sea-based aviation is dependent on land-based systems and relies on significant 
aerospace control that might not be possible in the presence of U�S� carriers�26 
U�S� naval carrier-based aviation is very useful in bridging and controlling such 
distances, and it would contribute the largest part of any aerospace campaign 
against the Russian Northern and Pacific Fleets�
The continuing acquisition of carriers by China—and by Australia, France, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and now South Korea—demonstrates that the 
flattop remains a vital component of diplomacy, power projection ashore, and 
operational warfare at sea�27
AIRCRAFT CARRIER SURVIVABILITY
While all surface vessels are susceptible to attack, the vulnerability of the carrier 
to multiple new weapons—including the hypersonic cruise missile, the antiship 
ballistic missile, and an arsenal of other arms that includes submarine torpedoes, 
mines, and drones—again is at the center of the debate on the large carrier’s 
continued viability�
Yet consider the examples of carrier survivability provided below�
World War II–Era Kamikaze Attacks
In an unexpected attack by a Japanese kamikaze (i�e�, suicide-attack) plane on 
30 October 1944, USS Franklin (CV 13) was hit with a 550-pound bomb� It pen-
etrated the ship’s unarmored flight deck and exploded, igniting dozens of other 
weapons on the aircraft parked on the ship’s hangar deck�28 Less than six months 
later, on 19 March 1945, Franklin was hit again, this time by two five-hundred-
pound bombs from Japanese attackers� Franklin suffered almost eight hundred 
dead out of 2,600 personnel aboard at the time of the attack�29 The Franklin 
battle-damage report later stated, “The conflagration in Franklin resulting from 
the action of 19 March was the most severe survived by any U�S� warship during 
the course of World War II� It is pertinent, however, to point out that the result-
ing damage would not in itself have caused the loss of the ship since the principal 
strength structure, watertight integrity and vital machinery below the hangar 
deck remained intact�”30
The official USN damage report highlights the robust design and survivability 
of the large flattop in action� The report does acknowledge that the “major dam-
age sustained in each of the actions of 30 October 1944 and 19 March 1945 dem-
onstrates the effectiveness of bomb hits when received by aircraft carriers during 
the extremely vulnerable period just prior to and during periods of launching 
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strikes�” However, the Franklin report then goes on to state, “The latter two cases 
of damage to Franklin illustrate thoroughly the ability of modern U�S� aircraft 
carriers to survive extensive damage from plane crashes, fire, and heavy bombs�” 
Large carriers can survive heavy damage and remain afloat, if not operational� 
When Franklin’s fires finally were brought under control, the ship resumed 
steaming under its own power�31 The damage to Franklin was important, in that 
it helped set new design parameters for post–World War II flattops (beginning 
with USS Midway [CV 41]) that emphasized armor and other forms of improved 
protection for the carrier�32
During the Okinawa campaign, the Japanese launched an estimated 
1,900 kamikaze sorties against the Allied fleet�33 Of the 793 kamikazes that 
actually found targets, 181 hit 
ships and another ninety-five 
crashed close enough to cause 
damage� Most of these aircraft 
were very agile fighters using 
very effective tactics, often 
making them superior in 
performance to modern anti-
ship missiles� During 1945, six large carriers were hit by these kamikazes, and 
another six by bombers using kamikaze tactics� None of the ships were sunk or 
damaged beyond repair�34
Vietnam-Era Accidents: Oriskany, Forrestal, and Enterprise
The lessons learned from Franklin and other World War II carriers influenced 
the design of subsequent Cold War flattops, with positive results� Three cases 
in particular emphasize the survivability of the big carrier across the Cold War�
USS Oriskany (CV 34), USS Forrestal (CV 59), and USS Enterprise (CVN 65) 
all experienced exploding bombs and severe fires that killed many sailors� Yet all 
returned to port for repairs under their own power� Enterprise later was assessed 
to have survived the equivalent of six heavyweight Soviet cruise-missile strikes in 
the course of its accident, but could have resumed air operations in several hours 
had repair capacity not been immediately available�35
USS America Testing
The former Kitty Hawk–class flattop USS America (CV 66) was the subject of four 
weeks of extensive survivability testing (referred to as a SINKEX) in May 2005�36 
The tests were designed to support the development of the future large nuclear 
carriers�37 America, with its double hull and more than a thousand watertight 
compartments, stubbornly resisted sinking; in the end, sending it to the bottom 
required deliberately opening the scuttles�38 Granted, a controlled SINKEX is not 
Army transports, tankers, merchant ships, and 
amphibious-warfare vessels . . . cannot survive 
for long without air cover. . . . The majority 
of the earth’s surface is out of range for land-
based fighters, so [o]nly carrier air wings can 
provide that capability.
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a combat test, but it does suggest that the current Nimitz- and Ford-class carri-
ers—which were built as improved versions of America—incorporate superior 
survivability�
Bonhomme Richard Fire
USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) was a large amphibious-warfare ship much like 
an aircraft carrier� In July 2020, it was moored at Naval Station San Diego, Cali-
fornia� The ship was undergoing upgrades to allow it to operate F-35B Lightning 
aircraft, as one of the so-called Lightning carriers, such as the most recent USS 
America (LHA 6), a similar large, amphibious warship that recently deployed 
with thirteen F-35B Marine Corps Lightning aircraft�39
Bonhomme Richard then underwent an unintended test of aviation-ship sur-
vivability� On 12 July 2020, the ship suffered a fire that resulted in severe damage� 
It affected eleven of the ship’s fourteen decks, buckled segments of the flight deck, 
damaged the vehicle storage area, and gutted the command-and-control spaces 
located in the ship’s island� The damage was so severe that Bonhomme Richard 
was declared beyond economical repair�40
The blaze demonstrates the vulnerability of large amphibious ships that act as 
light carriers� While ships such as Bonhomme Richard and America look like air-
craft carriers, and in fact are larger than World War II–era flattops such as Frank-
lin, they are not built to the same survivability standard as are full-size carriers�41 
They have little armor; more important, they incorporate little compartmenta-
tion, having large, open spaces that include well decks for landing craft and large 
storage parks for vehicles as key components of their mission to transport and 
land Marines� These characteristics add to the overall vulnerability of amphibious 
ships compared with purpose-built aircraft carriers�
OPTIONS FOR CARRIER SIZE
There are infinite varieties of potential carrier designs� For purposes of this ar-
ticle, it is useful to reduce that variety to three general sizes for consideration�
The Ford-Class CVN
The current Ford-class carrier is in serial production, with a planning goal of 
at least six ships� This was the first carrier designed under the post-Goldwater-
Nichols joint-bureaucratic process� While Ford has essentially the same hull as 
USS Nimitz (CVN 68), changes from Nimitz to Ford originated with Navy par-
ticipation but without the Navy having final decision authority� Many of those 
twenty-three changes were based on undeveloped technologies and have been 
the source of billions of dollars in cost overruns and years of delay�42 They include 
engineering challenges with the electromagnetic catapults (EMALS), advanced 
arrestor gear, and elevators�
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Ford also has been unable, so far, to meet the contracted rate of 160 sorties per 
day�43 The Ford catapult system in particular has not been able yet to match the 
Nimitz sortie-generation capability, which approached 130 sorties per day during 
the initial part of the 2003 Iraq war� But that raises a more fundamental question: 
Is there any need for a higher number of sorties than Nimitz flattops can provide? 
The requirement for a higher number came from a joint requirement committee 
that based it on the old Vietnam War–era Alpha strike, or “aluminum cloud,” 
operation—which no longer is conducted�44
A more serious, as yet unsolved problem that goes beyond mere reliability is 
that if one electromagnetic catapult goes down, all go down� The FY-20 Direc-
tor of Operational Test and Evaluation annual report stated, “[T]he crew cannot 
readily electrically isolate EMALS components during flight operations due to 
the shared nature of the Energy Storage Groups and Power Conversion Sub-
system inverters on board CVN 78 [Ford]� The process for electrically isolating 
equipment is time-consuming; spinning down the EMALS motor/generators 
takes 1�5 hours by itself� This inability precludes EMALS high power mainte-
nance during flight operations�”45
These new, unproven technologies mandated by the joint bureaucracy have 
caused delays that have increased the cost of the first unit to $13�3 billion so 
far� This represents an increase of over $3�3 billion from original estimates—to 
double the cost of the last Nimitz�46
The Ford class, like the Nimitz, can be built in only one shipyard, effectively 
making Newport News Shipbuilding a monopoly� This makes it difficult to ob-
tain innovation or cost savings in construction�
A New Midway-Size CVM
The Midway-class carriers of the immediate post–World War II era were de-
veloped to incorporate all the lessons from the Pacific War� Midway went on 
to serve a forty-six-year career, from 1945 through the 1991 Gulf War� Midway 
was roughly two-thirds the size of Nimitz� While a new Midway-size carrier 
would operate fewer aircraft than Nimitz/Ford vessels, its catapult and arrested-
landing configuration would allow it to operate all current and planned U�S� naval 
aircraft�
Changes in the oil-supply situation, including the U�S� transition from net oil 
importer to exporter, as well as lower prices, would make a new, conventionally 
powered, 65,000-ton carrier much less costly to build and operate than a Ford-
class flattop� There are several options for proven, low-risk, conventional propul-
sion systems, ranging from diesels through gas turbines to combined diesel and 
gas-turbine (CODAG) systems� Nuclear power also is an option, especially using 
existing, proven submarine power plants� A modern Midway-size carrier would 
offer 368,000 square feet of weapons storage and 1�48 million gallons of aviation 
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fuel—not as much as a Nimitz/Ford platform, but enough to support more than 
eighty sorties per day and at least a week of sustained operations�47
A future Midway-size carrier would incorporate all the survivability features 
of the CVNs� These would include extensive watertight compartmentation and 
lighter-weight yet much more effective side protection than heavy belt armor, 
and would incorporate advanced firefighting capability employing the latest 
technology�
LHD/LHA Lightning Carrier
Other platforms often mentioned as candidates to serve as light carriers, or to 
augment the current carrier force, are the ships of the U�S� “big deck” amphibi-
ous force� It consists of Wasp-class landing helicopter docks (LHDs) and the new 
America-class landing helicopter assault ships (LHAs)�
The eight ships of the Wasp (LHD 1) class and the current three Americas are 
amphibious-warfare ships designed for helicopter assault and well-deck-based 
landing operations with embarked U�S� Marines or other ground forces� Weigh-
ing in at over 45,000 tons and stretching almost 850 feet in length, they are nearly 
the size of the original Midway when it commissioned in 1945�48
These ships’ size and aircraft carrier–like flight decks have allowed them to 
operate the AV-8B Harrier II ground-attack aircraft for decades—in a second-
ary role, as an air/ground-attack element of Marine Corps amphibious, and later 
expeditionary, forces� An earlier LHA-class ship, Nassau (LHA 4), acted as a 
carrier during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, and later the small force of six 
Harriers aboard Kearsarge (LHD 3) played an outsize role in 2011’s Operation 
ODYSSEY DAWN against Mu‘ammar Gadhafi’s Libyan forces� As noted earlier, 
America recently deployed with thirteen F-35Bs embarked to test the Lightning 
carrier concept�49
Yet while these ships are large and carrier-like in many ways, they are built to 
a much lower standard of survivability than conventional flattops and are much 
slower, with a best speed of twenty-four knots� The fire on and subsequent deci-
sion to scrap Bonhomme Richard further suggest that the big-deck amphibious 
ship is not a viable carrier design�
NUCLEAR VERSUS CONVENTIONAL PROPULSION:  
COST AND RELATED FACTORS
The U�S� Navy has not built a nonnuclear-powered aircraft carrier since the first 
USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) was commissioned in 1968� The last conventionally 
powered carrier, USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), was decommissioned in 2009�
However, Congress has dropped earlier legislation mandating that all carriers 
be nuclear propelled�50 Another issue that was not appreciated fully in the late 
1970s is that of nuclear carrier defueling and ultimate disposal�
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Nonetheless, the U�S� Navy has been committed to nuclear propulsion for 
aircraft carriers� Yet apart from the operational advantages of nuclear power, 
there are significant cost differentials compared with conventional options� Some 
quick illustrations follow: 
• Acquisition: The current estimated cost of a nuclear plant producing 280,000 
shaft horsepower is $9�7 billion�51 The Navy has not analyzed the current 
estimated cost of a conventional plant producing the same horsepower using 
the latest technology, but it likely would be significantly less than that of the 
nuclear plant�
• Refueling (as part of a regular refueling complex overhaul [RCOH]): The 
cost for a nuclear carrier is $678 million�52
• Defueling: Current cost estimates for defueling and recycling a nuclear 
carrier at retirement range from $750 million to $1�5 billion (depending on 
whether a military or commercial shipyard is used)�53
• Fueling: The Navy has not calculated the current estimated annual cost of 
fueling a conventional carrier with modern diesel, gas-turbine, or CODAG 
propulsion at today’s fuel prices�
• Lost availability: An RCOH takes two years, whereas conventional flattops 
have no comparable loss of operational availability� 
A General Accounting Office study in 1998 put the operating cost differential 
at about 10 percent in favor of conventional propulsion� The Navy believed that 
nuclear propulsion offered 10 percent more in terms of operational advantages, 
most notably in terms of fossil fuel costs�54
Since those studies were conducted, two things have changed� First, technology 
has increased vastly the availability of fossil fuel in the United States; its effective 
average cost today is a small fraction of what it was in the 1990s� Another signifi-
cant difference is that now there is only one (monopoly) shipbuilder for supercar-
riers, leading to the runaway costs of the Ford-class carrier� In the words of a 2017 
RAND study, “[C]ontinuing the Ford-class carrier program imposes high acquisi-
tion cost and might unduly affect the whole of the Navy shipbuilding budget�”55
Other problems, with Ford’s electromagnetic catapults and arresting gear 
and new radar systems, have delayed the ship’s first deployment further� The 
follow-on units to Ford also have continued to see cost increases� Cost estimates 
for Newport News Shipbuilding to design and construct John F. Kennedy have 
increased by $3�58 billion so far�56
The aircraft carrier has been the single most expensive platform in the U�S� 
military ever since World War II, but the cost of the Ford class is out of proportion 
to that of any of its predecessors� There are several reasons for this� It is the first 
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carrier procurement managed by the joint Pentagon bureaucracy established by 
the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the 1980s, rather than by the Navy itself� Joint 
Requirements Oversight Committee inputs added twelve undeveloped technolo-
gies to the design, including electromagnetic catapults, arresting gear, and eleva-
tors, along with new radars and other fundamental elements of the ship’s infra-
structure—none of which existed at the time of the contract, and some of which 
have not been completed or tested successfully even at this writing�57 Some skep-
tics have described the Ford 
carrier as a seagoing camel 
(camel: a horse designed by 
a committee)� The ship was 
authorized in FY-08� Now, 
thirteen years later, the cost so 
far, in 2008 dollars, is over $14 
billion—and still climbing, since not all of its systems have been fully certified�58 
By contrast, the first ship of the Nimitz class (roughly the same size as Ford) took 
nine years from contract (1967) to deployment (1976) and cost $4 billion in 2008 
dollars, adjusted for inflation� (Nimitz cost about $1 billion in 1975 dollars�)59
Required maintenance also restricts carrier availability� Even a dozen super-
carriers cannot meet the demands from the regional combatant commanders 
(COCOMs)� The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 gave COCOMs the authority 
to issue demand signals for forces, and in effect force the Navy to provide more 
carriers for their operations, even when it means the ships forgo required main-
tenance and their crews’ required training�60
REQUIRED NUMBERS
The Korean War demonstrated a calculus that has remained consistent to the 
present day� For every deployed flattop, the Navy must possess three: the first 
carrier on station; the second in the shipyard undergoing refit; and the third in 
the training cycle, preparing to deploy�
Since the 1970s, carrier deployments have been concentrated in three hubs: 
the Mediterranean Sea, the western Pacific Ocean, and the Arabian Sea� The force 
requirements to maintain combat-credible power in those regions have played a 
prominent role in determining both the numbers of carriers needed and the size 
of the rest of the fleet�
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, the number of 
flattops required declined to twelve� The hope was that a dozen carriers could 
provide the appropriate global deterrent, perform Middle East war-fighting mis-
sions, and conduct presence operations in at least one other deployment region, 
as stipulated in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review document�61
COCOMs—not surprisingly—prefer to hold 
on to naval forces for as long as they can. 
These regional demands are being met at the 
cost of grinding down the ships and sailors.
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The Navy has tried to stretch the eleven-carrier force to cover the demands 
of the COCOMS; however, the Navy has learned—and relearned the hard way—
that the service cannot do more with less� The tried-and-true system of three 
carriers in rotation, intended to keep one forward-deployed, was able—in the 
emergency circumstances of wartime—to provide instead two out of the three; 
but that cannot be maintained in peacetime without severe damage to retention, 
maintenance, and readiness� That is where we are today� The Navy needs more 
ships�
Recent deployment lengths suggest this shortage is not going away� In January 
2020, the carrier Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) set a dubious record in making a 
yearlong deployment—the longest of any flattop since the Vietnam War�62 Dwight 
D. Eisenhower and Theodore Roosevelt made nine-month deployments in 2020�63 
George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) has completed a nine-month deployment, Carl 
Vinson (CVN 70) completed a 9�5-month deployment, and Theodore Roosevelt 
will complete an 8�5-month deployment in 2021�64 Despite strenuous efforts 
by a succession of SECNAVs and CNOs to reduce the length of carrier deploy-
ments, they have failed� Since the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1987, the CNO 
has no authority over the ships once they deploy in response to a request from a 
COCOM, and COCOMs—not surprisingly—prefer to hold on to naval forces for 
as long as they can� These regional demands are being met at the cost of grinding 
down the ships and sailors� Again: The Navy does not have enough ships�
The last Trump administration SECDEF, Mark T� Esper, did not support add-
ing carriers to the fleet� He suggested that as few as eight carriers and no more 
than eleven were needed� He called for replacing them with alternative force 
structures, including unmanned surface and subsurface units�65 These hopes are 
naive; many of the notional low-end platforms suggested as carrier replacements, 
and the logistics needed to support a large number of such units in a distributed 
deployment, simply do not exist�
The Navy cannot afford the time needed to travel—again—down the road 
of troubled joint ship classes when a rapid expansion of fleet capability is sorely 
needed now�
AN ELEVEN-CARRIER NAVY IN A FIFTEEN-CARRIER WORLD
The immediate post–World War II U�S� Navy and its Cold War successor embod-
ied a mix of capabilities in both high- and low-end units� Both navies, however, 
were built around carriers, as combat from the 1940s to the 1980s Falklands War 
proved that surface combatants cannot operate in the absence of sea-based air 
superiority� The carrier is not the only USN offensive platform that can strike 
targets ashore; other surface ships and submarines provide significant capability 
in terms of missile firepower� However, the carrier is the only platform that can 
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provide a mobile dome of 24/7 air superiority over the 71 percent of the earth’s 
surface covered by seawater� Carriers exist to protect the missile shooters as much 
as to conduct strikes themselves� Even distributed, low-end missile shooters, 
manned or unmanned, will require air superiority� And naval or other military 
supply ships, commercial tankers, transports—none of these can survive on the 
surface of the sea without air superiority above them�
The current great-power competition is playing out in at least three major 
geographic areas� Given the Chinese navy’s growth and hostile intent, the geog-
raphy of the Indo-Pacific—containing few and limited land bases—is a matter of 
particular concern�
Considering the current and increasing commitments of U�S� naval forces to 
multiple deployment hubs, the corrosive strain those deployments have placed on 
the current carrier fleet, the absence of any suitable alternative platform or sys-
tem, and the lack of any available replacements for our current carriers, it is ur-
gent that we build a larger carrier fleet than the present eleven- or twelve-flattop 
force� An increased level of sea-based aviation is of paramount importance, so 
more aircraft carriers are needed� However, they need not all be nuclear-powered 
supercarriers�
Factors
This article confirms the irreplaceable value of sea-based aviation as provided by 
the aircraft carrier, and it tees up the choices regarding that platform� A robust 
carrier force is required if the U�S� Navy is to do its part in assuring allies and 
partners of its credibility to deter and, if necessary, compel opponents to cease 
hostile actions and support war termination on terms favorable to the United 
States, its allies, and partners�
The following summarized principles apply�
Missions. The missions for airpower at sea in the third decade of the twenty-first 
century remain robust and varied as the Navy returns to great-power competition 
with China and Russia� As noted above, the Indo-Pacific region, and the Arctic 
as well, offers few locations for land-based aviation� Regions more familiar from 
recent U�S� combat action, such as the eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, do 
offer provisions for land-based aviation, but shifting political climates can limit 
access, and improved ballistic- and cruise-missile technologies threaten all fixed 
installations�
These geographic and political issues suggest that carrier-based aviation will 
remain a vital component of U�S� joint-force action in forward locations not only 
at the beginning of but throughout any sustained conflict� The carrier and its 
embarked aircraft are agile in their missions and can shift at short notice from 
performing sea control to power projection ashore to humanitarian-service 
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operations� The need for robust airpower at sea will remain a constant for the 
near future�
Survivability. No surface warship is more survivable than the large aircraft car-
rier� Dispersal of forces among smaller flattops might reduce susceptibility to at-
tack, but any flattop smaller than fifty thousand tons displacement will be more 
vulnerable to and less able to recover from damage�
The return to active competition with the Soviet Navy in the 1980s (after a 
focus on air strikes ashore in Vietnam) led to innovations in operations that 
reduced carrier vulnerability� The new Chinese and returning Russian threats 
likewise will spur a return to a more aggressive carrier posture at sea, with more 
deception operations to reduce vulnerability�66
Just as threats have increased, so have the carrier’s defenses� These come in 
the form of attack-submarine escorts, antisubmarine helicopters, and constantly 
improving technology in its Aegis escorts�
Finally, if carriers are attacked successfully, the accidents of the 1960s and the 
recent SINKEX of the ex–USS America suggest that large carriers can survive 
tremendous punishment� The recent Bonhomme Richard fire tells us, however, 
that ships not purpose-built as 
fleet carriers may suffer cata-
strophic failure even in cases 
of moderate damage, and 
they lack the ability of larger 
flattops to return to flight 
operations after taking heavy 
damage� Amphibious-warfare 
ships such as Bonhomme Richard can support Marine aviation in a ground-
support role and might serve as auxiliary carriers in low-threat regions, but they 
cannot pretend to be fleet carriers�
Numbers. How many carriers does the U�S� Navy need to carry out its global 
operations? Adversaries may change but geography does not, and analyses from 
diverse periods (the 1980s, 1993 [the Bottom-Up Review], and 2015) suggest that 
the U�S� Navy needs at least fifteen carriers to cover three deployment hubs effec-
tively without prematurely exhausting both the ships themselves and the sailors 
who crew them�67 Actual wartime operations likely would require more flattops�
Cruise missiles launched by surface ships are an important component of na-
val power, but it would take dozens of those ships—as well as a currently nonex-
istent rearming and resupply force to keep enough of them at sea—to serve as an 
effective deterrent or a sustained strike capability� Even then, they would require 
an escorting carrier to protect them from aerial attack�
A new, twenty-first-century design of the size 
of . . . USS Midway and supporting an air 
wing of sixty to sixty-five aircraft could serve 
as a complement to the larger nuclear flattops 
while still incorporating rugged survivability 
and being capable of independent operations.
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Cost. The Ford class is too expensive for it to be the ship that increases the carrier 
fleet� A smaller, conventionally powered flattop that is large enough to support a 
sixty-five-plane air wing would take advantage of the new U�S� status as a net oil 
provider to operate at a lower cost than can a nuclear flattop�
Above all, a carrier of this size can be built competitively—in multiple yards, by 
more than one builder—and that competition will improve innovation and drive 
down costs� Restoring competition in the defense marketplace, for both ideas and 
products, is essential if we are to regain control of the current runaway costs�
Choices
The Navy needs fully capable, nuclear-powered carriers� The Nimitz class rep-
resents one such option, but half of the operational lifespan of those vessels is 
already behind them�
The Ford class, encumbered with immature technologies and a rising price tag, 
cannot be the only carrier solution going forward into the next decade� Increas-
ing threats from peer competitors and regional powers demand a mix of carrier 
capabilities�
The existing USN big-deck amphibious warships—LHDs of the Wasp class 
and LHAs of the America class—have been adapted as Lightning carriers, em-
barking upward of two F-35 squadrons� However, they are too slow, they lack 
survivability, and in the absence of catapults they cannot support the vital early-
warning and electronic-warfare aircraft crucial to the success of the strike/air-
defense aircraft�
A new, twenty-first-century design of the size of the very successful USS 
Midway and supporting an air wing of sixty to sixty-five aircraft could serve 
as a complement to the larger nuclear flattops while still incorporating rugged 
survivability and being capable of independent operations� Such a ship could be 
designed and built in far less time than Ford, could be built competitively in more 
than one shipyard, and would cost far less� Even if, for industrial-base reasons, 
such a ship were nuclear powered, it might use reactors already developed for 
our submarine fleet�
The aircraft carrier’s roles and missions have remained controversial in the 
hundred years since its introduction to world navies� Critics have declared that 
carriers could not survive bombs from dirigibles, battleship guns, dive-bombers, 
kamikazes, submarine torpedoes, cruise missiles, sea-skimming supersonic mis-
siles, ballistic missiles, and hypersonic missiles�68 Yet in the age-old seesaw of 
offense versus defense, carrier critics consistently have been proved wrong�
Since World War II, the U�S� Navy has faced existential questions concern-
ing the future of the flattop on three distinct occasions (in 1949, during the late 
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1970s, and during the early 1990s), in addition to the current debate over carrier 
choices� All those debates eventually were resolved in favor of the carrier’s con-
tinued role in naval operations� It remains clear that the aircraft carrier should 
continue as the centerpiece of USN combat power� Submarine- and surface-
launched missiles are indeed important components of naval combat power, but 
they cannot replace the carrier�
The authors believe that the ships presented here constitute a complete set 
of practical candidates� Unending debate about and continued drift among the 
carrier choices presented by the executive and legislative branches, as well as 
the Navy itself, will result only in further erosion of naval capability, and thus 
national security�
In our judgment, the best choice is the Midway-size CVM carrier� It would be 
big enough to carry a full, three-dimensional air wing; could make speeds well 
above thirty knots; would deploy the highest-technology, close-in, electronic, 
cyber, and kinetic defenses; and would enjoy all the survivability of the Nimitz 
and Ford classes, not only owing to size but by incorporating multiple hulls, 
armored decks and side protection, full watertight compartmentation, and the 
latest firefighting technology� Finally, such a carrier would be small enough to be 
built in at least four American shipyards at a competitive price, at a fraction of 
what the Ford class costs�
The Navy—not a joint or multiservice committee—should design and procure 
this ship, and then the Navy must be held accountable� It is time to make a choice 
and proceed to construction�
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 Ironically, it was an arms-control treaty that set the U�S� Navy on the course of building a fleet centered on fast, large-displacement, heavy-tonnage, full-flight-
deck aircraft carriers� Such ships sometimes are referred to as supercarriers�
THE HISTORICAL PROGRESSION
The First Carriers
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1921–22—now at its hundredth anniversary—
was an attempt by President Warren G� Harding and his Secretary of State, 
Charles Evans Hughes, to restrain a global naval arms race, particularly the naval 
competition among Great Britain, the United States, and Japan�1 Idealism played 
a role, but there also was huge financial incentive; for the United States, with its 
army rapidly demobilized following World War I, naval expenditure was one of 
the largest federal government outlays�2 And the most expensive platform was 
the battleship—the capital ship of its day� Much as nuclear warheads were during 
the later SALT/START era, battleships were the 
ultimate measure of military power�3
In contrast, the fledgling aircraft carrier consti-
tuted an auxiliary issue during treaty negotiations, 
and for the United States and Britain an aggregate 
limit of 135,000 tons eventually was set, rather than 
any specific number of platforms; imperial Japan 
would be permitted 81,000 tons, per the 5 : 5 : 3 for-
mula that guided the conference�4 However, there 
were some sublimits; no future carrier individually 
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was to exceed 27,000 tons displacement (nor carry any gun larger than an eight-
inch)� By the time of the treaty, Britain—which had invented the all-aviation war-
ship—had commissioned five aircraft carriers, with two others under construc-
tion� All except the first displaced between 26,000 and 29,000 tons—the obvious 
source of the treaty limit on individual ships� In contrast, the United States had 
not yet commissioned its first carrier, USS Langley (CV 1), which was a converted 
collier that would have a displacement of approximately 14,000 tons at full load� 
Japan was building its first aircraft carrier—the world’s first purpose-built carrier 
constructed from the keel up, not a conversion—IJN Hosho, displacing slightly 
less than 10,000 tons�5 In consideration of the Royal Navy’s advantage, the treaty 
conference declared Langley and Hosho to be “experimental,” thereby not counting 
against the tonnage limit�6
To American naval aviation, the 135,000-ton limit was actually a godsend� The 
U�S� Congress had expressed no interest previously in ever building an aircraft 
carrier fleet to that aggregate size, and in its long-range planning for the construc-
tion of future carriers the Navy leadership had expected much less from a fiscally 
conservative Congress�7 Yet throughout the life of the treaty, the Department of 
the Navy was able to argue that the legislature needed to authorize building to 
that limit to maintain parity with the other treaty signatories—an argument that 
Congress eventually accepted�8
More importantly, there was another method of appealing to frugality� 
In addition to the United States disposing of older battleships and cruisers to 
achieve treaty limits in their respective categories, there were a number of under- 
construction warships, authorized during World War I but not completed, that 
would need to be scrapped� The American delegation to the Washington Confer-
ence proposed that each of the principal naval powers be allowed to convert two 
unfinished hulls into carriers, even if their displacements exceeded the 27,000-
ton individual limit� Although this was of no advantage to a Royal Navy that was 
almost at its aggregate limit already, the proposal was accepted� As the U�S� Navy 
already had selected two unfinished battle cruisers, both of which likely would 
displace 33,000 tons, the conference agreed to 33,000 as the conversion limit� 
From this conversion came USS Lexington (CV 2) and USS Saratoga (CV 3)�9 
Until construction of USS Midway (CV 41) in 1945, they were the biggest and 
fastest (thirty-one-plus knots) aircraft carriers the United States had built� Their 
large hulls and flight decks allowed them to accommodate the steadily increasing 
size of naval aircraft without the need for continual modification�10
Small Carriers and the Flying-Deck Cruiser
The true significance of the acquisition of Lexington and Saratoga is that—until 
the two ships proved their superiority in the fleet battle problems of the late 
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1920s—even the staunchest supporters of naval aviation within the Navy’s lead-
ership were convinced that a larger number of smaller carriers would be more 
operationally effective than a smaller number of supercarriers�11
Rear Admiral William A� Moffett, the first chief of the Department of the Na-
vy’s Bureau of Aeronautics—and often considered the father of naval aviation—
was one of those so convinced�12 While pleased with the commissioning of Lex-
ington and Saratoga—whose allowance he himself essentially had arranged, as an 
influential expert assigned to the Washington Conference—Moffett frequently 
stated that “there is a far greater flight deck area available on a large number of 
small ships than a small number of large ships�”13
Following the Washington Conference, Moffett drew up proposals for five car-
riers of 13,800 tons—the smallest tonnage that could provide a flight deck of ac-
ceptable length�14 With 66,000 of the 135,000 tons permitted by treaty taken up by 
Lexington and Saratoga, the five small carriers would bring the Navy to the treaty 
limit while maximizing the number of flight decks�
However, Moffett considered the resulting seven total carriers to be insuffi-
cient, so he drafted an additional proposal for the construction of eight hybrid 
“flying deck cruisers�”15 Such a vessel would retain its forward emplaced guns but 
would have a flight deck covering most of the ship aft of the deckhouse� Mof-
fett’s argument was that, as cruisers, these ships would not count under the treaty 
limitations on carriers�16 Estimated tonnage for each of these vessels was 10,000 
tons—the limit for cruisers�17
The flying-deck cruiser actually gained the support of the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), Admiral William V� Pratt, who—unlike Moffett—viewed 
it more as a cruiser than a small carrier�18 However, the Navy General Board, 
whose recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy effectively took prece-
dence over the individual views of the CNO (until Admiral Ernest J� King be-
came CNO as well as Commander in Chief, U�S� Fleet, in March 1942), was 
cool to the idea, rejecting it first in 1925�19 The follow-on to the Washington 
Conference, the London Naval Conference of 1930, retained the 135,000-ton 
limit on aircraft carriers�20 This caused the General Board to reconsider, and 
Secretary of the Navy Charles F� Adams requested $20 million for an experi-
mental flying-deck cruiser in the Navy’s fiscal year (FY) 1932 budget request to 
Congress—unsuccessfully�21 There were at least two congressional supporters, 
but by then expenditures for the Navy no longer were a priority�22 With the 
onset of the Great Depression, neither the 13,800-ton small carriers nor the 
10,000-ton flying-deck cruisers were built� Congress simply would not provide 
the money, and by the mid-1930s few in the naval leadership viewed either 
solution as a cost-effective method of massing airpower at sea�
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Every Ship a Carrier?
Additionally, Moffett advocated that all ships, from battleship to destroyer, 
should embark aircraft: floatplanes (seaplanes), launched from trainable cata-
pults� On their return, such planes would land on the ocean surface, then be 
winched back aboard� Tests proved that installation on destroyers was impracti-
cal; however, many battleships and cruisers were fitted with two scout aircraft� 
Moffett had argued for at least four—two scouts and two fighters� Proposed for 
the biggest ships was an addition of two bombers, for a total of six planes� In his 
estimate, these aircraft could conduct “small scale” offensive operations until the 
arrival of a carrier�23
Selected ships retained and operated catapult aircraft in World War II for 
scouting and for spotting for gunfire, particularly when carriers were not avail-
able (such as at the 1944 Normandy invasion)� However, the physical limitations 
of such seaplanes made them incapable of dueling with wheeled carrier aircraft 
and most land-based planes� The pre–World War II Navy was never afraid to 
retain “legacy systems” that might prove useful, and it experimented with and op-
erated seaplanes from combatants for twenty-four years� But the sea itself proved 
too treacherous a landing deck, regardless of its “low acquisition cost�” Not only 
was it difficult to mass effects from small numbers of dispersed seaplanes—all of 
them inferior in combat capabilities to their land-based counterparts—but the 
environment itself proved the concept impracticable, and conducting small-scale 
offensive operations appeared suicidal�
However, technology did demonstrate eventually (about forty years after Mof-
fett’s proposal) that the concept of every ship being able to carry aircraft was, in 
fact, viable—once the helicopter was perfected� Starting in the 1970s, the U�S� Na-
vy’s Light Airborne Multipurpose System (LAMPS) embarked at least one aircraft 
(helicopter), and often two, on almost all cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, while 
a landing spot for a visiting helicopter was added to almost every other type of 
naval vessel�
These were very specialized aircraft, primarily designed for low, slow, anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) operations, not for contesting with carrier-based 
conventional aircraft� LAMPS—like the problematic, preceding, drone antisub-
marine helicopter (known as DASH) program and the subsequent embarked-
drone aircraft of today—could be said to “conduct ‘small scale’ offensive opera-
tions until the arrival of a carrier�”24 But that is only to conduct several specialized 
missions, in which the aircraft in question remain highly vulnerable to attack by 
conventional aircraft�25 The most advanced vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing 
(V/STOL) aircraft—even if they could be operated from ships smaller than big-
deck amphibious warships—cannot match the range, lift capacity, or combat ef-
fectiveness of carrier aircraft (despite vociferous claims to the contrary by their 
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proponents)�26 In any case, the concept clearly has yet to be proved as a substitute 
for a large-deck, all-aviation ship�
The Light Carrier Experience: USS Ranger
Moffett continued to consider the advantages of numerous smaller carriers, even 
as the speed and size of USS Saratoga enabled its famous simulated surprise at-
tack on the Panama Canal in 1929�27 Less heralded—perhaps because it seemed 
so disturbing in the light of subsequent events—was Lexington and Saratoga’s 
combined simulated surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in 1932�28 Rear Admiral Jo-
seph M� Reeves, Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, gradually had in-
creased the aircraft complement of Saratoga, as well as on the small, slow Langley; 
while Saratoga was rated at seventy-four aircraft, Reeves increased its air wing to 
ninety, and Langley’s aircraft load was doubled from twenty-four to forty-eight�29
Theoretically, two small carriers could provide the same number of aircraft in 
the air if they could be operated together against one lone large carrier� But what 
bedeviled Moffett—as it has every other small-carrier proponent up to today—is 
that he could not build a suitably capable smaller carrier for half the price of a 
larger ship that would have more than double the combat effectiveness� In building 
USS Ranger (CV 4) at 18,000 tons full displacement, he was able to keep the finan-
cial cost (in contemporaneous dollars) to approximately half the final construction 
cost of either Lexington or Saratoga, but it was at the opportunity cost of speed, 
survivability (no underwater protection, and consistently overweight in terms of 
sea keeping), and aircraft and weapons load� (In addition, the final costs of Lexing-
ton and Saratoga, which included a 90 percent overrun, were magnified by the na-
ture of their conversion, so they were not considered representative�) Ranger, com-
missioned in 1934, initially could not carry torpedo bombers—which took on a 
greater significance during World War II than it bore at the ship’s commissioning�30
More importantly, Ranger’s small size meant that it could not keep up with 
the continuing increases in size and maintenance requirements of newer aircraft, 
unlike Lexington and Saratoga and subsequent large carriers� This increase was 
required particularly to match the fighting capabilities of Japanese aircraft� So 
as aircraft on both sides became more capable, Ranger slipped toward obsoles-
cence�31 The result was that the naval leadership deemed World War II Pacific 
operations too dangerous for Ranger, so it was kept in the Atlantic, where opera-
tions against U-boats were considered to be of slower pace and where the ship 
would not face attack by massed enemy aircraft� Ranger did participate in support 
of Operation TORCH and the North Africa landings�32 However, its overall contri-
butions were not considered significant, because land-based aircraft were readily 
available in the European theater�33
Rear Admiral Moffett did not live to see the commissioning of Ranger; he 
died in the crash of the airship USS Akron (ZRS 4) in 1933� However, a series of 
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“carrier spectrum studies” conducted prior to and during the development of 
Ranger estimated that four thousand additional tons of aircraft carrier displace-
ment resulted in the ability to add fifteen more aircraft—which was why Ranger 
was built with an 18,000-ton displacement rather than the 13,800 that would have 
provided five carriers under the treaty�34 But an additional four thousand on top 
of that might have added even more� Thus, the overall conclusion was that large 
carriers could be built at less of a relative incremental cost than was possible by 
restricting them to a smaller size� Reportedly, Moffett later in his career expressed 
regret at the decision to build Ranger� Moffett’s biographer William Trimble sum-
marized the admiral’s conclusions, as contained in a 1931 letter to the Secretary 
of the Navy, as follows: “greater displacement, he argued, allowed higher speed, 
more compartmentalization, armor protection for machinery and magazine 
spaces, and more hangar and flight deck space�”35 The experiment did not work�36
The follow-on Yorktown (CV 5) and Enterprise (CV 6) were each of 25,000 
tons full displacement� Another small carrier, USS Wasp (CV 7), similar to Rang-
er, was built at 18,000 tons displacement; however, it had been approved in 1934, 
before Ranger proved itself inadequate�37 Subsequent fleet carriers were built at 
34,000 tons full displacement�
The Light and Escort Carriers of World War II
The U�S� Navy did build light and escort carriers to complement fleet carriers 
during World War II� Most were vessels specialized for the escort of convoys, air 
support for amphibious operations, and ASW� Flattops of their type were consid-
ered “mobilization carriers�” Many were converted civilian ships� The inexorable 
requirement to build warships as quickly as possible precluded taking the time 
necessary to construct an all-large-carrier force� To some extent, these ships were 
considered expendable—and some were expended� Again, the Navy needed mass 
and numbers, given the attrition inevitable in warfare�
The twenty-fifth through the thirtieth USN aircraft carriers were considered 
“light carriers” or “austere carriers” and were designated CVL� Each was built 
in two years or less, most were commissioned in 1943, and they sacrificed size 
and survivability for speed of construction�38 Using materials already in the pro-
duction pipeline, some were built on cruiser hulls�39 Their displacements ranged 
from 16,000 to 19,000 tons� The Navy intended to operate them alongside the 
large fleet carriers (within large, carrier-centered battle groups)—as wingmen, if 
you will—not independently�40 The ratio of propulsion plant to displacement was 
proportionally large, to generate the thirty-knot speed necessary to keep up with 
the larger fleet carriers� The CVLs’ goal was to provide as much additional air 
cover to the task force as possible� Operating within (and protected by) the task 
force, all these ships survived the war; however, “they did not lend themselves to 
the changing requirements of carrier aviation post war�”41
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Escort carriers (CVEs) were built only to support the escorting of convoys 
(ASW), amphibious operations, and such duties as transporting aircraft (includ-
ing land-based aircraft) to replace losses in the island campaigns�42 Some were 
of new construction, some were conversions; a total of 120 were built during 
the war�43 Many were built for the Royal Navy� Again, speed of construction was 
everything; some were readied in ten months, from launch to commissioning� 
Their displacements ranged from 10,000 to 14,000 tons� Flight decks were one-
third the size of those of fleet carriers�
With an average maximum speed of twenty knots, the CVEs could not operate 
with a battle group� During amphibious operations they were expected to remain 
under the air cover provided by the large fleet carriers or land-based U�S� Ma-
rine aviation, if the Marines were established ashore�44 Protection against surface 
warships and submarines was provided by cruisers and destroyers� If the CVEs 
encountered Japanese ships when they were without protective carrier air cover 
(such as in the October 1944 battle of Samar), they were expected to withdraw� 
At Samar, a force of escort carriers and destroyers fought off a Japanese force, but 
at a loss of two CVEs by surface fire (plus two destroyers and a destroyer escort) 
and over one thousand sailors—more than at the Battles of the Coral Sea and 
Midway combined�45
CVLs and CVEs were built to provide additional mass and numbers, to over-
whelm Japanese forces� To put that in perspective, the Japanese entered World 
War II with eight carriers and built twenty-one total CV, CVL, and CVE equiva-
lents during the war, whereas the United States entered World War II with eight 
fleet carriers (split between two oceans), then built 146 carriers of all sizes during 
the war (that number is dependent on the counting rules)� To repeat: 21 versus 
146�
CVLs and CVEs never were expected to substitute for fleet carriers� Rather, 
they depended on fleet carriers for their survival�46
Postwar Carriers
USS Midway (CV 41) was the first aircraft carrier completed after the war, al-
though its construction was started during the war� With an original displace-
ment of approximately 45,000 tons, the ship dwarfed all previous carriers� It was 
the lead ship of an eight-carrier class�
Midway served for forty-seven years� Its large size allowed it and two counter-
parts, Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV 42) and Coral Sea (CV 43), to be converted to 
handle jet aircraft via the addition of an angled flight deck (among other modi-
fications)� A handful of the previous, smaller, World War II Essex-class carriers 
also were converted to handle jets, allowing them to take their turn on Yankee 
Station during the Vietnam War� The unconverted ships of the Midway class went 
on to other duties; for example, USS Valley Forge (CV 45) and the even older 
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Essex-class USS Boxer (CV 21) could be considered the first amphibious assault 
ships, comparable in concept to today’s USS America (LHA 6), which, like Valley 
Forge, does not have a well deck and displaces 45,000 tons�47
The bureaucratically bloody Department of Defense fight in 1949 over the 
proposed supercarrier United States (80,000 tons) resulted in cancelation of the 
program and a seeming repudiation of the value of the big-deck carrier—largely 
under the assumption that the next war would consist of nuclear strikes con-
ducted by U�S� Air Force bombers� For many of the Navy participants, it took on 
the appearance of a fight for the service’s very existence (along with that of the 
U�S� Marine Corps)�48
However, subsequent to the cancelation, real-world requirements dramatically 
changed perceptions and assumptions� The swift advance of the North Korean 
army into the South captured almost all land air bases available to the South Ko-
rean and U�S� air forces, so the initial means of applying airpower was the remain-
ing World War II–era aircraft carriers� Thus, when the six-ship USS Forrestal 
class was built (1952–61), there was much less opposition�49 Again, the perception 
was that the fast, large-displacement, heavy-tonnage, full-flight-deck aircraft car-
rier had been determined to be both necessary and combat proven�
Lingering Proposals and Alternatives
This did not mean that alternative proposals disappeared�50 The continuing 
development of the helicopter and the prospective development of V/STOL 
technology inspired a continuing search for (presumably) lower-cost alternatives�
Helicopters certainly could not provide the capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft, 
but they could land Marines ashore, thereby bypassing the difficulties of surface 
amphibious landings� Therefore, supposedly lower-cost, specialized, “big deck” 
amphibious assault ships—which could remove this mission from the lengthy 
mission sets of conventional carriers—were justified�51
Great hopes were placed that V/STOL aircraft development would allow for 
smaller carriers that did not require long flight decks, catapults, and arresting 
gear� From 1972 to 1978, and particularly during the administration of President 
Jimmy Carter, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Navy examined a 
bevy of small-carrier proposals�52
Frequently noted is CNO Admiral Elmo R� Zumwalt Jr�’s proposal for a V/
STOL-carrying “sea control ship�”53 However, Zumwalt himself directed the pro-
posal to the specific mission of ASW, not as an alternative to the large air wings 
and immense strike capabilities of large carriers�54 From Zumwalt’s perspective, 
the search for alternatives constituted a quest to reduce the unit cost of ships to 
“recover from the disastrous slide” in the total number of ships in the overall 
fleet as the result of the retirement of the remaining (albeit modernized) World 
War II inventory�55
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The constant refrain of these proposals was the need to reduce the per-unit 
acquisition costs of ships, and the view that the increasing costs of large-carrier 
construction—resulting primarily from the inclusion of emerging technologies, 
along with the increasing cost of labor and materials, plus inflation—made the 
ships “unaffordable�”56 However, this bumped up against the conundrum that 
V/STOL aircraft simply could not match conventional, fixed-wing aircraft in 
any mission area�57 The physical reality is that the power and thrust required to 
lift aircraft vertically result in a necessary reduction in carrying load and fuel, 
as well as a potential reduction in speed as a result of configuration�58 V/STOL 
aircraft could not compete effectively (or even survive) in an airspace dominated 
by capable, conventional military aircraft; rather, they could operate effectively 
only in conditions of limited opposing air threats�59 The development of the “ski 
jump” that allowed V/STOL aircraft to be launched via a “rolling start” could 
increase carrying load and range, since less power and fuel would be required 
at takeoff—but not so significant an improvement that they could approach the 
capabilities of conventional carrier aircraft�60 Meanwhile, development of the 
Nimitz-class, nuclear-powered, large-deck carrier (90,000 tons full-load dis-
placement) had begun�
The debates on alternatives came to a climax when President Carter vetoed the 
FY-79 defense bill since it included long-term funding for a fourth Nimitz-class 
carrier� However, the ship eventually was reinstated owing to the requirement for 
unprecedented operations in the Indian Ocean to counter the global expansion 
of the Soviet Navy, as well as trouble in the Middle East in the wake of the fun-
damentalist revolution in Iran� To respond to these challenges, nuclear-powered, 
large-deck carriers appeared necessary�61
One rather slender argument made in favor of the U�S� Navy’s examination of 
other carrier configurations was that the Soviet Navy had adopted them success-
fully� If the Soviet Navy thought it could challenge the U�S� Navy on the high seas, 
it was postulated, there must be something to these configurations—particularly 
if they could be built more cheaply than a large, nuclear-powered CV�62
Of particular interest were the Kiev-class “heavy aviation cruisers” or “heavy 
aircraft-carrying cruisers�” Kiev and its sisters appeared to be more-formidable 
warships than any individual platform in the U�S� inventory� Their foredecks bris-
tled with awesome displays of cruise and surface-to-air missiles� These included 
the SS-N-12 Sandbox (nuclear capable), the SA-N-3 Shtorm, the SA-N-4 Gecko, 
the SUW-N-1 ASW rocket (nuclear capable), and the RBU-6000 depth charge 
system� Additionally, they carried 76 mm guns, torpedo tubes, and an assortment 
of close-in weapons� Their afterdecks were taken up with an angled flight deck 
that could accommodate a mix of thirty-two V/STOL aircraft and helicopters�63 
Essentially, they were Moffett’s flying-deck cruisers�
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However, by the later stages of the Cold War it became apparent that although 
the Kiev class was capable of performing modest strike-at-sea missions, it was 
not designed to provide the capabilities of an aircraft carrier� It had a special-
ized mission: defending the Soviet nuclear strategic-ballistic-missile bastions in 
waters close to the Soviet Union�64 This was a mission that the U�S� Navy obvi-
ously did not have� The missions that the U�S� Navy did have required capabilities 
beyond those offered by combat-limited V/STOL aircraft� The flying-deck cruis-
ers—as devastating as they seemed visually—simply did not fit U�S� operational 
requirements�
THREE POINTS FOR DISCUSSION
What can one conclude from this history? Three points identify themselves�
The first is that—operationally—the U�S� Navy has sound reasons for prefer-
ring a large-deck aircraft carrier over any smaller variant�65 History is our truest 
laboratory, and fast, large-displacement, heavy-tonnage, full-flight-deck aircraft 
carriers have proved superior in war� With nuclear power plants, they are globally 
deployable� They are not some sort of naval fetish�
Second, the argument that small carriers can substitute for them—even in a 
world of modern technology—is unproven�66 They certainly could not during 
World War II, nor in subsequent naval operations� V/STOL aircraft remain a less-
capable substitute for conventional carrier aircraft�67 One can speculate regarding 
the damage a People’s Liberation Army DF-21 missile might effect if it struck a 
large carrier—but first it would have to hit it, which would be far from certain in 
a war characterized by deception and a struggle for use of the electromagnetic 
environment�68 A small carrier, if struck, is less likely to survive� Again, this was 
demonstrated in World War II�
The third point is that, in the end, the debate over aircraft carriers always boils 
down to cost� Their acquisition costs are much higher than for other ships and 
other single-item defense programs, making them a natural target for criticism� 
Yet that always has been true� The conversion costs of Lexington and Saratoga 
were estimated initially at $21 million each, but their final costs were $40 million 
apiece—a nearly 90 percent cost overrun� And yes, there were a lot of scream-
ing critics at the time—including congressmen� Combined with a simplistic per-
ception of vulnerability, high costs tend to cause critics to declare aircraft carri-
ers “unaffordable” and “vulnerable�”69 However, it is very fair to ask—as former 
Secretary of the Navy John F� Lehman and Steven Wills phrase the question—
“Compared to what?”70
As Norman Friedman writes, “The belief that somehow the aviation com-
munity and the carrier designers are conspiring to hide the real advantages of 
smaller and less expensive carriers persists to this day�”71 However, small does 
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not inevitably prove to be less expensive� An interesting acquisition case study 
would be to investigate whether the total spent (for ships, modules, and required 
developmental programs) of the Littoral Combat Ship program—in which ships 
already are starting to be decommissioned—would have bought one carrier or 
two (particularly if, as Lehman and Wills propose, they were the size of a non-
nuclear USS Midway)�72
Likewise, instead of proposing only to reduce the carrier force to fund oth-
er defense programs, it is logical and analytically sound to ask which programs 
could be reduced or eliminated to fund carriers—especially if we are firm in our 
desire to avoid another Afghanistan-type commitment and to adjust our defense 
resources accordingly� After all, aircraft carriers are combat-proven systems, 
while their vulnerability to modern military technology remains unproven�73
To suggest a more thorough study of alternatives that includes a fair hearing 
for high capabilities as well as lesser ones does not necessarily represent unquali-
fied support for large aircraft carriers�74 On the other hand, neither does it mean 
they should be rejected summarily�
A POSTSCRIPT: DID THE PLAN CONSIDER THE FLYING-DECK 
CRUISER—AND REJECT IT?
The first People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) aircraft carrier, the ex–Soviet 
Navy Varyag (now Liaoning), ostensibly was purchased by a “private” People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) company for conversion into a floating casino; it never 
became a casino� That is a story well known�75 A second carrier was built to the 
same specifications� The third (and larger) carrier now under construction is 
an attempt to incorporate new technologies developed for the latest U�S� carrier, 
such as the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (i�e�, EMALS)�76
Less known is the fact that PRC companies also purchased two of the four ex-
Soviet Kiev-class heavy-aviation cruisers, ostensibly as theme-park attractions� 
Neither was particularly successful in that intended role� The first (ex-Kiev) later 
was converted into a “luxury” hotel (reported to be near insolvency, having failed 
to attract sufficient guests)�77 The second (ex-Minsk), with its parent theme park 
failing, was acquired by the PRC government in 2016 for display in a naval mu-
seum in Jiangsu�78
It is not unreasonable to ponder whether these flying-deck cruisers were pur-
chased as speculative private ventures with the hope that they (like Varyag) would 
be purchased, in turn, by the PLAN� The incongruous nature of their “private” ac-
quisition—which included the cost of towing two poorly maintained large hulks 
to China to be massively refurbished for use in a relatively low-revenue indus-
try—primes this speculation� Although there is no available documentation, it is 
very logical that they were examined (to some extent) as potential additions to 
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the PLAN fleet but were rejected� Perhaps the repair, upgrading, and conversion 
costs were seen as too great� The mission for which they were built—defense of 
the Soviet nuclear-ballistic-missile submarine bastions—is not a PLAN mission 
(as far as we know)�
Or perhaps, like the United States in the 1930s, the PRC has determined that 
larger, all-aviation ships are a superior (in fact, the most desirable) method for 
bringing airpower to sea�
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 In 2017, President Moon Jae-in endorsed the development and acquisition of a nuclear submarine for the Republic of Korea (ROK—South Korea)� South 
Korean proponents of nuclear submarines favor the program for two technical 
reasons� First, nuclear submarines can stay underwater for months, rather than 
the days or weeks of which conventional diesel-electric submarines are capable� 
Second, nuclear submarines can maintain speeds of up to forty knots at depth, 
whereas nonnuclear submarines have difficulty sailing much above twenty knots 
at depth for any significant duration, and must surface frequently to recharge 
their batteries—which makes them easier to detect� These two attributes, South 
Korean nuclear-submarine proponents argue, make nuclear submarines ideal for 
detecting and neutralizing the ballistic-missile submarines of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK—North Korea)�1
Since Moon’s 2017 endorsement, South Korean interest in developing an 
indigenously designed nuclear submarine only has grown� Recent press reports 
indicate the intention of the ROK Navy (ROKN) to modify three KSS-III sub-
marines (of the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class) into four-thousand-ton nuclear-
powered submarines�2
Doing so would constitute a major commitment� Not only would the addition 
of nuclear power to the final three submarines in 
the class impact the defense budget severely, but 
South Korea also would have to find a reliable, 
long-term fuel supplier� South Korea has nuclear-
fuel purchase agreements with the United States, 
but for civilian applications only� In press reports, 
unnamed military sources assert that once the 
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United States agrees to supply low-enriched uranium for naval use, the develop-
ment process will be a breeze�3 This claim glosses over the complexities associated 
with and the many difficulties involved in building nuclear submarines�
Acquiring nuclear submarines would dictate the establishment of a dedicated 
line of funding that would affect other ROKN programs—a significant trade-off� 
This immediately raises the question of the relevance of nuclear submarines’ 
general operational advantages to South Korea’s specific needs, since the regional 
waters in which its navy operates are relatively shallow� In addition, South Korea 
must consider the legal aspects of promoting a nuclear-submarine program� Can 
the Moon administration negotiate with nuclear-fuel suppliers to acquire the 
necessary enriched fuel to power a nuclear-submarine fleet? South Korea likely 
would have to renegotiate the existing South Korean–U�S� “123 agreement” if it is 
to use purchased, enriched fuel for military purposes�4
Given the pros and cons of acquiring nuclear submarines, South Korea should 
consider alternatives� The ROKN is updating its surface and underwater fleets 
with highly capable antisubmarine warfare (ASW) systems� The ROK can rely 
on the United States to support state-of-the-art airborne ASW assets to enhance 
the ROKN’s capabilities to detect, track, and, if necessary, prosecute hostile sub 
threats� The Moon administration may seek to create and foster cooperative ASW 
agreements with Japan, the United States, or both� Given its highly technical 
economy, South Korea might invest in technologies—drones, lasers, magnetic-
anomaly detection, artificial intelligence (AI)—that could enhance all facets of 
FIGURE 1
NATIONAL CLAIMS TO SEA-LANES IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Source: Terence Roehrig, “South Korea: The Challenges of a Maritime Nation,” National Bureau of Asian Research, 23 December 2019, www.nbr.org/.
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ASW� Nuclear submarines’ high costs would permit acquisition of a very limited 
number of them, whereas the same money could purchase substantially greater 
nonnuclear ASW capabilities� Finally, nuclear submarines typically operate as 
ASW platforms, whereas the alternative surface and air assets can perform mul-
tiple missions beyond ASW�
THE EVOLVING NORTH KOREAN THREAT
North Korea left the Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003 and tested its first nuclear 
weapon in 2006� Between 2009 and 2016, the Kim regime tested four additional 
nuclear devices, then announced that the final one had been a thermonuclear 
device with an estimated 250-kiloton yield� Throughout the testing period, North 
Korea continued to refine its nuclear warhead miniaturization to enable integra-
tion onto a missile�5
As the Kim regime refined its nuclear-warhead designs, it also developed 
more-capable missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)� 
Under the guise of a peaceful space-launch-vehicle program, the DPRK even-
tually developed and tested the Hwasong-15 ICBM� The Hwasong-15, with 
a range of nearly thirteen thousand kilometers (km), can threaten the entire 
FIGURE 2 
TEST LAUNCH OF HWASONG-15 ICBM
Source: “Hwasong-15 (KN-22),” Missile Threat: CSIS Missile Defense Project, 7 December 2017, missilethreat.csis.org/.
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continental United States� After the successful testing of the Hwasong-15, 
North Korean state media claimed that the country had “finally realized the 
great historic cause of completing its nuclear force�”6 The inference is that the 
United States, not South Korea, is the deterrence objective of these strategic-
weapon systems�
North Korea’s supplement to land-based nuclear missiles has been its devel-
opment of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)� In 2015, it began 
testing its SLBMs, culminating in the launching of four missiles in 2016� After a 
hiatus of three years, in 2019 North Korea launched a new-generation SLBM, the 
Pukguksong-3, with a range of 1,900 km�7
North Korea possesses a submarine fleet of over seventy vessels, but most are 
of relatively obsolete designs from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s� Construction 
of North Korea’s first indigenous missile submarine, the Sinpo class, wrapped 
up in late 2014� However, the base design is still relatively antique compared 
with current attack submarines available to South Korea and Japan� South Ko-
rean analysis indicates that the Sinpo-class missile submarine may have just one 
vertical-launch tube for SLBMs�8 And while North Korea does possess missile 
submarines, it still must master the challenge of ejecting and launching an SLBM 
from an operational submarine�
North Korean short- and intermediate-range missiles already accomplish 
deterrence against any South Korean incursion or attempt to eliminate the 
FIGURE 3
ESTIMATED RANGES OF DPRK MISSILES
Source: Nicole Mortillaro, “‘Just a Matter of Time’: North Korea’s Missile Capabilities May Be Closer Than Once Thought,” CBC, 30 November 2017, 
www.cbc.ca/.
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Kim regime� The addition of ICBM and SLBM capabilities represents a deter-
rent aimed not at South Korea but at the United States� Thus, for South Korea, 
a nuclear-powered submarine is an unnecessary luxury, not a clear military 
requirement�
THE SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR-SUBMARINE ANSWER
South Korean nuclear-submarine proponents claim that nuclear submarines are 
the most effective counter against a nuclear-capable missile submarine from the 
DPRK or any other hostile state� The South Korean press has reported that the 
proposed South Korean nuclear-submarine fleet would consist of a minimum of 
three boats� The belief is that having three will guarantee the capability to keep at 
least one at sea continuously�9
The cost estimates for the three submarines plus their supporting infrastruc-
ture approach $9 billion, excluding operating costs�10 For fiscal year 2020, the 
South Korean defense budget totaled approximately $41�3 billion, of which $13�7 
billion was set aside for arms purchases�11 South Korea already has begun to over-
emphasize the advantages of nuclear-powered submarines to justify spending so 
much on the program (see sidebar)�
Retired ROKN captain Moo Keun-sik claims that basic designs for the sub-
marine and a miniaturized nuclear reactor were completed during the “326 
initiative�”12 This was a secret development program started in 2003 but shut down 
FIGURE 4
DPRK SINPO-CLASS BALLISTIC-MISSILE SUBMARINE
Source: Sy Gunson, “Is the West Coast of the United States Vulnerable to North Korean Submarines Carrying Nuclear Weapons?,” Quora, n.d., www 
.quora.com/.
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after it was exposed to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Korean 
public� Captain Moo’s projections seem overly optimistic, considering that basic 
designs for USN submarines take up to four years to create, with an additional 
nine years needed to complete the detailed design�13 “Five years is the minimum 
time frame to complete South Korea’s first nuclear-powered submarine, even with 
outside assistance, naval experts project”; even this counts only production, not 
actual entry into service�14 Yet how long it might take Seoul to acquire nuclear sub-
marines is perhaps the least of the problems its submarine-acquisition effort faces�
SOUTH KOREAN OBSTACLES TO A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE
Assuming the ROKN’s acquisition price (without supporting infrastructure) 
is between $1�6 and $2�5 billion for each proposed nuclear submarine, Seoul 
may need as much as $7�5 billion to build just three submarines� However, 
Nuclear-Powered Submarine Advantages
The greatest advantage the nuclear submarine offers is its ability to remain underwater and 
on station for months at a time without surfacing; in fact, a nuclear submarine can stay sub-
merged for its entire deployment. It never needs to surface to recharge batteries, as a diesel-
electric submarine must do periodically. The only time the nuclear submarine must near the 
surface is for critical communications between the submarine and higher authorities.
ROKN nuclear submarines could use either low-enriched uranium (LEU) or high-enriched 
uranium (HEU) fuel. If the submarine is LEU fueled, its operational period generally encom-
passes five to ten years without refueling. The ROK design could incorporate features like those 
of French nuclear submarines, which refuel with 6 percent LEU every ten years.
If the nuclear submarine is HEU fueled, the option exists for the entire nuclear-submarine 
fleet never to require refueling, which is a complex and time-consuming operation. However, 
the drawbacks are a dramatic increase in the cost per ship and the substantial proliferation risks 
associated with weapon-grade fuel.
Regardless of the type of nuclear fuel used, the limiting factor for the nuclear submarine 
is crew endurance; while the nuclear submarine can provide fresh water and oxygen, it must 
return to port to replenish food stores. To increase the operational tempo of the nuclear-
submarine fleet, the ROKN could employ the USN nuclear-missile-submarine doctrine of two 
independent crews per ship. This enables the ship to spend a greater amount of time at sea 
and the crews to recover from a highly stressful job.
The nuclear submarine’s ability to transit long distances at high speed permits the boat to 
meet far-flung operational needs. Britain’s Royal Navy (RN) used this feature to great effect 
during the Falklands War. The RN nuclear submarines had to traverse the length of the Atlantic 
in a timely manner to establish a sea-denial zone against any Argentine navy interference with 
British naval vessels attempting to land ground forces. This illustrated that the nuclear subma-
rine can project force anywhere on the globe; however, unlike those of the United Kingdom 
and the United States, the ROK government does not have far-flung possessions or allies it 
must protect.
A major technical advantage the nuclear submarine possesses over the diesel-electric boat 
is its available electrical power for warfare systems. The nuclear submarine provides a constant 
source of electrical power that will not diminish over time, unlike the battery bank of a diesel-
electric boat during submerged operations. This power source enables the nuclear submarine 
to maintain all sensors for detecting and tracking hostile submarines. The associated penalty is 
a submarine of greater size and complexity than the diesel-electric boat. The reactor compart-
ment requires additional space and increased buoyancy to counteract reactor weight.
The nuclear submarine’s advantages in extended underwater operations, available power 
density, technical prestige, and operational tempo make it suited for worldwide operations—
but the ROKN’s area of operations is regional, not global.
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operationally the navy will need as many as nine nuclear submarines to protect 
its regional sea-lanes, as it cannot deploy all its submarines simultaneously; gen-
erally, at any one time half of a submarine fleet is undergoing maintenance, crew 
rest, and retraining—activities separate from tracking adversary submarines�
Thus, a realistic nuclear-submarine fleet for South Korea would be six to nine 
submarines� That could cost as much as $22�5 billion� The Moon administration’s 
planned budget for 2019 was approximately $415 billion, which included nearly 
$42 billion in defense spending� Money spent acquiring nuclear submarines 
might be spent better on missile defense, air forces, ground forces, or reinvest-
ment in the national economy�15
More important, South Korea will need to overcome several additional struc-
tural barriers to build its nuclear submarines�
Shipbuilding Infrastructure
South Korea is the number one shipbuilder in the world, but that is of civilian 
ships, not warships� Adding a nuclear-submarine program to the ROK defense 
budget would require additional workers trained in the design, development, and 
production of these highly complex vessels� In addition, the shipbuilder would 
have to isolate and secure construction facilities dedicated solely to the nuclear-
submarine program, to ensure the security of the related nuclear technology and 
materials�
The major shipbuilders in Korea are Daehan Shipbuilding, Samsung Heavy 
Industries, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME), and Hanjin 
Heavy Industries & Construction (HHIC)� Of these four, only DSME and HHIC 
build military vessels, and both build military and civilian vessels in the same 
shipyards� Currently, DSME is constructing the ROKN’s conventionally powered 
submarines�16
South Korea would require dedicated port facilities for its proposed nuclear-
submarine fleet� The ROKN could convert existing harbor facilities or develop a 
new site� Either way, the Moon administration will require infrastructure funding 
in addition to the submarine-construction funding�
Design and Construction
South Korean shipbuilders also must develop the design parameters for mar-
rying a nuclear reactor with a submarine hull� Toward this end, designers will 
need educational facilities to teach nuclear-reactor operations and design� The 
U�S� Navy has identified the following eight characteristics as being critical to 
submarine design�
 1� Compactness: Reactor must fit within the space and weight constraints of a war-
ship, leaving room for weapons and crew, yet be powerful enough to drive the ship 
at tactical speeds for engagement or rapid transit to an operating area�
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 2� Crew protection: Crew lives and works for months at a time in close proximity to 
the reactor�
 3� Public Safety: Ship makes calls into populated ports throughout the world� 
Maintaining national and international acceptance demands the most  
conservative engineering and operational approach toward assuring safety of 
the public�
 4� Reliability: Ship requires continuous propulsion and electrical power to be self-
sufficient in a hostile and unforgiving environment—undersea, under ice, in 
combat�
 5� Ruggedness: Reactor must tolerate ship’s motion and vibration, and withstand 
severe shock under battle conditions�
 6� Maneuverability: Ship may require rapid and frequent power changes to support 
tactical maneuvering�
 7� Endurance: Reactor must operate many years between refuelings, ideally for the 
life of the ship, to minimize life-cycle cost, minimize demand on support infra-
structure, minimize occupational radiation exposure, and maximize ship avail-
ability to the fleet for service at sea�
 8� Quietness: Submarines must be extremely quiet to minimize the threat of acoustic 
detection and to be able to detect other ships�17
To field a capable nuclear-submarine fleet, South Korean designers would 
have to address each of these characteristics equally and become proficient in 
them� To quote a 1995 report from the USN reactor-design community, “Failing 
to satisfy any of [these requirements] would make the reactor unusable in the 
ship, or would compromise the safety and survivability of the ship and its ability 
to carry out its mission,” potentially putting the crew in danger�18
The warfare systems incorporated within a nuclear submarine should inte-
grate seamlessly with the ROKN’s current diesel-electric fleet� The designers 
would have to be cognizant of the increased electrical power available within a 
nuclear submarine, as well as the need for effective distribution of that power to 
the warfare systems and the increasingly advanced sensors to be incorporated in 
future hulls and modernizations�
Another consideration is retaining the workforce knowledge base once con-
struction of the nuclear-submarine fleet commences� Maintaining a knowledge 
base sufficient to accomplish future upgrades requires an effective strategy to 
extend workforce stability over the long term; if the government predicates its 
strategy on a service life of twenty-five to thirty years before the nuclear sub-
marine is replaced by a new generation, it must develop plans to maintain that 
trained design workforce for decades�
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The ROKN and its associated shipbuilder must overcome other construction 
constraints� Unlike the current construction requirements for conventional sub-
marines, a nuclear-submarine program would have much greater safety require-
ments, to deal with special nuclear materials and the possibility of accidental 
release of radioactivity via irradiated fuels�
South Korea could learn from the U�S� Navy’s experiences with submarine 
construction� Owing to design and construction errors, the U�S� Navy experi-
enced a tragic accident in the sinking of USS Thresher (SSN 593) with all hands 
during trials in 1963� Out of that experience came implementation of the Sub-
Safe program� SubSafe establishes a strict quality-control regime that is external 
to the shipbuilder and the program office overseeing construction�19 South 
Korea would need such a program if it were to pursue a nuclear-submarine 
program�
To fulfill the requirement for trained submarine designers, the nuclear-
submarine shipyard would have to compete against the public shipyards for 
trained construction personnel� Generally, private-sector jobs pay more than 
their public-sector equivalents� For a program of national-security interest, the 
nuclear-submarine shipyard would have to offer comparable salaries and the 
incentive of contributing to the well-being of the nation�
The government would need not only a skilled ship-construction workforce 
but also a skilled workforce for the infrastructure required to construct, house, 
maintain, and eventually dispose of the nuclear-submarine fleet�
Logistics and Training
The ROKN would need to develop new logistics methods for handling nuclear 
fuel� Transport and storage facilities would be needed to minimize nuclear- 
submarine maintenance periods� A secure source of nuclear fuel would be es-
sential� At a minimum, South Korea would need to renegotiate with the United 
States the two nations’ agreement regarding peaceful nuclear cooperation, and 
build both a uranium-enrichment plant and a fuel-fabrication plant�
Then there is the classroom training required for nuclear-submarine sailors� 
In the U�S� Navy, such training takes a year to complete� To conduct this train-
ing, the ROKN would need an onshore training reactor in a facility convenient 
to the nuclear-submarine fleet� Any modifications, updates, or other changes to 
the ships’ reactors would need to be replicated on the training reactor to ensure 
that the sailors train on equipment that is the same as that in the fleet� To gain 
superior proficiency operating a naval reactor, USN sailors require three years on 
the job; the ROKN and its sailors, being new to nuclear operations, might need 
even more time�
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Disposal
Unlike conventional submarines, which can be dismantled at a scrapyard, nuclear 
submarines require special facilities to handle irradiated materials� The reactor 
core and the reactor vessel demand facilities designed to remove and transport 
them safely�
The ROKN should review the disposal issues that both Russia and the United 
Kingdom are experiencing with their decommissioned nuclear submarines� 
Both nations are struggling to dismantle their out-of-service submarines—spe-
cifically, the removal and storage of the reactor core and associated irradiated 
materials�20
Prioritization
Any delay, regardless of cause, creates a potential technology gap between the 
fielded nuclear submarine and the adversary’s submarine capabilities� South Ko-
rea can learn from Brazil’s experience by ensuring dedicated long-term funding� 
Defense specialist Bernardo Wahl G� de Araújo Jorge notes that in addition to 
Brazil’s budget constraints, the delay that country has experienced in completing 
its own nuclear-submarine project has been caused by difficulties with mastering 
the fuel cycle needed to support nuclear propulsion�21
South Korea may not experience the same learning curve, since unlike Brazil 
it possesses extensive experience in modern shipbuilding and, more important, 
more nuclear-engineering expertise� But while it already has an advanced nuclear- 
power industry, it does not enrich nuclear fuel, and at present nuclear propulsion 
is not within South Korea’s shipbuilding repertoire�22 Understanding the signifi-
cance of this issue is important; South Korea would have to make the acquisition 
of a nuclear submarine a national priority, with full government backing irre-
spective of changes in administrations�
Nuclear-Material Agreements
The biggest obstacle to Seoul’s acquisition of a nuclear submarine is nuclear fuel� 
South Korea does not have an indigenous uranium supply, so it imports most 
of its fabricated uranium fuel from the United States� South Korea renewed its 
civilian nuclear cooperative 123 agreement with the United States in 2015� The 
agreement prohibits the ROK from using U�S�-supplied uranium for any military 
purpose, but permits Seoul to enrich uranium up to 20 percent for civilian ap-
plications, if Washington gives its consent� South Korea could purchase fuel from 
alternative suppliers, such as China, France, and Russia, but all three have similar 
peaceful-use requirements�23 If South Korea is unable to obtain the necessary 
enriched uranium from a foreign source, the alternative would be indigenous 
enrichment, which would break its nuclear cooperative agreements by diverting 
enriched uranium to the nuclear-submarine program�
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Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
If the ROK government authorizes an enrichment program, denuclearizing the 
peninsula will become more complicated� Ostensibly, achieving that is a major 
goal of the South Korean government�24
In the April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, Kim Jong-un and President Moon 
stated that North and South Korea would implement fully their previous agree-
ments and declarations� “The previous 1992 South/North Denuclearization 
Declaration is clear: ‘South and North Korea shall not test, manufacture, produce, 
receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons� South and North Korea 
shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes�’”25 North Korea clearly is in 
violation of this agreement�
SOUTH KOREA’S BEST RESPONSE
The ROKN possesses several very capable ASW platforms that provide a greater 
return on investment compared with a limited nuclear-submarine fleet� For the 
funds it would take to create and maintain a nuclear-submarine fleet, the Moon 
administration instead could purchase more of the current mix of available ASW 
assets� Likewise, making additional funds available could enable pursuit of new 
technologies that would provide ASW coverage over a greater swath of territory 
within the region�
Current Assets
The ROKN’s surface ships rival those in the surface fleets of many of the great 
powers in their ASW capability, augmented by decades spent developing coop-
erative tactics with the U�S� Navy� The ROKN can purchase more ASW capability 
within such a multidimensional program than it could by expending scarce de-
fense funds on a single ASW dimension� Historical precedent shows that diverse 
assets overcome a focus on one kind of asset—even nuclear submarines�
Surface Naval Combatants. The ROKN currently fields the Incheon-class guided- 
missile frigates� At present they are configured for the surface-warfare mis-
sion but can be upgraded to accept antisubmarine rockets as well as land- 
attack missiles� At a cost of only $250 million per ship, the ROKN could acquire 
multiple highly capable ASW frigates for less than the cost of a single nuclear 
submarine�26
The new Daegu-class guided-missile frigates incorporate ASW systems specif-
ic to countering the DPRK threat� The ships incorporate antisubmarine missiles, 
torpedoes, and sonar systems, at a per-ship cost of approximately $300 million�27
The ROKN currently is building and fielding the Sejong the Great class of 
destroyers� This class provides the ROKN with a true blue-water capability, plus 
an important upgrade to its ballistic-missile-defense capability� At approximately 
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$925 million per ship, the Sejong the Great destroyers provide an extensive ASW 
suite of weapons and sensors� The ship can store and launch 128 missiles con-
figurable for missile defense, land attack, or ASW� It also carries two helicopters 
for use in ASW operations�28
The cost per ship is significantly less than that of a nuclear submarine, while 
the ship provides an extra capability of ballistic-missile defense that a nuclear 
submarine cannot deliver�
FIGURE 5  
ROK NAVY DAEGU-CLASS FRIGATE
Source: Xavier Vavasseur, “HHI Launches Fourth Daegu-Class FFX Batch II Frigate for ROK Navy,” Naval News, 29 April 2020, www.navalnews.com/.
FIGURE 6 
ROK NAVY SEJONG THE GREAT–CLASS DESTROYERS
Source: USN photo, ID 100707-N-0260R-039
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Airborne ASW. To integrate fully all dimensions of ASW warfare, the ROKN re-
quires airborne assets that can operate and integrate with the surface and subsurface 
fleets� The United States has a very capable aircraft, the P-8A Poseidon, that can per-
form integrated ASW missions� The P-8A has a patrol radius of 1,200 nautical miles, 
with a capability to remain on station for four hours� It carries up to eleven torpe-
does and 120 sonobuoys� The P-8A also can monitor up to sixty-four sonobuoys and 
relay their data to integrated fleet units for prosecuting hostile submarine contacts� 
For the U�S� Navy, “the P-8A Poseidon and [ASW helicopter] MH60R Seahawk are 
a formidable team that holds at risk the surface and subsurface adversary to allow 
our carrier strike groups and joint forces access and freedom to maneuver�”29 The 
cost for this capability is $125 million per aircraft� In 2018, the U�S� State Depart-
ment approved the sale of eight Poseidons to South Korea, at an estimated cost of 
$2�1 billion�30
While the P-8A is a land-based asset, the MH-60R or equivalent helicopter 
is sea based� Both ROKN frigates and destroyers can operate ASW helicopters 
from their decks� Having a helicopter enables a frigate or destroyer to increase its 
coverage area during ASW operations� The MH-60R can carry up to three ASW 
torpedoes and twenty-five sonobuoys, and it contains the advanced airborne low-
frequency dipping sonar, which has both passive and active capabilities� The unit 
cost for the MH-60R is approximately $40 million per aircraft�31
Combining air assets with surface ships and submarines would enable the 
ROKN to detect and prosecute hostile nuclear-armed missile submarines across a 
much greater area than would be possible with a single nuclear submarine at sea� 
Source: “Restoring the UK’s Maritime Patrol Aircraft Capability (Part 2),” Navy Lookout, 4 April 2017, www.navylookout.com/.
FIGURE 7 
USN P-8A POSEIDON DEPLOYING MK-54 AERIAL ASW TORPEDO
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Combining new technologies, such as drone systems and AI, with existing ROKN 
assets would increase the probability of detection of hostile submarines even further�
Nonnuclear Submarines. The ROKN submarine fleet consists of the Jang Bogo 
class and the Sohn Won-il class� Both classes use diesel-electric propulsion, and 
each submarine has eight torpedo tubes� The Sohn Won-il boats have an endur-
ance capability of eighty-four days; the Jang Bogos, fifty� Although a nuclear 
submarine can boast of significantly higher endurance figures, these satisfy the 
requirements of regional patrol operations� Additionally, at approximately $300 
million per conventionally powered attack submarine, the ROKN could acquire 
a greater number of submarines to enable continuous patrol operations in its 
regional security zones�32
The ROKN is in the process of constructing the new Dosan Ahn Chang-ho 
class of submarines� Significantly larger than previous ROKN submarines, this 
class incorporates an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system� AIP provides 
greater underwater endurance than that of previous diesel-electric submarines� 
While the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho–class boat is larger, it has two fewer torpedo 
FIGURE 8  
MH-60R DEPLOYING DIPPING SONAR
Source: John Keller, “Navy Awards $65.8 Million Order to Raytheon to Provide 22 Helicopter Dipping Sonar Systems,” Military Aerospace, 16 November 
2015, www.militaryaerospace.com/.
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tubes than previous ROKN submarines; however, it has the added capability of 
vertical-launch missile cells� The per-ship cost of this class, at approximately $900 
million, is still significantly less than that of a nuclear submarine�33
Not only are the existing ROKN submarines capable of performing ASW 
missions at a fraction of the cost of nuclear submarines, but they offer a quieter 
operating platform� Detecting radiated noise is the key method for detecting 
submarines themselves, and thus avoiding potential attack by them� The quieter 
the submarine, the more difficult the ASW mission� While operating on electric 
power or AIP, a submarine is nearly undetectable by an adversary� In 2015 joint 
exercises, Sweden demonstrated the AIP’s advantage “when HMS Gotland, a 
Swedish AIP submarine, ‘sank’ many U�S� nuclear fast-attack subs, destroyers, 
frigates, cruisers, and even the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) aircraft carrier in 
joint exercises�”34
FIGURE 9 
ROK NAVY JANG BOGO–CLASS SUBMARINE AT SEA
Source: USN photo, www.cpf.navy.mil/.
FIGURE 10 
ROKN DOSAN AHN CHANG-HO FIRST-IN-CLASS SUBMARINE ON SEA TRIALS
Source: Xavier Vavasseur, “ROK Navy’s 1st 3000 Tons KSS-III Submarine ‘Dosan Ahn Chang-ho’ Passes Max Depth Test,” Naval News, 27 August 2019, 
www.navalnews.com/.
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Future Assets
Technology continues to reduce or eliminate ASW handicaps� The increased use 
of drone and autonomous systems can limit exposure of personnel and increase 
coverage of vast swaths of the ocean� New technologies open avenues in ASW 
by making submarines “visible” and reducing the threat of surprise� Improved 
computers also increase the effectiveness of ASW sensors through their ability to 
crunch vast amounts of data and provide actionable information to military and 
political decision makers� South Korea has a highly technical economic infra-
structure that can exploit these new technologies at a much lower cost than that 
of a nuclear-submarine program�
Drones. Current drones consist not only of aerial but also of surface and under-
water types� The aerial drone commonly used for ASW is the MQ-4C Triton� 
While it does not possess offensive weaponry, it does carry a powerful multi-
function active sensor, with an active electronically scanned array radar� As the 
Triton has a thirty-hour endurance at a speed of more than three hundred knots, 
this drone can monitor large areas using radar or magnetic-anomaly detection to 
locate submarines of potential adversaries� At a cost of $125 million per copy, the 
ROKN could purchase plenty of Tritons to cover important sea-lanes at a fraction 
of the cost of a single nuclear submarine� Also, the Triton is fully interoperable 
with all other military assets, enabling the immediate sharing of intelligence� An 
additional advantage of the Triton is that it uses commercial, off-the-shelf archi-
tecture, which means that upgrading the operating system is less complex, mak-
ing it easy to keep up with the latest technological advances�35
One example of a surface drone is the Liquid Robotics Wave Glider, which 
costs approximately $300,000 per copy� The Wave Glider can host several pay-
loads and underwater sensors to detect hostile submarines and provide connec-
tivity among underwater vessels and surface or air units for complete, multidi-
mensional ASW� The wave- and solar-powered Wave Glider has approximately a 
one-year endurance, and can maintain its location within a thirty-meter radius� 
As the Wave Glider has an extremely low profile, it is ideally suited for monitor-
ing hazardous waters, providing early detection and data relay to quick-response 
aerial assets for prosecuting hostile submarines in times of crisis�36
Teledyne’s Slocum G3 Glider operates underwater, using the energy in ocean 
waves to move in a sawtooth pattern up and down in the sea� At only $125,000–
$150,000 per copy, this autonomous vehicle provides yet another method of de-
tecting and communicating the locations of hostile submarines� When operating 
in swarms, Slocum Gliders can provide coverage over large ocean areas, reducing 
the requirement for manned-vessel sorties� The Slocum Glider is easy to operate 
using web-based navigation and has an endurance range measured in days or 
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FIGURE 11  
DEPICTION OF MQ-4C TRITON CONDUCTING SURFACE SCANNING FORWARD OF FLEET
Source: Northrup Grumman, “MQ-4C Triton Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS),” technical datasheet, World 
Defence News, 29 September 2012, worlddefencenews.blogspot.com/.
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months, depending on payload and mission� Each time the glider surfaces, it can 
transmit its data and receive new task orders as needed�37
New unmanned surface vessels (USVs) continue to advance through testing 
phases, with deployments following within three to five years� Specifically, the 
U�S� Navy’s Sea Hunter is a fully autonomous surface vessel that has the capability 
to navigate the seas without human input� Equipped with the latest towed-array 
sonar systems, the Sea Hunter can assist in detecting hostile submarines� Its 
relatively small and low profile reduces its radar signature compared with those 
of manned surface vessels� The Sea Hunter has an endurance of thirty to ninety 
days, depending on sea conditions, transit speed, and payloads� At approximately 
$36 million per ship, the Sea Hunter provides a very-low-cost alternative to 
nuclear submarines� Its daily operating costs are a fraction of those of manned 
surface vessels� In the future, the Sea Hunter could be outfitted with missiles for 
attacking hostile submarines or surface vessels, with the attack decision remain-
ing with a remote human operator�38
Sensor Technologies. Ships, planes, and drones are only as effective as the 
ASW sensors they employ or those located elsewhere that provide data to the 
command-and-control (C2) network� Continual development provides new sensor 
FIGURE 12  
DEPICTION OF SEA HUNTER USV IN SUBMARINE-HUNTING ROLE
Source: Alexander M. G. Walan, “Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) (Archived),” Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, n.d., www.darpa.mil/.
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systems designed to detect and prosecute hostile submarines� Early detection 
would contribute to the ROKN’s ability to track and counter hostile submarines, 
and during a crisis to prosecute an attack on them� Several different types of sys-
tems hold great potential for reducing further the missile-submarine threat�
The Deep Reliable Acoustic Path Exploitation System (DRAPES) deploys a 
stand-alone system of sonar arrays onto the seafloor to listen to the ocean� The 
advantage of seafloor-based arrays is that they are not subject to weather effects� 
The arrays can communicate submarine contacts along the array chain back to 
the shore-based C2 facility� DRAPES will assist the U�S� Navy in tracking down 
“one lone submarine amid vast swathes of oceans�”39 Implementation of DRAPES 
or a similar system would provide the ROKN with early-warning detection and 
tracking of DPRK missile submarines, obviating the need to sacrifice a significant 
portion of the ROK defense budget to a nuclear-submarine program�
During the Cold War, the U�S� Navy deployed the Sound Surveillance Sys-
tem (SOSUS) to monitor and track Soviet submarines, but changes are afoot�
Two next-generation, fixed-position detectors—the Transformational Reliable 
Acoustic Path System (TRAPS) and the Fixed Distributed System—are replacing 
existing SOSUS sensors� The TRAPS passive array sonar system relies on big data 
and advanced signal processing, which provide greater performance over the old 
SOSUS system and active sonar� “These use large arrays of detectors with a much 
smaller range to filter out other ocean noise and focus on signals from ‘even the 
quietest submarines at natural chokepoints in the ocean�’”40 South Korea is situ-
ated near natural oceanic choke points through which an adversary’s nuclear-
armed missile submarines would have to transit�
Historically, among ASW sensors, those of the acoustic type have predominat-
ed; however, new advances in laser technology may offer alternative submarine- 
detection methods� The U�S� Navy is experimenting with light detection and 
ranging (lidar) technology� Blue-light, solid-state lasers operating on a 455- 
nanometer wavelength detect submarines effectively� “[C]ompact LIDAR 
sensors aboard submarines and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) 
may vastly improve sub-to-sub detection�”41 If the ROKN were to marry this 
technology to a fleet of UUVs, it could monitor effectively any likely hostile 
nuclear-armed missile submarine in transit to the ocean� Once it had detected 
the submarine, the ROKN could dispatch the necessary ASW forces to deal 
with the threat�
Another nonacoustic technology that holds promise for submarine detection 
is advanced magnetic anomaly detection (MAD)� Submarine detection near 
the ocean surface already uses existing MAD technology; what is new is the 
increased availability of big data and the computers necessary to process those 
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data� For example, “[w]hen a pair (or more) of MAD sensors move across an area, 
magnetic gradiometry—the mapping of magnetic signatures—is enabled� With 
an array of sensors capturing multiple axes, continuous streams of data can be 
processed by advanced computer algorithms which filter out natural fluctuations 
in electromagnetic fields�”42
A final nonacoustic sensor is in the development process� Actually, it was the 
whiskers of seals that provided the model for this new development� “The passage 
of a submerged vessel creates small whirlpools, called a Karman vortex street� 
� � � When struck by a vortex, the whiskers vibrate, with the input from several 
telling [the] seal the approximate size, bearing, and velocity of the target�” As 
submarine-generated vortices can last for hours, a large window is open for any 
pursuer to pick up the submarine’s trail�43 This type of sensor will be ideal for use 
in congested waters and natural choke points, but will be limited to submarine 
trailing; it will not pick up submarines from the side or front, as there is no ability 
to detect the vortex until the submarine passes over the detector�
The rapid development in the technology of acoustic and nonacoustic sen-
sors could provide the ROKN a better return on investment than a nuclear-
submarine program� Advances in miniaturization, powerful computing systems, 
and unmanned systems mated with AI may provide the best protection against 
hostile submarine threats to South Korea� “If [sensor systems are] developed and 
deployed, significantly advanced non-acoustic detection technology can increase 
a nation’s [ad]vantage to monitor their surrounding waters for adversary attack 
vehicles�”44
Cooperative ASW. ASW exercises that the NATO Centre for Maritime Research 
and Experimentation (CMRE) conducted in February–March 2020 and again in 
the same months in 2021 illustrated the advantages of multidimensional ASW 
in the detecting and tracking of submarines� CMRE deployed numerous passive 
sensors on autonomous vehicles, buoys, and seabed devices off the coast of Sicily 
prior to the start of the exercise� For active submarine hunting, CMRE focused on 
the concept of multination multistatic ASW, “where an active sonar source would 
create pings for dozens or hundreds of passive sensors�” The array of passive 
sensors detects the resulting sound waves bouncing off enemy submarines� The 
more sensors in the water, the better detection and recognition of type of sub-
marine and the direction the submarine is heading� The DYNAMIC MANTA ex-
ercise used a combination of several Ocean Explorer twenty-one-inch-diameter 
autonomous underwater vehicles and Liquid Robotics’ Wave Gliders to serve as 
communication nodes between ships and autonomous underwater vehicles�
“The key to multi-nation multistatic ASW is information-sharing�” Each par-
ticipant must know where exactly the active sonar source is located� Those data 
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enable each participant to detect the sound source accurately and relocate assets 
to intercept or track the enemy submarine�45
The true advantage illustrated by these annual DYNAMIC MANTA exercises 
was multinational cooperation in conducting multidimensional ASW� A multi-
static ASW system, in cooperation with the United States and Japan, might serve 
South Korea better in its defense against the DPRK threat� Given the open-water 
constraints that Pyongyang and Beijing face, the multinational, multidimen-
sional solution may be Seoul’s better investment, versus the nuclear-submarine 
program�
Artificial Intelligence. AI has the potential to be a major game changer in the 
realm of ASW� The continued development of more-powerful sensors and the 
resulting increase in raw data require powerful AI algorithms to process� AI can 
turn mountains of data into the actionable knowledge that naval leaders need 
to prosecute hostile-submarine threats� Additionally, as the development of un-
manned systems continues, AI increasingly is required to operate them, in both 
friendly and hostile environments� AI provides the potential for unmanned sys-
tems to act in concert with each other� This aspect of AI opens the possibility 
of coordinating a complete multidimensional ASW mission without putting hu-
mans in harm’s way�
FIGURE 13  
MULTIFACETED VIEW OF COOPERATIVE ASW CAPABILITIES
Source: “Navy Communications System Modeling and Simulation,” Scalable Network Technologies, n.d., dev.commswork.com/.
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Researchers at the U�S� Naval Postgraduate School recently conducted a 
demonstration using swarm technology� With no human control, two flights 
consisting of ten drones each engaged in an aerial-combat exercise� An algorithm 
called Greedy Shooter controlled each drone� The objective was for a drone to 
maneuver against an opponent to obtain a kill shot�46 This demonstration illus-
trated the power and potential of AI in future military combat; the entire exercise 
proceeded without human intervention or control� Such is the power contained 
in fully autonomous systems, but ethics issues associated with fully autonomous 
weapon systems require serious consideration in the future�
Seoul’s case for acquiring nuclear submarines hinges on the assumption that it 
is a strategic necessity for South Korea to have them� As North Korea develops 
missile submarines and Russia and China deploy new nuclear submarines, 
South Korean officials presume that South Korea should have “corresponding 
military power�”47 Yet in fact, South Korean spending on a nuclear-submarine 
fleet actually may undermine the country’s overall national security, as com-
pared with spending the same amount, or even less, intelligently—on a non-
nuclear ASW force�
Certainly, the projected timeline for deploying the first ROKN nuclear subma-
rines is unreasonable; Seoul would be lucky to deploy before 2035� South Korea 
may reduce that timeline by modifying its existing KSS-III design, but a reason-
able assumption is that the timeline will not shrink significantly� This makes 
acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines a poor response to the current DPRK 
submarine threat�
Furthermore, the seas surrounding South Korea make nuclear-submarine 
operations problematic, at best� The West Sea (Yellow Sea) is too shallow (fifty 
meters deep) for large nuclear submarines� While the East Sea (Sea of Japan), 
with an average depth of 1,500 meters, provides the necessary operating environ-
ment for large nuclear submarines, the addition of a few South Korean nuclear 
submarines there will do little to reduce the DPRK missile-submarine threat; in 
2015, North Korea sallied about fifty submarines simultaneously� Countering 
such a large number of submarines demands higher-quality ASW capabilities 
than a handful of nuclear submarines ever could provide�48
Rather than waste its money on nuclear submarines, South Korea could lock 
down a superior suite of ASW capabilities that would provide multiple mission 
capabilities� A recent study on ASW concluded, “Based on Cold War experi-
ence, some U�S� experts assume that the United States would need to possess five 
SSNs [nuclear-powered attack submarines] to keep track of each Chinese SSBN 
[nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine] at sea�”49 On the basis of that state-
ment, the three to six nuclear submarines the ROKN desires would not meet its 
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requirements; instead, it would need a fleet of fifteen to twenty submarines to deal 
with DPRK and Chinese missile submarines� At a conservative cost of $1�6 billion 
per copy, the ROK defense budget would have to absorb an acquisition cost of 
between $24 and $32 billion; that figure does not include ancillary costs� As noted 
previously, the ROK annual defense budget was approximately $42 billion in 2019� 
Funding for pushing forward down a path toward acquiring nuclear submarines 
would compete with funding demands from the ROK Army and Air Force, put-
ting at risk the ROK’s overall defense posture against the Kim regime�
The better investment of limited ROK defense funds is toward the expansion 
of current ASW assets: frigates, destroyers, diesel-electric and AIP submarines, 
and ASW aircraft� These assets can be acquired for less than a nuclear subma-
rine costs, and Seoul already has the infrastructure to support and maintain 
such assets� The ROK shipbuilding industry would not suffer from the lack of 
a nuclear-submarine program, as the ROKN would be purchasing additional 
conventional-fleet units�
The ROKN should partner with leading technology industries to research and 
field new ASW sensors, both acoustic and nonacoustic� The ROK also must le-
verage the technical expertise that domestic industry is developing in the robotic 
and AI sectors� Combining new technologies with existing ROKN platforms 
would provide a multidimensional ASW capability versus a nuclear-submarine 
program that would provide a single-dimensional response�
As Frank von Hippel charges, “Nuclear submarines are superior for travel to 
distant employment areas, not for tracking a neighbor’s diesel-electric subma-
rines in nearby waters�”50 South Korea is not a global military nation; it is a nation 
with regional security requirements� Producing and operating nuclear subma-
rines would constitute a costly venture that would do little to increase Seoul’s 
national security�
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 The return of theater-wide competition in Europe with a revanchist Russia presents challenges to U�S� national-security interests� Addressing these 
challenges would benefit from the strategic thought of Baron Antoine-Henri de 
Jomini, a celebrated Swiss-born Napoleonic officer and one of the first modern 
theorists of war�1 A potential path for the U�S� military to compete effectively 
against Russia in the European theater, while preparing for potential combat op-
erations, resides in extracts from Jomini’s operational theory of warfare applied 
to the maritime domain� Jomini’s writings on campaigning and his “rectangular 
template” for gaining theater advantage offer a model for the United States to 
confront Russia’s asymmetric and “gray zone” threats in Europe�2
The European theater is highly significant for Russian national security� On land, 
besides offering direct and historical invasion routes into Russia’s interior, eastern 
Europe was a traditional sphere of Russian influence dating to tsarist times� In the 
modern era, the adjacent maritime regions have tak-
en on greater strategic importance� The Barents Sea 
and White Sea are the cornerstones of Russia’s pow-
er projection into the Arctic�3 In the Baltic Sea, Rus-
sia’s Kaliningrad exclave, several U�S� NATO allies, 
concerned neutral states, and wider European se-
curity and energy interests all converge�4 The Black 
and Caspian Seas touch several Russian national- 
security interests and serve as platforms for on-
going Russian political and military activities in 
Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia, Central Asia, and the 
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wider Middle East� Russia continues to expand the size and capability of its Cas-
pian Sea flotilla to serve further competitive adventurism in the region�5 Finally, 
eastern Europe’s riverine network provides direct access into the Russian heart-
land via the Dnieper, Don, and Volga feeder rivers�
Given the strategic importance of Europe’s maritime environment to Russia, a 
U�S� competition and battlefield-preparation campaign built on irregular warfare 
and Jominian concepts, and leveraging U�S� naval special-warfare expertise as 
part of a family of integrated and low-visibility or light-footprint capabilities— 
such as subsurface intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) methods 
and cyber actions—well may be the decisive approach to gaining an advantage 
over Russia prior to conflict� As noted by General Tod Wolters, Commander, 
U�S� European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, “Every day, 
[European Command] and NATO compete to challenge and counter Russia’s 
below-the-threshold strategy, and to counterbalance the multi-faceted and capable 
military power which underwrite[s] its malign approach�”6 Jomini’s campaign-
ing theory, in combination with maritime special-operations capabilities, sug-
gests a convincing maritime approach for supporting these efforts to contest Rus-
sia’s malign activity in Europe while remaining below the level of armed conflict, 
and supporting a broader conventional effort to prepare a possible future war- 
fighting environment in a manner consistent with the Department of Defense’s 
approach for using irregular warfare to secure advantages during peacetime and 
prior to potential conflicts�7
This article will first highlight the vexing nature of “gray zone” competition 
against Russia for the U�S� military in Europe and contrast this with Russia’s 
own adroitness� It then will distill the concepts from Jomini’s theory of cam-
paigning that are pertinent to competing with Russia and apply them to a pro-
posed maritime irregular-warfare campaign framework� These concepts include 
theater objectives, lines of effort, a rectangular template for organizing and ap-
plying forces, and measures of effectiveness� From this foundation, I develop 
an operational approach using naval special-warfare capabilities and a suite of 
special operations forces–enabled cyber and enhanced ISR capabilities for con-
ducting several peacetime missions against Russian activities: understanding the 
environment through special reconnaissance; preparing the environment to en-
able the military to transition rapidly from peacetime to combat operations, if 
needed; and performing active naval diplomacy measures, for both deterrent 
and coercive effect� This path offers a mechanism to move the U�S� defense es-
tablishment from contemplating competition to acting� It is also a step toward 
addressing findings in government-sponsored analysis that “more emphasis 
should be placed on developing operational-level guidance for employing spe-
cial operations forces (SOF) in competition below armed conflict,” specifically 
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in the European theater�8 This emphasis is needed to provide greater clarity for 
the future training and resourcing of special operations forces for their missions 
against great-power adversaries, which are different in many respects from the 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency focus of the past two decades�
THE CHALLENGE OF COMPETITION AND GRAY-ZONE  
OPERATIONS
The 2018 U�S� National Defense Strategy declared that “[i]nter-state strate-
gic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U�S� national 
security�”9 The Biden administration’s 2021 Interim National Security Strategic 
Guidance continues this policy thread and outlines an agenda for the United 
States “to prevail in strategic competition�”10
The concept of great-power competition raises three vexing issues for the U�S� 
military� First, the definition and contours of competition remain amorphous� 
There is a lack of consensus and agreement among various schools of traditional 
international-relations thought on great-power competition and what it means 
for the United States� A 2018 study postulates that there is no consensus on the 
definition of competition among states and assesses that little U�S� analysis or fore-
thought has been given to the characteristics of this emergent era�11 While this 
latter point may be an extreme conclusion, it nevertheless suggests a lack of clar-
ity in U�S� national-security approaches to competition�
Second, the national-security goals and strategy for competing against other 
great powers are nebulous� Amid this uncertainty, the U�S� military is exhorted 
to “adopt a better framework for understanding, describing, and participating 
within a competitive operational environment�”12 The current notion of great-
power competition, though, offers little prescription and unclear direction for 
U�S� defense policy�13
Third, the assumed primacy of nonmilitary activities in competition raises 
questions about the application of military power to compete with adversar-
ies and the appropriate nesting of military capabilities within a broader whole-
of-government approach� Russia’s “gray zone operations are a form of coercion 
that mix conventional and unconventional military activities with other security 
forces and non-military actions—like diplomacy, influence operations, and eco-
nomic pressures�”14 U�S� Defense Department guidance asserts that the military 
element of national power needs to find its role and approach to remain below 
the level of armed conflict while creating strategic opportunities for the U�S� 
interagency and allies�15 The preceding points highlight the lack of direction, un-
derstanding, and focus within the U�S� national-security establishment on how 
to apply military power effectively to compete against Russia without precipi-
tous escalation�
87
Naval War College: Autumn 2021 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 8 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
In contrast, Russia appears to operate effectively in this gray competitive 
space, given its strategic culture, historical experience, and limitations as a great 
power� The Kremlin employs a mixture of national-power instruments to ex-
ploit and achieve temporal and regional advantages while avoiding its targets’ 
thresholds for armed conflict�16 With the perspective that competition is an 
integral element of the “permanent state of war” mentality that some analysts 
believe characterizes Russian national-security thinking on interstate rela-
tions, Russia employs a set of hybrid means to attempt to destabilize relevant 
countries and weaken both U�S� influence and the NATO alliance�17 As General 
Wolters noted, this “below-the-threshold of armed conflict strategy via proxies 
and intermediary forces � � � attempt[s] to weaken, divide, and intimidate [U�S�] 
Allies and partners using a range of covert, difficult-to-attribute, and malign 
actions�”18 President Vladimir Putin’s modern empire-building effort to restore 
Russian prestige and great-power status does not rely solely on military power 
but includes a “postmodern” mix of political blackmail and subversion, infor-
mation and cyber operations, economic leverage and financial intimidation, 
and military sales and exercises�19 This mix is not new, and much of it flows 
from the legacy of Soviet “active measures” dating to the Bolshevik Revolution 
and the Cold War�20
Russia has demonstrated these methods in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, Libya, 
and the High North� In Georgia, Moscow initiated a passport-distribution 
scheme in 2002 to create “Russian citizens” in the Abkhazia and South Os-
setia regions who later could be instrumentalized as “oppressed minorities” 
leading up to the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war� This consular effort was 
accompanied later by cyber denial-of-service attacks launched from Russian 
servers that paralyzed Georgian government websites prior to the conventional 
conflict�21 In Ukraine, the Kremlin used information operations to shape and 
control a pro-Russian narrative of the 2013–14 Maidan revolution and sub-
sequent takeover of Crimea and contested occupation of the Donbas region� 
Armies of Russian bloggers, journalists, and propagandists sustained a social 
media campaign designed to undermine pro-Western Ukrainian actors, create 
fear within the pro-Russian population, and obscure Russian irregular-warfare 
activity by proxy forces in Crimea�22 These operations often had primacy over 
more-conventional military activities�
In Syria, Russia has used proxies effectively to steady the Assad regime�23 
Specifically, Russia’s use of operatives from the Wagner Group, a private mili-
tary company—many recruited from among former intelligence-services per-
sonnel and military veterans—allowed Russia to attack U�S� and coalition forces 
in Syria in February 2018 while maintaining plausible deniability�24 Similarly, 
in Libya, Russia expanded its use of deniable proxies from the Wagner Group 
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to advise Libyan National Army troops as well as to engage in direct combat 
operations� These efforts enhance Russia’s geopolitical leverage in the Mediter-
ranean beyond its Syrian naval bases while obscuring official Russian govern-
ment involvement�25
Finally, in the maritime domain, particularly in the High North, Russia has 
continued opportunities for mischief by applying subversive measures on geo-
graphically isolated islands, undersea cables, energy supplies, and commercial 
supply chains through front companies, proxies, and dual-use commercial ves-
sels�26 These ambiguous Russian activities can be nested in the concepts pro-
mulgated by the Russian chief of the general staff Valery Gerasimov in widely 
cited remarks published in February 2013, in which he urged a new formula-
tion of doctrine and tactics to win the wars of the twenty-first century, where 
the lines between war and peace are blurred�27 Russia’s gray-zone operations 
can be combatted, and perhaps even reversed, by applying Jominian principles 
to an irregular-warfare framework to develop an operational approach that 
applies naval special-operations tools against Russia in the European theater’s 
maritime competitive space�
JOMINIAN THEORY AND A MARITIME CAMPAIGN FRAMEWORK
Russian power can be confronted and contained using principles of strategic 
organization that Jomini outlined in his best-known work, Summary of the Art 
of War�28 If one abstracts Russia’s broad strategic efforts and superimposes them 
on the geographic Eurasian landmass, Jomini’s principles of geometry, strategic 
points, and force provide an analytical framework that illuminates the options for 
integrating naval and other special operations forces into a synchronized, theater-
level campaign�29 Like Clausewitz and On War, Jomini is often ambiguous about 
his theory of warfare, requiring interpretation for modern application�30 Also, 
Jomini’s theory was developed in a nineteenth-century context that was charac-
terized by well-defined conditions of peace and war� This consideration may limit 
the full application of his ideas to current gray-zone operations, but—considering 
the Russian national-security perspective that interstate relations are a perma-
nent and fluid state of war, and that the current conflict with the United States 
and the West is being fought across multiple domains, albeit for the most part in 
a nonlethal fashion—Jominian principles may be more relevant than expected�31 
In particular, Jomini’s ideas on campaigning, a rectangular template for theater 
operations, and a concentration on decisive strategic points provide a basis for 
conceptualizing a special operations–centered maritime irregular-warfare cam-
paign against Russia in the European area of operations�
For Jomini, the campaign was a central element of warfare requiring careful 
planning and preparation, in which the commander’s main objective was to 
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dominate his assigned zone of operations or theater�32 Jomini further charac-
terized the operational theater as “the territory upon which the parties may as-
sail each other�”33 In modern terms, this territory is the geographic area where 
adversaries engage either in competition below the threshold of conflict or in 
actual war� Consistent with giving primacy to the campaign and emphasiz-
ing the theater of operations, Jomini was spatially oriented� He believed that 
“[s]trategy is the art of making war upon the map and comprehends the whole 
theater of operations�”34 To gain theater advantage and domination, Jomini 
theorized what I call a “rectangular template” for visualizing his recommend-
ed operational approach, writing, “If every theater of war forms a figure pre-
senting four faces more or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of 
the campaign, may hold one of these faces � � � while the enemy occupies the 
other� � � � The different ways of occupying this theater will lead to widely dif-
ferent combinations�” Jomini’s prescription for domination was to control at 
least two, and potentially three, sides of this rectangle to wrest control and 
advantage from an adversary� A commander achieved this control by identify-
ing and controlling decisive strategic points relative to the theater rectangle� 
These decisive strategic points, often geographic, were characterized by some 
enduring military significance for the theater and the military operations 
within its boundaries� Jomini further indicated that some of these strategic lo-
cations possessed a high political value and termed these sites “political objec-
tive points�” For Jomini, success implied concentrating forces at these decisive 
points to dominate the theater rectangle while taking the initiative to keep an 
opponent off balance�35
Applied to twenty-first-century conditions and within a campaign frame-
work, Jomini’s theoretical concepts illustrate a path to gain theater advan-
tage over Russia’s gray-zone campaigns for influence in Europe� First, if the 
Jominian theater aim is to “dominate the assigned zone of operations,” then U�S� 
theater objectives in maritime competition should be the disruption of Russian 
activities that are below the threshold of war while gaining the initiative in that 
competitive space and imposing greater costs on Russian actions�
Placing Jomini’s rectangular template over eastern Europe—the target of most 
of Russia’s hybrid activity—suggests that the most promising locations for strate-
gic efforts exist primarily within the maritime space (see map)� Russia holds its 
north–south baseline on the east side of the rectangle and the U�S� and NATO 
allies hold the north–south baseline on the western face� The other two faces 
are largely maritime corridors� The northern west–east face includes the Baltic, 
Barents, and White Seas, and the southern face consists of the Black and Caspian 
Seas� Both faces’ respective littoral doorways provide Jominian opportunities to 
influence the other two faces of the rectangle and gain the competitive initiative 
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by surveilling, disrupting, or dislocating Russian activities while remaining below 
the level of armed conflict�
Russia has a long landmass border of approximately 4,700 miles stretching 
from Norway to Azerbaijan, flanked by these maritime access points in the Ba-
rents and White Seas and the Baltic, Black, and Caspian Seas, including their 
related rivers and estuaries� Although U�S� Army, Air Force, and Marine ground 
units conduct frequent deterrence activities along the Russian land border, often 
with allies and partners, the land portion of this border is more restrictive for U�S� 
disruptive competitive action owing to political, military, and legal restraints and 
escalation considerations�
In contrast, the maritime avenues offer the best ingress and access points into 
Russian areas of interest and influence with legal and political space that avoids 
the unacceptable escalatory risks of acting across sovereign land boundaries� 
This operational approach would adhere to two relevant Jominian principles� 
The first is to maneuver forces to threaten strategic decisive points, specifically 
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implies activities relying on access and relationships that prepare the environ-
ment to allow for a rapid transition by the U�S� military into offensive combat 
operations if needed� The maritime environment provides international navi-
gational rights in the Barents, White, Baltic, and Black Seas, which offer the 
flexibility to approach Russia’s strategic decisive points in its littoral regions in 
a manner that the land borders with Russia do not permit� Additionally, the 
littoral regions offer a surfeit of strategic decisive points, or targets of interest, 
including the Kola Peninsula, the Baltic islands, Crimea, and the mouth of the 
Don River�
These points host critical infrastructure and strategic forces that are essen-
tial to Russian national defense, and special operations forces’ peacetime opera-
tions near these points can provide greater situational awareness and under-
standing of these nodes for numerous purposes, ranging from early warning to 
preparation for contingency operations� (Given the Caspian Sea’s inland loca-
tion, a coastal state would have to grant access, which involves some diplomatic 
relationships that presently are challenging for the United States�) Additionally, 
in his section in the Art of War on “descents,” Jomini mentions maritime opera-
tions as being valuable “[t]o make a diversion, at once political and military,” 
to distract or impose costs on an enemy�37 While Jomini’s comments refer to 
operations in actual conflict, this principle has validity for maritime operations 
during peacetime competition as well� Finally, while one can argue that cyber 
and information operations are unconstrained by physical borders and make 
them irrelevant, these activities are not stand-alone as currently practiced, 
but instead generally are linked to an accessible physical domain—air, land, 
or sea—to achieve desired effects� In the case of Russia, the maritime domain 
seems to offer the best opportunities for access and maneuver at lower escala-
tion risk and can be used to amplify the political effects of cyber and informa-
tion operations�
Jomini does not directly discuss in the Art of War how to assess a campaign’s 
success in the modern sense, since in his era victory in combat and the oc-
cupation of territory were the marks of effectiveness�38 Nevertheless, by apply-
ing his principles to a modern competition campaign, measures of effective-
ness would be indicated and derived from changes in Russian activities and 
behavior in the respective maritime regions of interest and near the identified 
decisive strategic points, as a result of U�S� naval special-operations activity� 
Qualitative assessment of Russian reactions to U�S� activities and an estimation 
of the costs imposed could be initial criteria for evaluation� These measures 
would be developed further as the campaign and force experience progressed� 
To convert any proposed campaign objectives, lines of effort, and measures of 
effectiveness into action, an operational approach for naval maritime special 
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operations forces provides the application of special-operations capabilities to 
exploit Russia’s maritime flanks strategically�
NAVAL SPECIAL-WARFARE OPERATIONAL APPROACH
An operational approach (what U�S� military planners call “ways”) is simply a 
description of the broad actions the military must take to achieve the desired 
objectives (known as “ends”)�39 This section sketches out the operational ap-
proach for naval special operations to execute a Jominian irregular-warfare 
campaign to achieve several competitive objectives: disrupt Russian activities 
occurring below the threshold of war; gain initiative in the competitive space; 
impose greater costs on Russian actions; and prepare the theater for potential 
combat operations� According to Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA (Ret�), 
and Nic Vincent, from a military perspective success in interstate competition 
requires operating in the gray zone with low-signature, nimble, and rapidly de-
ployable forces�40 This outlook implies using special operations forces for com-
petition because of their low visibility, small-footprint profile, and expertise 
in close-in maritime and riverine access� Special operations forces and naval 
special warfare have powerful, flexible tools that can be integrated across the 
full range of conflict and operations, as part of whole-of-government efforts, 
and with partner nations and U�S� allies to deter Russian activities of concern�
Besides U�S� naval special-warfare units’ unique capabilities in maritime 
close access and placement, they possess equipment ranging from a family 
of low-visibility, multimission surface and subsurface tactical craft to sophis-
ticated signals and communications gear�41 The proposed irregular-warfare 
campaign would use a dedicated naval special warfare group and its enablers, 
in conjunction with other U�S� agencies to provide both cyber and ISR sup-
port� Implementing the Jominian approach advocated in and around the Bal-
tic, Black, Caspian, and Barents and White Seas would include the following: 
conducting special reconnaissance to understand the maritime environment 
better; executing special missions for the preparation of the environment for 
eventual combat operations; and performing visible information operations as 
a subset of naval diplomatic measures to support more-cogent counter-Russia 
or pro-U�S� and -NATO narratives� The first two missions mentioned directly 
support preparing for potential combat operations, while the last contributes to 
competition below the threshold of conflict�
Special reconnaissance activities enabling a greater and deeper understand-
ing of the contiguous bodies of water and their littorals along Russia’s mari-
time periphery are a first step in developing “strategic opportunities for the 
U�S� and its partners�”42 The mission of special reconnaissance—defined as “re-
connaissance and surveillance activities conducted as a special operation in, 
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but not limited to, hostile, denied, or diplomatically and politically sensitive 
environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational sig-
nificance”—is a core special-operations task, and naval special-warfare assets 
are trained and equipped to perform it in and from maritime environments�43 
Maritime special reconnaissance generally requires capabilities not found in 
the conventional force�44 A thorough “mapping” of the Jominian maritime 
corridors would create greater situational awareness, with details on adver-
sary human activities and greater data on the meteorological, hydrographic, 
and geographic characteristics of the respective littoral regions�45 Extensive 
and comprehensive special reconnaissance of the waters along the pertinent 
Jominian rectangle faces—to include surface, subsurface, and coastal investiga-
tion—would lay a foundation for better knowledge of the adversary and enable 
a wider-ranging preparation of the environment for potential future opera-
tions, including combat if required�
For special operations forces, preparation of the environment is “an umbrella 
term for operations and activities conducted by selectively trained special opera-
tions forces to develop an environment for potential future special and conven-
tional operations�”46 In the European theater, naval special operations forces would 
prepare the environment to create conditions conducive for successful competi-
tion and other military operations on the spectrum of conflict, to include prepa-
rations to allow the U�S� military to embark quickly and successfully on combat 
operations if that becomes necessary�47 Subcombat competition could focus on 
exposing, illuminating, and addressing Russian commercial gray-zone activities 
in the maritime environment� As illustration, in September 2018, Finnish police 
and military raided the Finnish Baltic island of Säkkiluoto� A Russian business-
man from Saint Petersburg had purchased the island legally, then developed it to 
include nine piers, a helipad, and military-grade communications equipment�48 
While the Russian government denied ulterior motives, this type of activity easily 
could be highlighted within a maritime special-operations campaign for an al-
lied national government to conduct additional action� Such activities would nest 
within conventional USN objectives in the European theater and enable further 
military and interagency actions�
This maritime preparation of the environment, led by U�S� naval special-
warfare units in partnership with allies, would aim at identifying, understand-
ing, and framing sensitive Russian maritime decisive strategic points as tar-
gets for potential follow-on actions, deterrent or otherwise� Examples of these 
sensitive points include Russian pipelines, undersea cables, commercial ships, 
fishing vessels, navigational beacons, and other objects� Preparation activities 
are not exclusively covert, which by their nature have minimal, if any, deterrent 
effect� They also encompass military-engagement and security-cooperation 
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activities to build relationships with critical allies and their capability and capac-
ity to contribute to operations on the Jominian maritime template� Important 
partners include Finland, Sweden, the Baltic States, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Greece, Georgia, and Ukraine� These partners can themselves support special 
reconnaissance of the maritime environment around Russia to refine the loca-
tion of specific targets and further develop them for additional activities� These 
activities align with established special-operations missions that include the 
reconnaissance of significant objects of interest; the tagging and tracking of 
significant maritime objects; and the logistics preparation for both special and 
conventional force arrival in a particular maritime region, to include the build-
ing of preconflict infrastructure�49
Finally, U�S� naval special-operations activities along the northern and south-
ern faces of the Jominian theater rectangle would enable refined and nuanced 
NATO information operations as part of active naval-diplomacy measures for 
both deterrent and coercive effect against adversarial Russian activities� If the 
aim of competition is to remain below the level of armed conflict, naval forces 
are particularly well positioned to support partners and allies, coerce adver-
saries, and advertise national sea power with the aim of influencing foreign 
leaders�50 Special operations forces, as opposed to conventional forces, have the 
most important role in the spectrum of conflict short of war, at a level where 
the military can support and integrate with other elements of national power, 
especially diplomatic and information components�51
Taken together, this idea suggests that linking naval special operations forces 
with overt naval diplomacy in the European theater is an effective and endur-
ing deterrence approach against a great power� This method aligns well with 
the concept of naval diplomacy as a “political instrument short of war” that 
aims to influence the “perceptions of policy-makers in hostile and friendly 
Powers�”52 As Geoffrey Till notes, naval diplomacy—what he terms presence—
enables both coercion and coalition building�53 Hence, naval special-operations 
activities and the presence of naval special-warfare detachments in these Eu-
ropean littoral and riparian regions would provide opportunities for selective 
deterrence or compellence messages aimed at creating anxiety or uncertainty 
in the minds of Russian national-security decision makers and developing 
narratives to counter and supplant Russian propaganda and disinformation 
campaigns� These information operations range from publicized maritime special- 
operations exercises with partner nations to signal allied solidarity and interoper-
ability, to visible maritime special operations forces boarding commercial ships 
with partner-nation law enforcement to demonstrate ship-interdiction capa-
bilities� These maritime special-operations activities, often military-to-military, 
can be amplified by ambassadorial-level diplomatic public affairs and media 
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engagement to message U�S� presence and commitment to allies and partners� 
These actions aim to offset contrary Russian media and commercial efforts�
Overt naval special-warfare activities that are visible but have a small footprint 
also could reinforce some generic U�S� European Command themes, such as the 
benefits of NATO and European Union membership for security and economic 
progress, the promotion of a common Black Sea allied naval presence, freedom-
of-navigation operations in support of international maritime law, and a reduc-
tion of overall Russian and allied military presence in the Arctic to prevent con-
flict and preserve the polar environment�54 These overt activities, amplified by 
appropriate and supporting information operations, have a twofold psychological 
effect� One aspect strengthens allied resolve through presence, placement, and 
the reinforcement of regional relationships� The other side is to create uncer-
tainty in the minds of adversary leadership, leading them to question what mari-
time special operations forces actually are doing in these sensitive littoral regions� 
For example, naval special-warfare patrol craft conducting visible and publicized 
operations with NATO-ally naval special operations forces in the littoral waters 
of the Barents and White Seas and the Baltic, Black, and Caspian Seas gener-
ates questions for Russia’s decision makers about the capabilities that the United 
States and partners could bring to bear against it, and concern about other ac-
tivities they may be performing clandestinely� Special-operations-forces activity 
often connotes or implies clandestine action, which, when coupled with the overt 
presence of naval special-warfare units and craft in a sensitive area, creates im-
pressions that can affect Russian leaders’ decision-making calculus and steer their 
reactions in the maritime space� The visibility of special-operations units alone 
may be more significant than the particular tasks they conduct�55
Naval special-warfare forces employing a Jominian operational approach, in 
combination with cyber and ISR operations, offer the United States and its allies 
a framework for sustained contest against Russian operations and activities in 
Europe as part of a wider, integrated deterrence effort while preparing the theater 
for potential conflict scenarios� In conjunction with conventional military capa-
bilities and coupled with U�S� efforts, naval special-warfare capabilities provide a 
maritime instrument for countering Russian competition and suggest a guide for 
action below the threshold of conflict in the European theater, particularly in an 
overt naval-diplomacy role� While balancing risks and escalation is essential to 
ensuring this approach keeps competition below the threshold of conflict, the na-
ture of gray-zone competition suggests that deliberate, methodical, and measured 
efforts to move the United States from a reactive to a proactive position in Europe’s 
competitive space can produce salutary strategic effects� It is ironic that Baron 
Jomini, who was concerned mostly with land-warfare theory and who served for 
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 The most significant clashes between great powers are occurring on land� Rus-sia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, the rivalry between Iran and the United States 
and its regional allies, the lengthy conflict in Afghanistan, and the expansion of 
China’s influence along its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) vectors—these are just a 
few illustrations of the persistent vying for continental political control and influ-
ence� For a maritime power such as the United States, these conflicts—with the 
exception of China’s naval actions in the South China Sea—present a peculiar and 
recurrent challenge, because they take place on continental Eurasia and not on 
the sea� The United States needs superior naval power and command over mari-
time access routes to be able to project its will across the oceans� But the other 
players—from Russia to China and Iran—enjoy internal, continental lines of 
communication that, while perhaps not as cost-effective as maritime routes, can 
be shorter and are less vulnerable to seaborne predations� As a result, from the 
perspective of the United States, sea power is necessary but also has serious limits�
The key question for any maritime power is how to translate its control over the 
sea into political influence over the land� This conversion of sea power into strate-
gic effects on the continent is neither guaranteed nor easy� Sailing undisturbed on 
the oceans does not mean that a sea power, such as the United States, has political 
influence on land; control of the sea does not yield power automatically over the 
land� This recurrent question and the attendant challenge are not insurmountable, 
of course, and throughout history maritime states 
have pursued strategies to alleviate the limits of sea 
power and use their maritime superiority to shape 
political dynamics on land� Blockading their rivals, 
controlling inland seas, keeping a substantial conti-
nental presence, seeking the support of proxy forces 
and land-based allies, and—on a grand-strategy 
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level—managing rather than defeating the continental rival are some of the ap-
proaches that sea powers have adopted to deal with their own limits� But these 
limits are enduring, requiring continued attention; they never can be overcome 
fully—they only can be mitigated�
Even raising the possibility that sea powers have inherent weaknesses goes 
against a Mahan-inspired partiality for the historical superiority of maritime 
states� Captain (later Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, was the “evangelist of 
sea power,” writing for a rising maritime power and passionately trying to con-
vince his American audience of the greatness of sea power and the importance of 
having a navy�1 He pointed out persuasively that sea-lanes were of greater strategic 
value than land routes, and thereby highlighted the importance of who controlled 
them� “Land carriage � � � toils enviously but hopelessly behind, vainly seeking to 
replace and supplant the royal highway of nature’s own making�”2 Several decades 
before Mahan, John Adams had summed up this great faith in maritime power 
eloquently� In an 1802 letter, he wrote, 
The council which Themistocles gave to Athens—Pompey to Rome—Cromwell 
to England—DeWitt to Holland—and Colbert to France, I have always given, and 
shall continue to give to my countrymen—That as the great questions of commerce 
between nations and empires must be decided by a military marine, and war or  
peace are determined by sea, all reasonable encouragement should be given to a  
navy� The trident of Neptune is the sceptre of the world�3
Undoubtedly, control of the sea is a precondition for any far-reaching policy that 
a power such as the United States may want to pursue; without it, the United States 
is severed from the rest of the world, turning into an isolated, continental island, 
not only impotent but vulnerable to the seaborne attacks of adversaries�4 Moreover, 
sea powers have several advantages over land powers� The pressure on their borders 
tends to be lower than for their continental rivals; in the purest example, islands are 
more secure than landlocked countries� They have access to, and can control, the 
maritime arteries of regional and global commerce, making it possible for them to 
influence the economic welfare of others� They tend to have a more expansive out-
look, thinking of distant lands and seeking faraway markets� They have the means 
to attack a rival state in an unexpected location on its periphery, outflanking it and 
distracting it from its main vector of expansion� And because of their combination 
of range with relative security, sea powers tend to enjoy a diplomatic flexibility that 
a land power, surrounded by enduring enemies, lacks� Mahan, therefore, was not 
wrong when he argued—and in doing so incited envy among the leaders of land 
powers such as late-nineteenth-century Germany—that the great powers in his-
tory tended to be sea powers� Or, as Paul Kennedy qualified it, writing of the late 
nineteenth century, “Sea power, as represented by a large surface fleet, commercial 
activity, naval bases at home and abroad, remained still the best indicator of the 
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relative national power of all those nations who wished to play on the world stage�”5 
And U�S� history continues to demonstrate the benefits of being a sea power with 
access to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and the markets located on their shores�
But sea powers also have many handicaps that often are forgotten, resulting 
in a dangerous overestimation of their safety, influence, and staying power in 
a competitive world� From the Athenian Pericles to Germany’s Admiral Alfred 
von Tirpitz, many political leaders placed enormous confidence in the ability 
of maritime command to protect their countries and of naval power to defeat 
their rivals�6 It gave them a false sense of power� A more clear-eyed assessment 
of power—one less enamored of the grandeur associated with naval might— 
often revealed that such hope was unwarranted, and that it often ended up having 
tragic results for the naval aspirant or even the established sea power�
Two weaknesses—or enduring challenges that need to be addressed—have char-
acterized all sea powers in history� First, to be competitive, sea powers have to 
convert their command of the seas into political effects on land—a feat whose 
accomplishment is not automatic and requires certain conditions that often are 
outside the sea power’s control� Second, because of their flexibility in alliances 
and basing, sea powers suffer from a credibility gap that weakens their staying 
power in faraway lands�
Both of these weaknesses revolve around a core problem: that politics occur 
on land, where people live, and commanding the seas does not guarantee the 
desired political outcomes on land�7 A purely continental school of strategy—if it 
emphasizes that the only political, economic, and military dynamics that matter 
occur on land—is certainly too dismissive of the strategic benefits of sea power�8 
But a purely maritime-power grand strategy—if it does not consider how to ad-
dress the fundamental challenge of how to use command of the sea to achieve 
political outcomes on land and does not deal with the inherent limitations of sea 
power—is likely to fail� In sum, political outcomes are achieved on land, and sea 
power, under certain conditions, can be a useful tool�9 Julian S� Corbett, the Brit-
ish naval strategist concerned with how to use maritime power to influence po-
litical dynamics on the European continent, wrote that “[s]ince men live upon the 
land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been 
decided—except in the rarest cases—either by what your army can do against 
your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes 
it possible for your army to do�”10
FROM SEA TO LAND
The first weakness—the challenge of converting sea power into political effect—
is perhaps the most pervasive, and it becomes particularly evident when a sea 
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power competes with a continental rival� Translating superiority on the seas into 
political influence on land is neither automatic nor dependent exclusively on the 
sea power’s skills� In fact, the main determinant of this weakness lies in the nature 
of the sea power’s rival, particularly its exposure to and dependence on the sea� 
As James E� S� Cable put it, the “elephant is not vulnerable to the crocodile until 
his trunk dangles near the water’s edge�”11 The less reliant the rival is on the sea, 
the less vulnerable it is to a maritime blockade, for example� In such cases, from 
the sea power’s point of view, its command of the seas is less useful and offers less 
leverage than it might wish�
Historically, the advantage of sea powers stemmed from the cost-effectiveness 
of maritime navigation and the seaborne transport of goods and forces, as Ma-
han suggested in the quote given previously� Venice, for example, benefited from 
an improvement in navigation in the Mediterranean from the eleventh century 
on, driven by advances in shipbuilding, the enhanced security of key maritime 
passages, and a growing demand for high-value goods, which combined to give 
greater weight to sea-lanes over land routes� Hence, the First Crusade at the end 
of the eleventh century went mostly by land through Constantinople to Jerusa-
lem, while the Third Crusade at the end of the twelfth century proceeded more by 
sea, as did the notorious Fourth Crusade in the early thirteenth century�12 Control 
of the sea, then, bestowed something of enormous value on Venice, or any other 
power capable of holding it, because it provided leverage over other polities that 
relied increasingly on maritime commerce and transport�
A similar dynamic favored Great Britain in the nineteenth century, allowing 
it to turn its maritime dominion into diplomatic supremacy� Like Venice, Great 
Britain rose to great power 
in an era of primitive overland communications� There were few all-weather roads, no 
motor road vehicles, and only the beginnings of a railway grid� Large-scale movement 
of people and bulky freight overland, even for relatively short distances, was slow and 
costly� The advantage of water-borne transport was nearly everywhere decisive� Under 
these conditions blockade of a country’s ports could be a paralyzing experience� Fur-
thermore, it was generally quicker and cheaper in those days to travel around Europe 
than to cross it� Though the island of Britain lies on the periphery of Europe, the su-
perior mobility of movement by sea rendered the British position strategically central 
vis-à-vis every continental country, so long as the British Navy controlled the sea�13
But the strategic advantage of the seas ebbs and flows in history� Land commu-
nications are not perennially inferior and sea-lanes are not inexorably ascendant 
in strategic value� In some historical periods, a sea power may compete with a ri-
val land power that does not rely heavily on the seas, and therefore is less vulner-
able to the sea power� Therefore the ability of a maritime state to wield influence 
is diminished considerably by factors that are outside its control�
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The possibility that sea power would decrease in strategic relevance was en-
visaged by the two most famous geopolitical thinkers, Sir Halford J� Mackin-
der and Admiral Mahan� Both argued broadly that the sea powers on the outer 
edges of Eurasia were outflanking the traditional potentates on the landmass� 
But access to oceanic routes combined with the maintenance of a large navy con-
stituted a form of power that could be withstood, and perhaps at some point 
challenged, by a large, well-organized power located in the continental core� The 
principal threat to maritime dominance therefore was not another power with a 
large navy (although that, of course, could be a cause of intramaritime rivalry) 
but a continental center, impenetrable to a sea power’s sorties, united by well- 
functioning land routes, and economically self-sufficient� Another way to de-
scribe this nineteenth-century competition is that it was between steamships 
and railroads, between the efficiency of naval navigation and the speed of land 
transport� But the general principle has applied throughout history: control of the 
sea matters in a competition between sea and land powers only when maritime 
routes are vital to the latter�
The corollary of this principle is that sea powers have a strong interest in pre-
venting the improvement of land routes that could unify a continental power 
or, more broadly, that would shift commerce away from the sea� But at the same 
time they have a limited ability to shape this balance of advantages between land 
and sea routes� They certainly may try to obstruct the development of conti-
nental commerce and to compensate with technological innovations in mari-
time navigation, but the outcome of this balance does not lie exclusively in their 
own hands� The land power can engage in efforts, such as railroad building in 
nineteenth-century continental Europe or the development of pipelines and 
roads across Eurasia in more-recent decades (e�g�, China’s OBOR efforts), that 
are to a large degree impervious to the sea power’s influence and may result in a 
considerable diminishment of its grip over the continent�14
As the continental power’s dependence on and vulnerability to the sea de-
crease, the maritime power has to figure out other ways to exercise pressure on 
land� As a tool, a naval blockade of an enemy is very selective (targeting a spe-
cific power and not others) and low risk (easy to turn on and off); however, it 
works only if the targeted state relies on the sea�15 And in any case, while a naval 
blockade can starve a land power of vital resources, hurting its economy and 
society, on its own it cannot dislodge the rival from a piece of territory or defeat 
it comprehensively� The naval power may hope to be able to change the enemy’s 
behavior by merely showing its ships offshore, coercing the rival by the prom-
ise of punishment, especially along its coastline�16 Modern airpower extends the 
range of naval forces, making targets deep inside the continental mass vulnerable 
and reinforcing the threat of a seaborne standoff attack� But, like a naval-artillery 
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barrage, this is an exercise in targeting that may have limited lasting effects on 
local political dynamics�17 In the end, there may be a need to inflict a defeat on 
the continental power, or at least to establish control over a coastal area, and to 
achieve such an objective airpower and ships floating at a distance do not suf-
fice�18 The mere control of sea-lanes and the threat of a maritime blockade are 
insufficient to influence the behavior of a continental rival that has a limited ex-
posure to and reliance on the sea�
To penetrate the rival state’s continental shell and have a significant effect on its 
political and economic dynamics, sea powers historically had three main options: 
amphibious assaults (resulting in the establishment of a presence) on the enemy’s 
coastal regions, pressure on the rival’s land borders, and control over internal seas�19
Continental Military Presence
The first option is perhaps the most visible, because it involves fleets delivering 
forces onto shore, followed by sieges of cities and other land battles� Usually, 
however, such an attack on a coastal fortress or port has been extremely limited 
in geographic scope, and has not been followed by a massive and lengthy inva-
sion of the rival’s territory� Most historical maritime powers, from Venice to Great 
Britain, focused on ports and other strategic outposts along sea-lanes; they were 
aware that territorial control required manpower and resources that their states 
did not have and that were better used on the sea in any case� Instead, the sea 
power’s purpose was to deprive a rival of a safe harbor so it could damage the 
rival’s fleet, reduce its seaborne commerce by attrition, or both� Of course, 
another gain was a base for its own use� Only rarely, however, could it actually 
overthrow the hostile polity�20
A limited continental commitment permitted the sea power to maintain a focus 
on the maritime realm, keeping control of the sea-lanes and accessing distant mar-
kets and cities� But the disadvantage was that it had a narrow effect on the hostile 
land power, and in fact the absence of a long-term presence on the continent ex-
posed the sea power to the rise of land threats that remained unchecked until the 
only option to deal with them was appeasement�21 For instance, with the excep-
tion of the Fourth Crusade’s targeting the imperial remnants of Byzantium, Venice 
never fully defeated the rival continental power in question, such as the Ottoman 
Empire or Hungary� It could thwart a competitor from accessing and controlling a 
sliver of the sea, or it could inflict a punishing raid on an outpost that was within 
easy reach of the sea, but it could not overpower its enemy�22 Land-based allies are 
a way for sea powers to compensate for a limited continental commitment, but the 
strength of such alliances is tied to the sea power’s guarantee to the allies, dem-
onstrated by its durable physical presence� These land-based allies thus are not 
an alternative to a sea power’s continental commitment but an integral part of it�
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Continental powers can be defeated only by depriving them of land, con-
quering their territories piecemeal, and weakening and devastating their armies 
through battles�23 As a result, maritime powers, whose efforts focus on the sea and 
who often are very sensitive to casualties, are more inclined to use diplomacy to 
conciliate their rivals rather than to embark on a land expedition aimed at territo-
rial conquest and defeat of their enemies� The inherent limitations they have on 
land lead them toward a grand strategy of managing, rather than defeating, their 
continental rivals�
Pressure on the Rival’s Land Frontier
Creating pressure along the rival’s land borders is another option at the disposal 
of the sea power� The goal is to inflict costs on the continental enemy, most im-
portantly to redirect its attention from the sea to its immediate neighbors along 
a land frontier�24 Land borders have a powerful diversionary effect because they 
shape the security of the state’s homeland most immediately� Mahan went so far 
as to suggest “the inability of a state with even a single continental frontier to 
compete in naval development with one that is insular, although of smaller popu-
lations and resources,” indicating the enormous vulnerability any state experi-
ences on its land side�25 A sea power, then, can take advantage of this weakness of 
the enemy by generating pressure on its rival’s land frontier� But usually, because 
of logistical difficulties or a lack of suitable resources, a sea power pursues such a 
strategy indirectly, through the forces of other states or groups� Such an approach 
requires diplomacy—that is, some form of bribery or subsidies—that can con-
vince the rival’s neighbors to push on the land frontier� Or, in some other cases, 
the sea power can create conditions for an exacerbated rivalry on land among 
various powers by inciting conflicts and skillfully shifting its support from one 
side to the other�
Yet ultimately, the outcome is in the hands of other actors, leaving the sea 
power at their mercy and requiring a constant and skillful diplomatic effort to 
keep them either on its side or in conflict with each other� At any point, these 
powers jockeying for control on land can reach a deal to end their conflict, leav-
ing the sea power without a means to exercise influence on the continent� The 
geopolitical nightmare for Great Britain, for instance, was the rise of a conti-
nental alliance—a “thievish partnership” between France and Russia—that would 
cut Britain off from Europe and challenge its interests in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East�26 During World War II, the great fear in London and Washing-
ton was that Stalin would reach a separate peace with Hitler—another Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact—leaving the maritime powers without a way to exert pressure on 
Germany’s eastern land borders�27 Similarly, today the great geopolitical question 
for the United States is whether Russia will be more aligned with China—estab-
lishing a continental entente—rather than maintaining a lengthy land frontier of 
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friction� In brief, relying on another power to establish lasting sources of con-
tinental diversion of a rival is a sometimes necessary but potentially precarious 
strategy for the sea power�
Control of Internal Seas
The third way for a sea power to influence a land rival’s actions is to control the 
internal seas of and the “brown waters” immediately adjacent to the opponent� 
These are waters that either are surrounded by land or pierce the continental 
shell, in the form of bays or channels between coasts and nearby islands� Each 
bay, inlet, or river can become a “dagger into the interior�”28 For the land power, 
they function as internal routes, linking one region to another through water-
ways rather than roads, on top of serving as access points to the wider seas� A 
sea power that establishes naval superiority in such waters can control the move-
ments along the coast and even riverine trade, and by doing so it can impose 
costs on the rival, translating the power of the navy into economic and political 
effects on land�
Throughout history, rivers have enabled crucial extensions of sea power, al-
lowing a maritime state to extend influence along the internal arteries of com-
merce, where a large percentage of the local population also tended to live (e�g�, 
the Congo River for the Belgians, the Red [or Hong] River for the French in 
Indochina)�29 This is a lesson that Mahan drew from history as well as from his 
personal experience as an officer in the Union navy during the American Civil 
War� In his first book, The Gulf and Inland Waters (1883), he describes how the 
Union’s control of coastal waters from Key West to the outlet of the Rio Grande 
and its penetration along the Mississippi River hemmed in the Confederate 
states�30 These Union naval efforts, on top of imposing serious economic costs 
through a blockade of the South, fractured the enemy’s territorial integrity�
But a brown-water strategy also reveals a sea power’s weakness, because it is 
an imperfect substitute for an intervention and presence on land� It works best as 
a joint operation in conjunction with land forces that sea powers, as mentioned 
earlier, often are reluctant to use� Such a limited, or supporting, role was assigned 
to U�S� naval forces in the Mediterranean during the early Cold War, to back the 
main efforts of allied forces in a land war in Europe and, in the best-case scenario, 
to open a second front on the southern flank of the USSR to divert some of the 
Soviet forces away from their westward march�31
Moreover, while the naval power can break a continental state’s territorial in-
tegrity by establishing naval superiority in these brown waters, the land power 
equally can deny control of these waters to its rival without having to build a 
matching fleet�32 Often the nature of internal waters, whether bays or larger seas 
circumscribed by land, is such that they can be controlled through a continental 
108
Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 4, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/1
 G RYG I E L  1 0 3
strategy of dominating key pieces of real estate� The positioning of land forces, and 
in some cases small littoral fleets, on strategic choke points (such as the Gallip- 
oli Peninsula on the Dardanelles Strait or the deeply embayed Dalmatian coast) 
can serve to harass, and even deny passage to, the sea power’s navy� Such a conti-
nental strategy creates bastions along the littoral that constrain the naval move-
ments of a maritime rival� In the most modern iteration of this approach, a land 
power such as Russia or China can deny access to a maritime power through the 
development of weapons that from the coast can threaten to inflict unacceptable 
costs on a hostile naval force (the so-called antiaccess/area-denial approach)�33
An even more ambitious strategy for a land power is to conquer the coast sur-
rounding the sea, challenging the rival state’s naval superiority by denying it access 
to ports and safe harbors� As Napoléon allegedly said in 1806, his goal was “to 
conquer the sea through the power of land�”34 Similarly, the ancient Roman Re-
public pursued a continental, rather than a thalassocentric, strategy, extending 
control over the circumference of the Mediterranean Sea�35 The Russian empire 
also sought to enclose the Black and Baltic Seas from the seventeenth century on�36 
This is a form of sea power by coastal control that continental powers can achieve 
despite the rival’s naval superiority� In fact, naval superiority loses its effectiveness 
in semienclosed seas�37 The competition among great powers as a struggle of na-
vies versus land forces was made more pronounced—while perhaps benefiting the 
land powers more—by the gunpowder revolution and the advent of coastal artil-
lery from the fifteenth century on�38 Another way to put this is that a land power 
can exercise control over internal or semienclosed seas without having naval supe-
riority; it can establish control of the sea without having command of it�
Sea powers’ weakness, then, is that they may be unable to translate their superior-
ity on the seas into political effects on land� And if they cannot project influence 
on land or if they control sea-lanes that are irrelevant to their rivals, then their 
naval capability is an expensive, capital-intensive resource that is of but limited 
use in statecraft� It can bring them wealth and even protect them from potentially 
hostile forces coming from the sea, but beyond this limited defensive role it has 
little influence over the land powers� Hence, Rome succeeded in preventing an 
attack on its home territory from Macedonia, an ally of the Carthaginian Hanni-
bal, simply by positioning a naval squadron in the Adriatic near Brindisi, so that 
“not a soldier of the phalanxes ever set foot in Italy�”39 But such a show of force is 
more useful to prevent an attack than to force the rival to accept more-onerous 
conditions; it is a tool of prevention and deterrence, not of compulsion� As illus-
trated by the fifth-century BC war between Athens and Sparta, control of the sea 
allows the maritime power to survive, but it does not suffice as a means to defeat 
the land rival�40
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SEA-POWER FLEXIBILITY AND DIPLOMATIC PERFIDY
Sea powers face a second considerable limitation� Since they are blessed with 
many strategic options of where to project their force, this flexibility decreases 
the credibility of their staying power in any given location�41 This is what the 
English philosopher and statesman Francis Bacon suggested, perhaps inadver-
tently, when he wrote that “he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may 
take as much or as little of the war as he will�”42 The relative ease of movement 
that maritime powers have—for instance, to show up in distant places through 
multiple sea routes—bestows an advantage over a land power that must focus 
on its immediate neighbors�43 The American political scientist Nicholas J� Spyk-
man observed as much when he envisioned the nature of continental expan-
sion as a series of concentric circles, made predictable in their sequencing by 
the necessary contiguity of territorial control� Maritime powers can hop from 
point to point, skipping difficult-to-control outposts or changing their market 
outlets�44 Hence, as the American strategic theorist Admiral J� C� Wylie, USN, 
described it, “the sailor or airman thinks in terms of an entire world, [while] 
the soldier at work thinks in terms of theaters, in terms of campaigns, or in 
terms of battles�”45
But this tactical luxury of high mobility has diplomatic costs� The possibility 
of moving away with little effort also can translate into an easy exit for a maritime 
power� This flexibility can be interpreted as fecklessness� As a result, every time 
a maritime power establishes a presence on a distant coast or island, it does so 
under the shadow of doubt regarding the strength of its long-term commitment� 
And even when a sea power is locked in a relentless competition with a continen-
tal rival, its limitations mentioned earlier push it toward a policy of managing the 
rival—which at times may include appeasing and even aligning with it� The dif-
ficulty that sea powers have in defeating a continental power makes them at least 
seem unreliable to other polities that may be in the path of a given land power’s 
expansionistic impulses� Unreliability can translate into diplomatic perfidy, with 
the sea power committing to land-based alliances but lacking either the capacity 
to protect allies fully from their continental rival or the will to devote sufficient 
resources to defeat the enemy�
The simplest geographic variable—distance—affects not just the abil-
ity to deliver power (the effect of the so-called power gradient: the farther 
the projection of power, the more costly and less effective it is) but also cred-
ibility� Venice, for instance, had an easier time convincing its rivals of its com-
mitment to maintaining a monopoly over trade at the nearby outlet of the Po 
River than it did of its intention to maintain its long-term presence in the Ae-
gean Sea and the eastern Mediterranean islands� Maintaining its stato da mar 
possessions in the Mediterranean required constant efforts and repeated 
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reconquests� Rebellious indigenous populations (e�g�, in Crete) may have calcu-
lated—like every guerrilla force in history—that their commitment to their own 
islands was infinitely firmer than that of the distant Venetians�46
The relative weakness of credibility consumes resources because sea powers 
have to use force constantly to demonstrate their willingness to stay in a distant 
place� Thus, being a sea power is an expensive proposition, not only because of 
the costs associated with maintaining a superior naval force, but also because of 
the unremitting demands to show presence in faraway lands, to maintain cus-
tody over vital ports, and to respond to recurrent mutinies in distant outposts�
The protection the seas offer gives the maritime power the leeway to aban-
don allies without suffering a dramatic loss of security� Whether the allies ac-
tually are abandoned is less relevant than the reputation for unreliability that 
attaches to a sea power� It was just such a reputation that gave England the 
moniker “Perfidious Albion�” As seventeenth-century French bishop Jacques-
Bénigne Bossuet put it in a sermon, “England, perfidious England, which the 
ramparts of her seas made inaccessible to the Romans�”47 The security that the 
sea provides goes hand in hand with a latent detachment—which others often 
interpret as perfidy�
The grip of sea powers over the continents is precarious, even when they 
dominate the oceans� They can endure protracted great-power competitions, 
win wars, accumulate the most fabulous fortunes, establish footholds in the far-
thest ends of the earth, and even become objects of jealous emulation for states 
locked in a continental bastion� But they also have serious limitations that stem 
from their very nature as masters of the seas, because their maritime strength 
has limited effects on land� There are, of course, answers to these constraints, 
ranging from vying for control of inland seas to keeping some presence on the 
continent, but they only mitigate the limitations, which remain as enduring 
features of maritime powers� The American historian Theodore Ropp alleg-
edly would walk into his classroom, point to a world map, and announce to his 
students that “everything blue belongs to us�” The problem, of course, was how 
to translate such control of the “blue” into a victory that included control over 
the “brown” and the “green�”48
The logical conclusion of this analysis of a sea power’s limits is that two 
conditions must be present (although not necessarily simultaneously) for a sea 
power to have an effective strategy and to compete successfully with a land 
rival� First, the sea power must maintain a continental presence�49 The extent 
and scope of that presence will vary, as they necessarily are linked to the pecu-
liarities of the moment; the effort may require massive physical presence (e�g�, 
American involvement in the European campaign in World War II), aid to 
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guerrillas (e�g�, the British approach in the early-nineteenth-century Peninsular 
War), or large bases and powerful allies (e�g�, the late-twentieth-century U�S� 
approach)� But without such a presence, the translation of maritime power into 
continental influence is sporadic at best and impossible at worst�
The second condition is that the continental rival must be exposed to the sea 
and be vulnerable to a threat of disruption of its access to sea-lanes� The assess-
ment of this second condition should shape the sea power’s efforts on the first 
condition; the less vulnerable to the sea the land power is, the greater the neces-
sity for the sea power to have a continental presence� For example, the USSR 
was not very dependent on maritime commerce, and thus was less susceptible 
to the threat of a naval blockade� Moreover, its main vectors of expansion were 
on the Eurasian landmass, with internal lines of communication, and hence its 
efforts were less vulnerable to Western maritime interdiction� Thus, the United 
States had to have a large continental presence in Europe to exercise deterrence 
and influence Soviet behavior� Now, China’s economy is more vulnerable to the 
sea, and an American naval presence demonstrating our command of the seas 
is our primary effort at affecting its behavior� But if Beijing firms up its control 
over land routes linking China with the rest of Eurasia, creating a continental 
core, American naval forces floating in the Pacific Ocean will have considerably 
less effect on its decisions and behavior�
Eventually, the risk all sea powers face is that they will end up like the 
French man-of-war positioned off the African coast described by the Polish-
British writer Joseph Conrad� “In the empty immensity of earth, sky, and water, 
there she was, incomprehensible, firing into a continent�” Nothing happened, of 
course, because “nothing could happen,” even though there must have been a 
“camp of natives � � � hidden out of sight somewhere�”50 “Firing into the conti-
nent” is an activity that may give the impression of might, but in fact has little 
impact�
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to the methodical maneuvers of entire fleets�” 
Consequently, regional powers such as Italy 
and France in the early twentieth century de-
veloped “shore based aircraft, heavily gunned 
cruisers, and heavy battleships� The carrier 
and the big flying boat were both unneces-
sary and the capital ship for such conditions 
needed to be as nearly unsinkable as possi-
ble�” The absence of long-distance maneuvers 
meant short, sharp, and close-quarter fights, 
requiring a different technological solution� 
Ropp, “Continental Doctrines of Sea Power,” 
p� 455�
 39� Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea 
Power upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1898), p� 16�
 40� This weakness of the sea power facing a land 
power also was evident during the Napole-
onic Wars� Napoléon had to be defeated on 
land, by armies, and while the naval might of 
Great Britain could prevent a French expan-
sion outside continental Europe, it could 
not arrest the movement of the Napoleonic 
forces on land� The role of the navy there-
fore was merely defensive, and the British 
Empire needed an army, preferably small, for 
offensive purposes, such as the defeat of a 
land rival� As a historian puts it, “despite the 
famous dictum of Admiral Mahan, it was not 
‘those far-distant, storm-beaten ships, upon 
which the Grand Army never looked’ that 
defeated Napoleon, simply because the Grand 
Army never looked upon them�” J� F� Lazenby, 
“Naval Warfare in the Ancient World: Myths 
and Realities,” International History Review 9, 
no� 3 (August 1987), p� 441� Also see Robert 
Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and 
the Coming of the Great War (New York: 
Random House, 1991), p� 626�
 41� This limitation is related, of course, to the 
features that characterize a navy� Ken Booth 
lists the following seven: versatility, control-
lability, mobility, projection ability, access 
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potential, symbolism, and endurance� The 
last one, endurance, may appear to contra-
dict the point I make here—namely, that sea 
powers have a credibility problem owing to 
their great flexibility� But Booth refers to the 
ability of a few ships to stay put in a particular 
location for weeks and months, not to the 
enduring ties that a maritime power may 
develop to a distant location� Navies, by their 
very nature, can move away with great ease, 
even if they have the endurance to stay at sea� 
Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, pp� 33–35�
 42� In his elegy on sea power, Bacon added that 
the “vantage of strength at sea (which is one 
of the principal dowries of this kingdom of 
Great Britain) is great � � � because most of the 
kingdoms of Europe are not merely inland, 
but girt with the sea most part of their com-
pass�” Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis 
Bacon (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1842), 
vol� 1, p� 39�
 43� An ancillary consequence is that sea powers 
often generate a mentality of insouciance 
regarding or disinterest in the affairs of the 
land� Joseph Conrad described it best: “In 
the immutability of their surroundings the 
foreign shores, the foreign faces, the changing 
immensity of life, glide past, veiled not by a 
sense of mystery but by a slightly disdainful 
ignorance; for there is nothing mysterious to 
a seaman unless it be the sea itself, which is 
the mistress of his existence and as inscru-
table as Destiny� For the rest, after his hours 
of work, a casual stroll or a casual spree on 
shore suffices to unfold for him the secret of 
a whole continent, and generally he finds the 
secret not worth knowing�” Joseph Conrad, 
The Heart of Darkness, in Youth and Two 
Other Stories (New York: Doubleday, Page, 
1924), p� 48�
 44� “A sea power conquers a large space by leap-
ing lightly from point to point, adjusting itself 
to existing political relationships wherever 
possible, and often not establishing its legal 
control until its factual domination has 
long been tacitly recognized� An expanding 
land power moves slowly and methodically 
forward, forced by the nature of its terrain to 
establish its control step by step and so pre-
serve the mobility of its forces� Thus, a land 
power thinks in terms of continuous surfaces 
surrounding a central point of control, while 
a sea power thinks in terms of points and 
connecting lines dominating an immense ter-
ritory�” Nicholas J� Spykman, “Geography and 
Foreign Policy, II,” American Political Science 
Review 32, no� 2 (April 1938), p� 224�
 45� Joseph C� Wylie Jr� [Rear Adm�, USN], 
Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power 
Control (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1967; 
repr� 1980), p� 49�
 46� For the classic history of Venice and its 
constant trade-offs between the Italian main-
land and its Mediterranean possessions, see 
Frederic Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ� Press, 
1973)� On Venice’s stato da mar, see David 
Jacoby, “La Venezia d’Oltremare,” in Storia di 
Venezia, vol� 2, L’età del Comune, ed� Giorgio  
Cracco and Gherardo Ortalli (Rome: Istituto 
della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1995), pp� 263–99�
 47� Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, Oeuvres com- 
plètes de Bossuet (Besançon, Fr�: Outhenin-
Chalandre Fils, 1840–41), vol� 5, p� 264�
 48� See James Stokesbury, review of Command of 
the Sea: The History and Strategy of Maritime 
Empires, by Clark Reynolds, Naval War Col-
lege Review 38, no� 2 (March–April 1985), p� 
118�
 49� On the necessity of a “joint” approach to sea 
and land power, see also Carnes Lord, “The 
Leverage of Sea Power,” Comparative Strategy 
40, no� 2 (2021), pp� 194–97�
 50� Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p� 62�
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 Germany’s war at sea from 1939 to 1945 commonly is characterized as a submarine (U-boat) war with minor appearances by famous but ineffectual 
battleships� Indeed, Winston Churchill famously wrote that the only thing that 
“ever really frightened” him during the war was the U-boat menace, and scholar-
ship on the Second World War at sea largely has reinforced the perception that 
the only meaningful threat the German navy posed during the war came from its 
submarines� While much has been written on the famous engagements between 
Germany’s major capital ships—in particular Admiral Graf Spee, Bismarck, and 
Scharnhorst—and their British pursuers, these episodes tend to be treated as 
singular or as exceptional to the general conduct of the war at sea�1 These surface 
battles are rarely placed in a strategic context� Admiral Erich Raeder, head of the 
German navy at the time, wrote at the outbreak of war with Britain and France that 
the German surface fleet could “do no more than show that they know how to die 
gallantly and thus are willing to create the foundations for later reconstruction�”2 
He stated later, in his memoirs, that “[s]ooner or later our [surface] raiders would 
inevitably wear out, and their importance in the war picture wane� But I hoped that 
by that time our submarines would be strong enough to take their place against 
the enemy with even greater effect�”3 Taken out of broader strategic context, both 
statements give the impression that Germany’s surface fleet was inevitably doomed 
against the Allied navies and merely bought time for the U-boat’s ascendancy�
While Germany’s naval war from 1942 on was waged primarily by U-boats, its 
surface fleet played a far more significant strategic 
role in the first half of the war than is appreciated 
popularly� Furthermore, the construction of Ger-
many’s surface fleet was not the result of myopic 
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or traditionalist naval officers desiring to revive the mighty Hochseeflotte (High 
Seas Fleet) of the First World War, as often is assumed� Rather, it was the result of 
considered appraisals of the German navy’s performance in the First World War 
and the development of naval technology during the interwar period�
And despite his initial pessimism and postwar recollections, Admiral Raeder 
had not given up on the surface fleet’s prospects against enemy shipping and na-
val concentration when war broke out in 1939� Until 1942, the German surface 
fleet managed to disperse British forces effectively and wage economic warfare 
against British shipping in conjunction with the U-boat campaign� Plans also 
were made—though never fully realized—to challenge British naval power di-
rectly by the deployment of the surface fleet, inflict a decisive blow against British 
shipping, and win the war at sea� It was only in 1941 and 1942, with the destruc-
tion of Bismarck and the relocation of German surface forces away from the At-
lantic, that the war at sea between Britain and Germany shifted predominantly 
to a “U-boat war�”
LEARNING THE LESSONS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1918–30
It long has been believed that between the world wars German naval officers 
remained fixated on large surface ships and a somewhat caricatured version of 
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea-power theories, convinced that a decisive engagement 
between large surface fleets was the only way to ensure control of the sea for the 
victor�4 Therefore, it often is argued, the German navy was unprepared for the 
Second World War because it failed to realize the full potential of U-boats�5 More 
recently, some historians have challenged the view that navies the world over 
were really so wedded to the presumption of the battleship’s tactical primacy�6 
Building on these recent analyses, an examination of the postwar reflections of 
German naval officers shows that planners had a far more nuanced, considered, 
and realistic appraisal of the First World War’s U-boat campaign, which helps 
explain why Germany devoted such significant resources to constructing surface 
warships before the outbreak of the Second World War�
The recovery of the German navy after the First World War was a long and ardu-
ous process� The Treaty of Versailles permitted the Weimar Republic to maintain a 
Reichsmarine that was largely a coastal force, and it forbade U-boats until modified 
by the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement� Although the German navy main-
tained a focus on continental defense throughout most of the interwar period, this 
did not mean that officers failed to reflect on the First World War at sea� Indeed, 
operational analyses were undertaken throughout the 1920s, often in the guise of 
historical studies, with the intention of reviewing the use of naval power in another 
global conflict�7 These studies provide key insights into the professional mind-set 
that would inform the development of the German surface fleet later, in the 1930s�
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While historians have regarded the unrestricted U-boat warfare campaign of 
the First World War as heralding the ascendancy of U-boats (and later airpower) 
over battleships, to many German contemporaries this was not the reality� In-
deed, even during the unrestricted U-boat campaign there was a growing real-
ization that the U-boats could not deliver a decisive blow against Britain’s vital 
shipping� In spite of a promising start, the U-boats were not able to stop shipping 
from reaching Britain, and their efforts to do so helped bring the United States 
into the war against Germany�8 Initial efforts during the First World War to hunt 
down and destroy the U-boats were ineffective because to that point there was 
no means of locating and destroying submerged U-boats� The situation changed 
in 1917 with the introduction of the convoy system, in which clustered merchant 
ships were protected by escort vessels equipped with a variety of antisubmarine-
warfare (ASW) devices�9 Notably, interview data from captured German U-
boat crews showed a recognition that U-boats alone could not bring victory to 
Germany�10
In an attempt to aid the U-boats’ efforts, beginning in late 1917 the Imperial 
German Navy deployed its surface fleet to support the U-boats� Admiral Rein-
hard Scheer, who had been the commander in chief of the High Seas Fleet during 
the 1916 Battle of Jutland, recounted in his memoirs that by deploying the fleet to 
attack North Sea convoys, it was hoped that “[a]part from depriving the enemy of 
the supplies he awaited, it would place him under the necessity of affording better 
protection to the neutral shipping placed at his service, for which more warships 
would be required; these, again, would have to be taken from among those oc-
cupied in the war on U-boats�”11
The German fleet did place renewed strain on the Allies and presented the 
Germans with an opportunity to harass both components of British sea power, its 
military strength and resources, which U-boats had been unable to do on their 
own� Sir Henry Newbolt, a historian for Britain’s Committee of Imperial Defence, 
writing during the interwar period, noted that the assignment of battle squad-
rons to protect convoys against enemy surface ships “was a great departure from 
the principle of rigid concentration which had dominated the organization and 
employment of the [British] Grand Fleet since the war began: it was illustrative 
of the extent to which the war against commerce had engaged our strength and 
resources�”12 By the end of the war, the High Seas Fleet had been able to show only 
meager results in support of the unrestricted U-boat-warfare campaign� None-
theless, as noted, even during the war it became clear that U-boats were incapable 
of delivering a decisive blow to Britain on their own� Thus, reflecting on the con-
duct of the war at sea throughout the 1920s, key German officers emphasized that 
the potential represented by cooperation between U-boats and the surface fleet, 
while heretofore unrealized, was nonetheless real�
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Rear Admiral Arno Spindler was charged with the construction and develop-
ment of Germany’s U-boats during the First World War� Later he headed the bu-
reau studying ASW, established in 1925� In an essay written in 1926, he acknowl-
edged that “[a]s long as submarines exist they will continue to be a threat to those 
nations which are unconditionally forced to rely upon overseas transportation�” 
On the other hand, he recognized the effect the British surface warships had, 
especially their blockading of the North Sea, stressing that “the purely military 
employment of the submarines”—that is, the targeting of enemy warships rather 
than merchant ships—“was prematurely brought to a close�”13 If the U-boats had 
been deployed more effectively against warships, he argued, they might have 
proved invaluable in breaking the blockade� In this vein, Captain Albert Gayer, 
a senior officer in the U-boat arm during the war, also noted several attempts 
at conducting operations with the surface fleet against enemy warships (in one 
such foray, in August 1917, the British lost two cruisers to U-boats deployed in 
ambush) and also drew attention to unrealized plans for asymmetrical warfare 
conducted by air, surface, and U-boat units�14
With regard to using U-boats as commerce raiders, Spindler, Gayer, and oth-
ers argued that U-boats needed to be made larger to increase their operational 
range and better armed for engaging convoy escorts, even on the surface�15 Gayer 
assessed the potential of these large vessels, known as U-cruisers, late in the war 
as follows: “The British regarded with great anxiety these new developments in 
submarine warfare, and the greater possibilities which existed as a result of this 
expansion of submarine warfare� That these operations would extend far beyond 
the field of the British counter-measures was better understood in England than 
in Germany; hence their characterization that the Germans had given up their 
weapons ‘five minutes’ too soon�”16 In apparent validation of Gayer’s ideas, former 
German submariners were working on the other side of the world to help the Im-
perial Japanese Navy design a submarine fleet that ended up closely resembling 
the U-cruiser concept�17
Wolfgang Wegener, a flag officer during the interwar period, was arguably one 
of the most influential personalities within the Reichsmarine�18 In his main work, 
The Naval Strategy of the World War, published in 1927, he characterized the 
effectiveness of the unrestricted U-boat campaign and the British blockade of 
Germany as being akin (to use a modern term) to mutually assured destruction: 
“[W]e starved in jail and almost succeeded in making our jailer starve with us�”19 
In other words, while U-boats were able to attack Britain’s vital maritime ship-
ping, the blockade imposed by the Royal Navy effectively left Germany unable to 
access its own vital shipping� He concludes that, “[a]s valuable as the submarine 
campaign may have been, it gained only partial command of the sea� The subma-
rine can destroy sea lanes but cannot protect them� Submarines can dive under a 
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blockade but cannot break it�”20 Overcoming those obstacles still would require a 
powerful surface fleet�
Finally, the development of asdic (a primitive sonar named after the Anti- 
Submarine Detection Investigation Committee) also reinforced during the inter-
war period the view that ASW outmatched the capability of U-boats� By sending 
out pulses that would rebound off a submerged U-boat’s hull, asdic could provide 
its approximate location� The device was developed but not used operationally 
during the First World War� Historical examination suggests that while the Royal 
Navy placed undue faith in and reliance on asdic during the interwar period, it 
did so to dissuade potential rivals from developing U-boats�21 Karl Dönitz, Rae-
der’s successor and the head of the U-boat arm during the Second World War, 
later boasted in his memoirs, “I did not consider that the efficient working of 
ASDIC had been proved, and in any case I had no intention of allowing myself 
to be intimidated by British disclosures�”22 Yet, according to Peter Padfield, “un-
certainty about the range and effectiveness of ASDIC influenced U-boat Com-
manders right up to the outbreak of war,” and Dönitz as well�23 Thus, right up to 
the very eve of the Second World War, even the head of the U-boat arm did not 
believe that U-boats offered a viable alternative to a surface fleet�
Although focusing on U-boat performance during the First World War, these 
studies help to explain the later development of the German surface fleet� The 
use of U-boats as a war-winning weapon in the First World War ultimately was 
considered a failure� The limitations on the U-boat’s armament and operational 
range meant that Germany was unable to challenge the British blockade effective-
ly or operate in distant theaters� The implementation of the convoy system and 
the development of ASW devices, and later asdic, also appeared to undermine 
the wartime potential of U-boats� Given these limitations and the restrictions 
imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, it was a reasonable belief that a surface fleet 
would continue to be the decisive factor in the employment of naval power in any 
future conflict�
This did not mean that U-boats were neglected completely� Rather, it appeared 
that U-boats could not be relied on as a stand-alone decisive weapon and did 
not offer a realistic alternative for the revival of the German navy in the interwar 
period until nearly the outbreak of the Second World War, as will be discussed� 
Instead, several German officers speculated on how U-boats and surface forces 
could be of mutually beneficial use�
For Erich Raeder, the future head of the German navy, the First World War 
also suggested that the surface fleet would continue to be decisive in any future 
global war� Raeder spent part of his interwar career posted to the archives, work-
ing on a dissertation focused on cruiser warfare for the official history of the 
German war at sea� Although he is characterized as a staunch traditionalist of the 
121
Naval War College: Autumn 2021 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 1 1 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
“Mahan school,” one who sought decisive battle to achieve maritime hegemony, 
his work during this period suggests otherwise�24 Keith Bird, Raeder’s biographer, 
argues that in his analysis of Vice Admiral Maximilian von Spee’s Far East Asian 
Cruiser Squadron, “Raeder noted the disruption and dislocation of troop move-
ments and Allied shipping caused by the threat posed by Spee’s ships, as well as 
the large number of warships diverted to search for his squadron and the lone 
raiders such as the Emden and Karlsruhe�”25 Indeed, rather than dismissing the 
impact of Spee’s squadron as a distraction from a decisive battle with the British 
in the North Sea, Raeder instead noted that “this Squadron affected conditions 
at almost every British Station, and materially altered the strengths in the main 
theater of the war, no fewer than three battlecruisers being withdrawn from the 
North Sea at the same time; this weakening of the Grand Fleet should have had 
a definite influence on the attitude of the German Naval Staff and the Higher 
Command�”26
Raeder’s interest in cruiser warfare and using surface warships to disperse an 
opponent’s naval force possibly dates from 1914, when Vice Admiral Franz Hip-
per, whom Raeder served as chief of staff, proposed to use fast battle cruisers to 
break out into the Atlantic to conduct such operations, hoping to disperse the 
British Grand Fleet that was tasked with bottling up the High Seas Fleet in the 
North Sea�27
Raeder found validation for his evaluation of Spee’s squadron from French 
naval theorist Admiral Raoul Castex� Castex posited that a favorable situation for 
a weaker naval power could be created by strategic maneuver to force a dispersal 
of superior enemy forces, and notably he used Spee’s squadron as an unrealized 
example�28 The influence of Castex on Raeder has received almost no historical 
attention, although it challenges the assumption that Raeder’s understanding of 
sea power was fundamentally, if simplistically, Mahanian�29 Years later, during the 
lead-up to the Second World War, the potential value of undermining superior 
sea power by dispersing one’s own naval forces and attacking the opponent’s ship-
ping was Raeder’s guiding strategic principle�
REARMING: THE EVOLUTION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE  
GERMAN NAVY, 1930–39
Throughout the 1930s, the German navy underwent a process of rearmament 
that saw the capital ship retain its supremacy as the main arbiter of naval power� 
This was not because of a manic fixation on big ships; rather, it was because 
capital ships offered the most-effective means of exercising naval power, owing 
to improvements in their operational range, armaments, propulsion, and armor� 
In contrast, the performance of U-boats barely had improved since 1918; they 
continued to suffer from poor visibility on the surface, leaving them vulnerable 
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to surprise attack, and near immobility when submerged� As a platform they had 
restricted armament, while speed remained generally constrained� Still, several 
innovations would elevate the importance of the U-boat within the fleet�30
Under the Treaty of Versailles, the six obsolete battleships permitted to the 
Reichsmarine could be replaced in the 1930s, although the new ships were not 
to exceed ten thousand tons� As a result, the new ships sacrificed the heavy ar-
mament and protection of a standard battleship for the high speed of a cruiser, 
leading to a hybrid capital ship termed a Panzerschiff (armored ship), colloquially 
known as a pocket battleship� The first to be laid down, Deutschland, possessed 
a limited main armament of six eleven-inch guns, accompanied by a secondary 
armament of eight six-inch guns and eight torpedo tubes� This comparatively 
paltry armament was compensated for with a maximum speed of twenty-eight 
knots, unmatched by any battleship of the time�31 Another novel feature was its 
diesel engines, which provided an astounding ten-thousand-nautical-mile range 
at twenty knots without needing to refuel—alleviating what had been a major 
handicap of the High Seas Fleet�32 These capabilities led German strategists to 
theorize that the Panzerschiff could prey almost at will on enemy shipping by 
outrunning more-powerful opponents and outgunning weaker ones�33
Germany’s naval rearmament plan seemingly was vindicated in June 1935 
with the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement� The potential threat 
that Deutschland posed had spurred Britain to conclude the agreement to cap 
Germany’s naval revival and reduce the pace of rearmament in Europe�34 It per-
mitted Germany a 35 percent parity to the Royal Navy in surface ship tonnage 
and 45 percent in U-boat tonnage—beyond the Versailles restrictions�35 How-
ever, thereafter Adolf Hitler pursued a continentally focused rearmament policy, 
and only another two Panzerschiffe, Admiral Scheer and Admiral Graf Spee, were 
completed�
Secret preparations also had been under way to revive the U-boat arm via 
foreign firms, German dummy companies, and preassembly that circumvented 
the Versailles restrictions, although actual production was not begun until the 
Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed� From 1935 to 1939 the Kriegsma-
rine (renamed from Reichsmarine in 1935) built fifty-seven U-boats, mainly of 
three distinct classes� The Type IIA was the first of a series (A through D) of 
small coastal boats displacing a mere 254 tons and completed just weeks after the 
1935 agreement�36 These were intended as intermediate designs to provide data 
to inform future U-boat construction and to operate in the North and Baltic Seas 
against potential threats posed by France, Russia, and Poland� A larger vessel, 
the Type I, displaced 862 tons and had a greater range and armament� This type 
proved to be overly cumbersome, so only two (U-25 and U-26) were completed, 
compared with the fifty Type IIs commissioned between 1935 and 1940�37
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The primary purpose of the two follow-on U-boat classes, the Type VII and 
Type IX, was to conduct longer-range operations in the Atlantic� The first of the 
Type VII series (A through F) displaced 626 tons when completed in 1936 and 
had a range of 6,200 nautical miles at ten knots on the surface� The Type IX was 
the largest of the new U-boats, displacing 1,032 tons and accommodating an 
increased armament capacity of six torpedo tubes (four bow, two stern) and a 
10,500-nautical-mile range at ten knots� Its initial role was somewhat ambiguous, 
as the naval high command favored its use in direct cooperation with the sur-
face fleet, while Dönitz and his supporters advocated that it be used as a distant 
commerce raider�38 Production was paused until a decision was reached—one 
that favored Dönitz’s conception—and consequently the first Type IX was not 
commissioned until 1938�39 Despite some setbacks, of 1,158 U-boats constructed 
from 1935 to 1945, approximately nine hundred were Type VIIs and IXs�40
It was the ominous emergence of Deutschland, however, that was of primary 
concern to other European navies� Indeed, an arms race ensued from 1935 to 1939 
that led to the evolution of the fast battleship� The fast battleship type emphasized 
speed on a platform that had been designed to optimize firepower and protection� 
The first to counter Deutschland was the French Dunkerque, launched in 1935, 
which achieved 29�5 knots� The Italians, in turn, responded in 1937 with the thirty- 
knot Vittorio Veneto class� The Germans countered with the Scharnhorst class, 
comprising its namesake and Gneisenau, which had been intended as Panzer-
schiffe until the original keels were scrapped in 1934 and redesigned�41 The new 
hulls, laid down in 1935 and eventually displacing around 34,841 tons, carried a 
heavier nine-gun main battery and better armor protection� The new class was 
intended to counter Dunkerque, although political considerations limited its ar-
mament to eleven-inch guns so as not to antagonize Britain� Experimental high-
pressure steam turbines that promised a maximum speed of around thirty knots 
but at a cost in range and endurance were incorporated instead of diesel engines 
like Deutschland’s, and they proved much more challenging to maintain�42 In 1936, 
Germany laid down its first true fast battleships, the 41,700-ton Bismarck class 
(Bismarck and Tirpitz), equipped with eight fifteen-inch guns, capable of reaching 
twenty-nine knots, and with an 8,500-nautical-mile operational range at nineteen 
knots—representing significant reductions compared with Panzerschiff character-
istics�43 The British Admiralty responded with its own fast battleships, the King 
George V class, in 1939�
In the meantime, Raeder was refining his views on German naval strategy� In 
February 1937, he outlined his ideas for rearmament and his principles of naval 
strategy to Hitler and other senior figures of the Reich� These “reflected a clear 
formulation of his naval strategy and the culmination of his own strategic stud-
ies and experiences and the themes that had dominated the debate over naval 
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strategy since the end of World War I�”44 Seeing the Atlantic Ocean as the pivotal 
theater of naval operations for conducting war on an enemy’s economy, Raeder 
declared that the objective of the German navy must be the defense of German 
shipping lanes and the relentless “interdiction of those of our enemy�”45 A deter-
mined offensive against enemy shipping would undermine the economic ability 
of opponents to wage war, while simultaneously forcing them to defend their own 
sea-lanes rather than target German shipping� Tellingly, Raeder also argued that 
new technology, such as submarines and airpower, had not supplanted capital 
ships as decisive units in naval warfare, but rather had augmented their opera-
tional possibilities at sea�46
In 1938, Hitler declared Britain to be a potential adversary� That same year, a 
strategic study recently produced by the Oberkommando der Marine (German 
naval command) concluded that only by cruiser warfare conducted by surface 
ships (especially the Panzerschiffe), with the cooperation of U-boats, could Ger-
many hope to exercise effective naval power� No consensus, however, could be 
reached on the exact role that capital ships were to play in cruiser warfare waged 
in the Atlantic�47 Although Raeder continued to support a strategy of cruiser war-
fare conducted by the Panzerschiffe, his views came into increasing conflict with 
Hitler’s, who hoped to use the revived German surface fleet as an instrument of 
global power politics against British naval power, more so than its commerce�48 
This tension undermined the establishment of a clear direction for the Kriegsma-
rine up to and during the Second World War�
Nonetheless, plans were put in effect for the construction of a German fleet, 
known as Plan Z� Although it remained unrealized, thus ultimately more of a wish 
list of warships than a coherent plan, it offers insight into the Kriegsmarine’s stra-
tegic priorities just before the outbreak of war� Rather than rely on a single vessel 
type, and perhaps hoping to reach a consensus, Raeder instead pushed for a bal-
anced fleet comprising sixteen capital ships, four aircraft carriers, 249 U-boats, and 
several light vessels, to be complete by 1947� Of the 249 U-boats listed in the plan, 
sixty were coastal U-boats, 162 the Atlantic types, and twenty-seven large types� 
But the nucleus of the Plan Z fleet was a new generation of Panzerschiffe and fast 
battleships (never completed) that would have optimized range and speed�49
Although Plan Z concentrated on the construction of new capital ships, the Ger-
man naval high command did have plans for a robust U-boat arm that included 
large fleet U-boats and U-cruisers that could operate both with the surface fleet 
and independently in distant waters� Only one, the Type XB minelayer, was ever 
completed� The Type XII, which resembled the Type IX in shape and armament 
but displaced some two thousand tons and was capable of making twenty knots, 
finally would have provided the German navy with a submarine capable of oper-
ating directly with its surface ships� Echoing Gayer’s assessment in 1926, Raeder 
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outlined specifications for a U-cruiser in a letter dated March 1937� “Tasks: of-
fensive operations against merchantmen in distant waters� The U-cruiser has to be 
able to take over the role of a surface ship and have the firepower of an auxiliary 
cruiser or escort ship, when protecting or attacking merchantmen�”50 The Type XI 
U-cruiser would have had an enormous displacement of 3,140 tons� Its main arma-
ment, aside from eight torpedo tubes, was to be four five-inch guns in two twin 
turrets and four antiaircraft guns� It also was designed to carry a seaplane for recon-
naissance� Although these designs appear somewhat fantastical, they indicate that 
the German naval command had high hopes and ambitions for its U-boat arm�
By 1939, the construction of the Plan Z fleet was under way� The battle in-
structions for the Kriegsmarine, issued in May 1939, reemphasized the need to 
concentrate operations against enemy shipping rather than against naval forces, 
in the event of war with Britain and France� The aim of naval warfare, it stated, 
was to “cripple England’s and France’s military and economic imports by water�” 
This, the instructions declared, could be successfully undertaken “only on the 
oceans”—that is, beyond the North Sea�51 The instructions went on to state that 
war on enemy shipping “is directed equally against the cargoes and shipping space 
of the enemy� Combat action even against inferior enemy naval forces is not an 
aim in itself and is therefore not to be sought�”52 While the U-boats concentrated 
on enemy shipping around the coast, the Luftwaffe (German air force) was to 
mine and destroy transport facilities in enemy ports by air� As many surface ships 
as possible would operate throughout the Atlantic and farther abroad, supported 
by a network of supply ships, many operating out of neutral ports—a system that 
had its origins in the First World War�53 Finally, to aid the war on enemy ship-
ping, German naval forces were to disrupt the expected British blockade of the 
North Sea through small operations, with the further aim of “keeping as many of 
the enemy forces as possible continuously tied up” in the North Sea�54 Thus, the 
primary purpose of the German surface fleet in the event of war with Britain and 
France was to make a relentless attack on enemy sea-lanes, with the intention of 
destroying and disrupting enemy shipping and dispersing enemy naval forces�
The plan’s strategic concept went beyond cruiser warfare and had origins in 
the First World War, when the High Seas Fleet was deployed to degrade British 
maritime power in both its economic and military dimensions, and was reminis-
cent of Castex’s theory�55 Only in September 1939 did Dönitz advocate a strategic 
alternative, in a memorandum outlining a construction program for three hun-
dred U-boats and various light surface craft�56 Concerned more about the mer-
chant vessels themselves than their cargo, he hoped to wage a tonnage war, with 
the intention of sinking ships faster than new ones could be built to replace them� 
The famous wolf-pack tactic would be used to overwhelm merchant convoys, 
coordinated by radio communication either from shore or from a Type IX U-boat 
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serving as a command-and-control hub for the “pack�” Given the later conduct of 
the war, Dönitz’s alternative appears reasonable� However, his proposal came on 
the eve of the war and in the context of impressive technological improvements 
to surface warships� Until this point, therefore, the U-boats did not offer a feasible 
alternative to Germany’s hybrid cruiser-warfare concept�
Indeed, the evolution of Germany’s naval strategy clearly was linked with the 
technological innovations of the 1930s� The capital ship remained the primary 
instrument of sea power because of the comparative primitiveness of submarines 
and aircraft� Deutschland appeared to be an epochal warship that made feasible a 
nascent conception of cruiser warfare using powerful surface warships operating 
at distant ranges� The lessons of the First World War were refined and adapted 
in response to the emergence and progress of technology and the anticipation of 
enemy fleets and plans� Despite its focus on capital ships, the Plan Z fleet reflected 
an evolution in German naval thought beyond the “decisive battle” strategy that 
had dominated the Imperial German Navy� When war did break out in Septem-
ber 1939, however, the Kriegsmarine possessed an incomplete naval force that 
was smaller than the High Seas Fleet, with most of its units not intended for 
operations against the Royal Navy� Although ultimately unsuccessful, these con-
cepts significantly determined the course of the war from 1939 to 1941�
THE HEYDAY OF THE GERMAN SURFACE FLEET: 1939–41
With Plan Z well out of reach, construction of heavy warships ceased in Septem-
ber 1939, exempting those nearing completion, and a new program dedicated to 
producing the Type VII and Type IX U-boats was implemented� However, the 
number of U-boats available was limited and the strategic prospects of the Ger-
man navy at the outbreak of war in 1939 were negligible� Yet by June 1940, Ger-
many’s geostrategic position had improved owing to the seizure of Norway (an 
achievement greatly aided by the surface fleet) and France� The French coastal 
ports were especially crucial because they allowed direct access to the Atlantic, 
while Norway secured the North Sea, thus undermining the effectiveness of the 
British blockade�57 Raeder’s initial pessimism that his forces could do nothing 
more than show how to “die gallantly” was replaced by an enthusiasm to oper-
ate the surface fleet and U-boat arm together against Britain’s shipping, aided by 
auxiliary cruisers�
U-boats were deployed at focal points for trade around Britain—the most 
likely places they might encounter merchant ships� Their numbers were insuf-
ficient, however, to threaten Britain’s maritime shipping decisively; Germany 
would not have more than a hundred U-boats until April 1941�58 Lack of numbers 
also meant that most attacks were conducted against independent vessels by indi-
vidual U-boats� It was not until September 1940 that Dönitz successfully used the 
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wolf-pack tactic against a convoy, sinking eleven of fifteen merchant ships�59 De-
spite sinking 2,186,158 tons of merchant shipping in 1940, this translated to over-
all convoy losses that year of just 1�63 percent—insufficient to be decisive� Thus, 
to supplement the U-boat campaign, surface ships once again were deployed to 
wage cruiser warfare� The Reichsmarine believed this would force the Royal Navy 
to disperse its forces, would disrupt enemy naval operations, and would prevent a 
concentration against the U-boats�60 Germany’s commerce raiders were ordered 
not to engage equal or superior enemy ships�
The heyday of surface operations lasted from 1940 until 1941, during which 
time the conduct of the surface fleet, in conjunction with the U-boats, caused 
disproportionate havoc to Britain’s shipping and prevented the Royal Navy from 
concentrating its forces fully�61 In October 1940, Admiral Scheer became the first 
German capital ship to break out into the Atlantic since the war began�62 Show-
casing both the qualities of the class and the efficiency of the supply-ship system 
in a voyage that stretched as far as the Indian Ocean, Scheer sank 99,059 tons of 
merchant shipping before returning to Germany in March 1941� An attack on 
Convoy HX84 in the North Atlantic resulted in the sinking of five ships totaling 
38,720 tons, along with the escorting armed merchant cruiser Jervis Bay� Although 
a relatively minor achievement, the attack caused the next two HX convoys to be 
recalled to port and held up further convoys for twelve days� The heavy cruiser 
Admiral Hipper made a follow-on sortie in November� It achieved meager results 
but was the first heavy German warship to put in successfully to the French port 
of Brest, in December 1940, where it posed a more immediate threat to Atlantic 
shipping�63 Meanwhile, disguised auxiliary cruisers were deployed into the Atlan-
tic, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific� In July, one auxiliary cruiser, Widder, forced 
the British Admiralty to stop independent shipping and divert convoys away from 
the West Indies, while another, Atlantis, would sink a record 145,687 tons before 
meeting its end in November 1941 against HMS Devonshire�64
Although it may appear that the surface fleet was merely being used as a stop-
gap until more U-boats were made available, the operations of the surface fleet 
played a far more significant strategic role in the first half of the war at sea than 
often is acknowledged� These operations not only disrupted Britain’s shipping; 
they also often forced Britain to disperse its naval power across the globe� Three 
Royal Navy task forces, including four cruisers and two aircraft carriers, were dis-
patched to find Scheer� A sighting by HMS Glasgow brought an additional carrier 
and four cruisers into the hunt�65 Through the continuous deployment of power-
ful surface warships, Raeder also hoped to affect the overall strategic situation� 
He calculated that this threat to their merchant shipping would force the British 
to split their forces even further between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean�66 
On 25 December 1940, Hipper intercepted a convoy carrying forty thousand 
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troops to the Middle East, but was driven off after a brief engagement with British 
escorts� This encounter nonetheless had significant consequences; the Admiralty 
rushed to assign heavy warships to convoy escort�67 Although fewer ASW vessels 
were diverted than Germany’s naval high command expected, the commitment 
of British heavy escorts demonstrates the Admiralty’s level of anxiety and vali-
dates the threat Raeder’s surface fleet posed� The surface fleet, therefore, did not 
operate as a mere transitional force in anticipation of a larger U-boat fleet�
Four heavy German warships were active from January until March 1941, a 
period that marked the first successful complex, anticommerce naval operation 
in the Atlantic theater� Operation BERLIN was the largest and the most success-
ful Atlantic operation conducted by the German surface fleet during the war� It 
began in January 1941, when Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, under the command 
of Vice Admiral Günther Lütjens, ventured into the Atlantic and, aided by nine 
supply ships, sank or captured 116,610 tons of shipping over sixty days� Distant 
cooperation among Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and U-boats led to the tracking and 
interception of Convoy SL67 on 7–8 March, which resulted in five ships being 
sunk by the U-boats� Before steering for France, Lütjens intercepted several more 
merchant ships that had been dispersed from a convoy because of an attack by U-
boats�68 On 9–11 February, during Hipper’s second sortie, U-37, FW-600 aircraft, 
and Hipper carried out the first successful asymmetrical attack against Convoy 
HG30�69 The next day, this also led to Hipper’s greatest success: sinking seven of 
nineteen unescorted ships from Convoy SLS64�70
Dispersed as it was, the Royal Navy could not deal effectively with the multi-
faceted threat posed by Germany’s surface fleet, U-boats, and auxiliary cruisers� 
As Stephen Roskill notes, Britain lost significant merchant shipping during this 
period� The German surface ships, “for a time, completely dislocated our Atlantic 
convoy circles, with serious consequences to our vital imports� Their [Scharnhorst 
and Gneisenau’s] depredations forced the wide dispersal of our already strained 
naval resources, and successfully diverted attention from the returning Scheer and 
Hipper; while, by their subsequent arrival in a Biscay port, they became an immi-
nent threat to all our Atlantic shipping�”71 Despite the best efforts of Admiral John 
Tovey, commander in chief of the Home Fleet, all four warships reached port safely: 
Scheer and Hipper to Germany, and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to Brest in France�
The pressure that these forays exerted was especially important because in 
February the number of active U-boats was at its lowest level of the entire war� 
Furthermore, the U-boats now were confronted with improved radar, escorts, 
and ASW tactics, forcing Dönitz to redeploy his units farther west and away 
from convoy congestion zones�72 Still, total tonnage sunk from January until 
March amounted to 1,253,339 tons� The U-boats sank the largest portion of these 
losses, accounting for 566,585 tons, but the surface fleet and auxiliary cruisers 
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contributed nearly a quarter of the overall total, with 301,885 tons� The surface 
raiders therefore made an invaluable contribution to Germany’s attempt to con-
summate a blockade of Britain, by dispersing British naval strength, disrupting 
military convoys, and sinking the shipping tonnage they did�
So far, the deployment of the surface fleet had aided the German war effort 
dramatically, despite its inferior size and strength relative to the Royal Navy� 
For the first time in history, German battleships were operating in the Atlan-
tic against British shipping with near impunity� Only when they reached port in 
France were the ships seemingly vulnerable, to heavy air raids�73 Additionally, 
the German surface fleet soon reached its zenith with the commissioning of the 
battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. Anticipating 
further success, in April 1941 Raeder outlined plans for a new operation, code-
named RHINE EXERCISE� In a manner reminiscent of Germany’s prewar planning 
and Castex’s theories, the new warships, along with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, 
now would be free to engage their dispersed enemy counterparts� This, it was 
expected, would change further the balance of naval power, creating favorable 
circumstances to achieve victory in the war at sea� Reflecting his faith in the op-
eration, Raeder even gave orders that U�S� naval forces could be engaged as well�74
However, Raeder’s original cohort of four capital ships and two cruisers was 
reduced quickly� The British Admiralty, realizing the threat that a concentration 
of German surface forces posed, attempted to keep the ships from going to sea 
by heavy Royal Air Force bombardment of Brest that damaged Gneisenau. Mean-
while, mechanical problems kept Scharnhorst in port, and Tirpitz could not be 
made ready in time for the operation� This left only Bismarck and Prinz Eugen� 
Nonetheless, determined to keep up the pressure on British shipping, the opera-
tion commenced on 18 May under the command of Admiral Lütjens� It famously 
would end with the destruction of Bismarck on 27 May 1941�75
Although the drama of Bismarck’s loss has overshadowed the strategic impor-
tance of the operation, to the Admiralty even a reduced sortie of German surface 
fleets was a major threat, especially in light of Operation BERLIN’s success against 
British shipping� The Admiralty therefore had mobilized a force of nineteen 
major warships drawn from the Home Fleet, Force H (stationed at Gibraltar), 
and convoy escorts to hunt Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.76 This traditionally has 
been seen as an exaggerated response to Bismarck’s victory over the battle cruiser 
Hood, pride of the Royal Navy�77 However, had Bismarck arrived safely in France 
it would have been united with Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen, and 
perhaps even Tirpitz—and Germany could have commenced RHINE EXERCISE 
once again�78 However, a chance torpedo hit on Bismarck’s rudder, delivered by 
an aircraft from Ark Royal, crippled the German ship, providing Admiral Tovey 
enough time to bring up his forces—before they ran out of fuel—to finish the 
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German battleship� The loss of Bismarck was a critical juncture in the war at sea, 
as it brought a sudden end to Raeder’s surface-fleet strategy�
Although Prinz Eugen, having been detached from Bismarck before the battle-
ship met its end, made it safely to France, never again did German surface ships 
challenge the Royal Navy offensively� German supply ships and auxiliary cruisers 
also became prime targets for the Royal Navy, with ten destroyed by the end of 
1941�79 Pressure from Britain and the United States also helped curtail resupply 
efforts in and from neutral ports�80 Shocked by the loss of Bismarck, Hitler ex-
erted increased personal control over the deployment of surface ships, refusing 
to allow further operations� Indeed, the loss of Bismarck marked the German 
surface fleet’s last Atlantic operation, and in February 1942 Hitler, over Raeder’s 
protests, ordered the remaining heavy warships to Norway to provide defense 
and to disrupt Arctic convoys to Russia�81
By 1942, therefore, the surface fleet largely ceased to be a major strategic threat 
to British operations in the Atlantic� By then, however, the U-boats had surpassed 
their prewar numbers and were achieving great success� Convoy attacks peaked 
in 1941, and in 1942 the highest proportion of shipping of the entire war was 
sunk� By 1943, though, the U-boat campaign also was on the wane, while Germa-
ny suffered major defeats across North Africa and in Russia�82 Raeder retired that 
year and Dönitz took over as head of the Kriegsmarine� Although the commerce-
raiding potential of Germany’s surface fleet never materialized fully during the 
war, this should not overshadow the very real threat it posed from 1939 to 1941�
After the war Dönitz claimed, “The sinking of the Bismarck was a grave loss for 
the navy� � � � On the other hand, the strong reaction of English naval forces proved 
that the strategic object had succeeded—that of keeping the English Fleet busy, 
added to the direct success attained by sinkings�”83
However, the German surface fleet was much more than a mere placeholder 
force while the U-boat arm was built up� Indeed, the war at sea between Britain 
and Germany was not purely a U-boat war, nor was the German surface fleet 
made up of antiquated ships destined to sink or expire over the course of the 
conflict� Even Churchill’s famous comment on the U-boat menace was in refer-
ence to the years 1940 and 1941—a time that, as this article has highlighted, was 
in fact the heyday of the German surface fleet’s attacks against British merchant 
shipping and when U-boat numbers were relatively low�84 In reality, the German 
surface fleet played a pivotal role in the war at sea from 1939 to 1942�
In the aftermath of the First World War, many German naval thinkers reflect-
ed� They appraised the respective roles of U-boats and the surface fleet, theoriz-
ing about what functions these units could perform in a future naval war� Guided 
by the experience of that war and influenced by the anticipated success of ASW 
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measures, they generally accepted that U-boats could not be relied on as the de-
cisive instrument of naval warfare� This was not, however, a case of traditionalist 
myopia� Cruiser warfare was of particular interest to Raeder, who believed that 
only a surface fleet, operating in conjunction with U-boats and, later, airpower, 
could disperse an enemy naval force sufficiently to accomplish the piecemeal 
weakening of its parent country, militarily and economically�
Technological development during the 1930s provided further clarity on the 
potential of the surface fleet� The Germans produced remarkable innovations 
such as the Panzerschiff, which seemingly vindicated their faith in the capital ship 
as the core of any modern fleet� This also was due in no small part to the still-
primitive state of U-boat development� Still, they concluded by the late 1930s 
that no single form of naval power, be it U-boat or capital ships, was sufficient 
on its own to be a decisive force� As a result, German planners opted to build a 
balanced fleet that integrated submarines, aircraft, and auxiliary combatants with 
the battleship as its nucleus, rather than the classic surface fleet� The German 
navy formulated an appropriate strategy for challenging the Royal Navy, but it 
lacked the capability to implement it in 1939� Still, despite his initial pessimism, 
Raeder committed his small force to offensive operations�
Far from being merely a transitional period leading to the ascent of the Ger-
man U-boats to being the foremost weapon for waging war on British commerce, 
the early years of World War II saw Germany’s surface fleet making a concerted 
effort to disrupt and destroy British commerce and naval power, which created a 
major strategic threat to the British� The seizure of Norway and France allowed 
the effective deployment of German naval forces against British sea trade� The 
surface fleet made crucial contributions to the war at sea by disrupting and dis-
persing the Royal Navy, not just supporting the still-sparse U-boat fleet� Indeed, 
the British Admiralty devoted extensive resources to preventing the concentra-
tion of German surface forces during the war, knowing how significantly a major 
German thrust would threaten critical transatlantic trade� This validation of Ger-
many’s hybrid strategy in conception, if not in execution, similarly validates the 
importance of surface fleets in the understanding of the European war at sea, and 
the conduct of commerce war in general�
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LETTER FROM PORT MORESBY
John D. Moore
As the world shifts away from the global 
war on terrorism toward renewed great-
power rivalry, areas previously considered 
strategically peripheral offer the United 
States and its allies both opportunity and 
challenge� Papua New Guinea (PNG), 
with its strategic location in the southwest 
Pacific, is poised to play a role in this new 
“Great Game�” American engagement with 
PNG and other Pacific Island nations that 
focuses on collaboration with regional al-
lies and that smartly applies U�S� political, 
financial, and military power will be a key 
factor in the outcome� At the same time, 
understanding the broader regional set of 
interests of allies and opponents alike will better inform policy making and im-
prove the potential for positive policy outcomes�
A COMPLEX PLACE
Although it achieved its independence in 1975, PNG still is beset by multiple 
development challenges, akin to those experienced elsewhere in the Pacific and 
parts of Africa� Yet, as seen in the national intro-
spection displayed at the February 2021 passing 
of PNG founding father and first prime minister 
Sir Michael Thomas Somare, the country con-
tinues to show the potential to move beyond its 
current challenges�1 To those fortunate enough 
to have lived and worked in PNG, it is at once a 
Currently based in Australia, John D. Moore has 
over twenty-five years of experience supporting U.S. 
government, humanitarian, and private-sector oper-
ations in fragile-state and frontier-market contexts 
across the Middle East, South Asia, and East Africa, 
including five-plus years in Papua New Guinea.
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breathtakingly beautiful and a frustratingly complex place to engage� With over 
850 languages, thousands of clan and subclan groups, an overlay of Christianity 
on local belief systems, and over 70 percent of its population living in rural—
often highly rugged—areas, the complicated nature of the country cannot be 
overstated�2 PNG occupies the eastern half of the western Pacific island of New 
Guinea, together with the key islands of New Britain, New Ireland, and the Au-
tonomous Region of Bougainville, along with some six hundred lesser islands 
and atolls�3 PNG, with an estimated population of eight million, is the largest and 
most populated of the countries composing the Pacific Island area� In addition 
to its human complexities, PNG has an incredible diversity of geographic and 
natural resources�
Sharing a long land border with Indonesian Papua, PNG is a young, modern 
nation-state, but one that reflects and holds onto a much longer history�4 The tri-
als of traditional society coming to grips with modernity have shaped PNG for 
decades and also will influence the way it engages, and is engaged by, the evolv-
ing rivalry between the United States and its allies and a strengthening China 
and those countries within its orbit� There is limited government penetration 
across the country, and many of the present development challenges are likely 
to continue for the foreseeable future� Limited institutional capacity, lack of a 
governmental monopoly on violence, a limited formal economy, and the need 
for a political leadership that can articulate, garner support for, and implement 
public policies that represent a shared sense of national interest are but some of 
the issues that PNG faces� It is essential to understand these challenges, as they 
shape directly the way in which the growing competition to establish favorable 
regional relations is unfolding�
A STRATEGIC POSITION
PNG’s previous colonial power, Australia, which managed it after World War I, 
has a deep and enduring relationship with its northern neighbor� PNG remains 
Australia’s largest recipient of foreign aid, and strong ties continue between the 
Australian Defence Force and the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF)� PNG domi-
nates the northern approaches to Australia; that, added to historical tension 
with Indonesia and increasing Chinese involvement in PNG and the region, 
explains why Australia’s interest in maintaining a leading role in PNG is likely 
to continue�
While Australia plays an outsize role in PNG, multiple other countries also 
have substantial ties to the country� Japan long has been an aid donor to PNG 
and maintains strong diplomatic ties, and New Zealand similarly is a leading 
donor� Ties between PNG and other Melanesian countries, such as Fiji, continue 
to strengthen and grow� At the same time, Chinese diplomatic and economic 
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investment in PNG has increased, including involvement in a mix of infrastruc-
ture projects (including energy, roads, and airports) on mainland PNG, as well 
as the islands of Manus and Bougainville� Similarly to the pattern seen in other 
countries, PNG’s leaders seek to benefit from multiple points of investment in the 
country without compromising its sovereignty�
While memory of the combat that engulfed the then territory of New Guinea 
remains a key part of Australian and PNG military lore, most Americans long 
have forgotten their country’s involvement in the campaign, much less New 
Guinea’s strategic role in supporting the American advance through the Pacif-
ic�5 Some seven thousand American soldiers and airmen were killed during the 
New Guinea campaign, with missing-in-action records indicating that hundreds 
more were lost in the jungles and seas across mainland PNG and its surrounding 
islands�6
Since the 2018 U�S� commitment to join Australia’s effort to upgrade the 
PNGDF’s Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island, many elites in Port Moresby 
view the country as having reemerged onto the U�S� radar� Others may recall 
Manus Island as playing a part in the much-debated Australian asylum-seeker 
policy� One of PNG’s twenty-two provinces, the island sits north of the PNG 
mainland and is positioned along critical air and naval lines of communication 
linked to U�S� outposts in the Marianas and elsewhere in the Pacific�7 Its posi-
tion enables naval and air assets based on the island to influence the area along 
Source: Shugart, “A Chinese-Built Airport?”
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Australia’s eastern seaboard south to New Zealand, as well as the approaches to 
maritime East Asia�8
Manus, as well as other locations in PNG, complements efforts by the United 
States, Australia, Japan, and their allies to expand and enhance maritime- 
surveillance networks to monitor vessel traffic and conduct early warning, while 
assisting the PNGDF to increase its basic maritime-reconnaissance and patrol 
capabilities� While the country is unable to house major USN surface combatants 
without significant and sustained investment, pre-positioning of fuel and other 
stocks in PNG can assist vessels operating in the region� Meanwhile, advances 
in aerial, surface, and subsurface unmanned capabilities hold the potential for 
the establishment of a network of interlocking microbases across the Pacific, in 
which Manus could play an important role� In addition to Manus Island, loca-
tions elsewhere along PNG’s northern and eastern areas may offer the potential 
for both fuel pre-positioning and the basing of intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance assets in the future� Engagement also can span other areas of mu-
tual interest, including research into tropical diseases, countering illegal fishing, 
monitoring changes in coastal as well as blue-water environmental conditions, 
and maritime emergency response�
RELATIONSHIPS ARE WHAT MATTER
While PNG offers opportunities to support U�S� and coalition naval operations, 
stronger diplomatic and military relations with PNG and other Pacific island na-
tions are likely to prove even more critical than the physical basing of supplies or 
naval assets� Lessons from the Cold War, as well as post–Cold War engagement 
in the Middle East and South Asia, repeatedly have demonstrated that relying 
on merely transactional approaches rather than longer-term relation-building 
efforts—whether conducted in bilateral or multilateral settings—limits the 
potential for lasting positive outcomes� Other lessons underscore the dangers 
of mission creep and overreach, along with the problematic impacts that occur 
when tactics are mistaken for strategy�
The U�S�-Australia relationship is a cornerstone of American policy in this 
part of the Pacific, but Australia has limitations in its ability to manage regional 
engagement across the strategic-operational-tactical continuum� Given Austra-
lia’s historical connections to PNG, along with PNG’s proximity as Australia’s 
nearest neighbor, successive governments in Canberra have pushed to be the 
lead partner for PNG and the medium through which Washington should engage 
with Port Moresby� Over the decades, Australia regularly has advised the United 
States and other allies to “leave PNG to us�”9
However, the rising competition with China has seen the Australian position 
moderate in recent years, as Canberra aims to collaborate with Washington and 
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others to counter Beijing’s growing political and economic investment in PNG� 
The need for the United States to bolster, and on occasion strategically to re-
align, allied engagement in the region is reflected in recent divisions within the 
Pacific Islands Forum and subsequent concerns that China may take advantage 
of such rifts, should Australia prove unable to resolve them effectively�10 In turn, 
while Australia welcomes further U�S� engagement in the region, Canberra has 
valid concerns over any U�S� engagement that might smack of the clumsiness 
Washington has shown in other regions� Genuine partnership and a willingness 
by Canberra and Washington both to lead and to follow, depending on shifting 
situational dynamics, are needed�
Capitalizing on joint efforts in the development space as a platform for 
increased military cooperation is not just smart but essential� The Australian 
Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP) is one such framework, 
with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States working with the PNG 
government to support the country’s target of providing 70 percent of the popula-
tion access to reliable electricity by 2030 under the AIFFP’s Papua New Guinea 
Electrification Partnership�11
Chinese involvement in Bougainville is an ongoing concern for Australia and 
the United States, as are Chinese efforts to establish a fish-processing facility on 
Daru Island, which is located only a few kilometers from Australia’s northern 
border and some two hundred kilometers from its mainland�12 Chinese engage-
ment in PNG has seen several Chinese parastatal and Chinese Communist 
Party–linked private-sector companies build ties to local politicos and busi-
nesses� As part of its regional initiative, China has become an increasingly im-
portant source of loans and other financial support to the PNG economy, and 
Beijing remains an important export market for PNG’s natural resources�13 A 
Chinese-government Guide for Foreign Investment and Cooperation, published 
in January 2019, gives insight into Beijing’s intent� The document character-
izes PNG as a supporter of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with the closing 
paragraph stating, “The Chinese government calls on more powerful Chinese 
companies, inspired by the Belt and Road Initiative, to carry out reciprocal trade 
and invest in PNG�”14
While the discussion of so-called debt trap diplomacy has ebbed and flowed, 
of likely greater importance than a specific debt percentage of gross domestic 
product owed to Beijing is the way Chinese loans (or other state-to-state en-
gagements) are structured and governed� By allowing local elites access to these 
rent streams, China builds local leverage� Such leverage may not prove lasting, 
however; there are few obvious sociocultural ties between the PNG and Chinese 
peoples, and thus the extent to which Beijing can use transactional relationships 
to exert more-overt control over PNG’s external orientation remains to be seen�
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The Manus example is informative� At the same time as the joint Australian-
U�S� effort at Lombrum is under way, Manus Island Momote Airport, financed 
primarily by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), is being upgraded by China 
Harbour Engineering Company, a subsidiary of China Communications Con-
struction Company (CCCC)�15 Worthy of note is that CCCC reportedly is sup-
porting the construction of China’s artificial island bases in the South China Sea, 
so Washington has targeted it for potential sanctions�16 According to politically 
astute Manus Islanders, the current governor is “pushing above his weight” and 
does not necessarily have broad support, even as he attempts to use Chinese eco-
nomic involvement to advance his own narrow interests�17
While local political leaders may seek to use the rivalry with China to their 
personal advantage, there remains a reservoir of positive sentiment toward the 
United States� The historical memory of the American role in Manus and else-
where in the vicinity during World War II is key to this, with the generation of 
elders who lived during that period passing on stories to successive generations� 
Yet geostrategic interests need both to respect and to value local pragmatism 
about the people’s socioeconomic aspirations�
ENGAGEMENT FORWARD
In looking toward fostering a new era of U�S�-PNG relations, it is critical that the 
United States keep its eyes wide open regarding the country’s reality� Local poli-
tics increasingly has become a means for elites to capture wealth, with the views 
and actions of elected leaders not necessarily representing the actual interests of 
the communities with which the United States may engage� Australia’s engage-
ments in PNG and Oceania offer insights into how the United States best can 
build and sustain long-term political-military relationships in support of Ameri-
can interests� USN port visits and humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief 
operations, along with public-relations efforts, will continue to prove important� 
Participation alongside the Royal Australian Navy in training exercises with PNG 
counterparts, combined with U�S� provision or funding of equipment and logisti-
cal support for PNGDF littoral operations, also provides opportunities for naval 
forces to engage with PNG and to shape U�S�-PNG relations positively�
Beyond these traditional forms of engagement, an increased tempo of visits from 
U�S� Indo-Pacific Command personnel, combined with efforts by the U�S� State 
Department and other government agencies to strengthen diplomatic and eco-
nomic relations, at the same time as the United States builds further collaboration 
with Australia and other allies in the region, is critical� The eventual opening of the 
new U�S� embassy building in Port Moresby will be an important milestone in the 
growing American commitment to PNG, with embassy reach strengthened by the 
integration of a defense attaché office within the diplomatic mission�18 Additional 
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interagency involvement that draws on the principles espoused in the Global Fra-
gility Strategy would bolster efforts to strengthen U�S�-PNG relations further�19
While collaboration with Canberra and other regional capitals is essential, 
it also is important for Washington to foster a distinctly U�S� relationship with 
the PNG state and its diverse people� In PNG there is a rare spirit of openness 
and friendship toward the United States that often is absent in other parts of the 
world� Yet that sense of goodwill is insufficient absent U�S� political and econom-
ic, as well as military, investment� With China able to use strategic investments 
to peel away layers of elite support, engagement in PNG and elsewhere is not 
cost-free, yet the transactional nature of China’s engagement to date offers the 
United States the opportunity to strengthen ties with both PNG’s government 
and its society�
China’s rise does not necessarily imply that future conflict is destined� Howev-
er, where a vacuum of U�S� and allied engagement and investment exists, Beijing 
will be poised to fill such space� As the strategic landscape continues to evolve, 
ensuring a permissive peacetime environment for maritime operations while 
strengthening political and military relationships well prior to any potential 
war-fighting scenario is fundamental� The United States must work with other 
nations, not alone nor solely with existing regional allies� America must act with 
humility and listen to those with more insight regarding regional, country, and 
subcountry dynamics�
From the perspective of those in the region, Washington should pursue a mul-
tidimensional approach that understands and appreciates differences between 
“like-situated countries” that are more concerned about risks arising from great-
power rivalries and those countries that are like-minded and willing to oppose 
the weakening of a liberal, rules-based order� Countries across the region have 
different interests and drivers and have different, and occasionally competing, 
foreign-policy priorities, as well as different capacities to counter Chinese pres-
sure�20 Efforts to move beyond the transactional aspects of state-to-state relations 
to relations based increasingly on shared values ultimately will prove more lasting 
and more supportive of American interests�
N O T E S
 1� Somare was a prominent PNG political 
leader� Often called the father of the nation, 
he was a teacher and radio journalist before 
his 1968 election to the territorial House of 
Assembly� Appointed chief minister of the 
territory in 1973, he became the country’s 
first prime minister upon independence in 
1975, and served again as prime minister 
on two other occasions� His formal political 
career ended in 2012�
 2� The main religion in PNG is Christianity, 
although, like elsewhere, pre-Christian belief 
systems continue to shape the interpretation 
and practice of religion� For a more detailed 
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overview of Christian denominations and 
religious minorities present, see U�S� State 
Dept�, “Papua New Guinea,” in 2019 Report 
on International Religious Freedom (Wash-
ington, DC: Office of International Religious 
Freedom, 2019), available at www�state�gov/�
 3� The other half of the island is part of Indo-
nesia, with West Papuan independence and 
associated claims of Indonesian human-rights 
abuses an ongoing issue� PNG is divided 
into four regions, with a total of twenty-two 
provinces across the different regions, as 
follows: Highlands Region—Hela, Jiwaka, 
Chimbu, Eastern Highlands, Enga, Southern 
Highlands, and Western Highlands; Islands 
Region—East New Britain, Manus, New 
Ireland, Autonomous Region of Bougainville, 
and West New Britain; Momase Region—East 
Sepik, Madang, Morobe, and West Sepik 
(Sandaun); Southern Region—Central, Gulf, 
Milne Bay, Oro, Western, and the National 
Capital District�
 4� PNG’s settled history is thousands of years 
old, with European (British, Dutch, German) 
engagement increasing in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries�
 5� It was over the PNG island of Bougainville 
that U�S� airmen intercepted and shot down 
a Japanese bomber carrying the architect of 
Japan’s Pearl Harbor attack, Adm� Isoroku 
Yamamoto, in Operation VENGEANCE� For 
details of U�S� soldiers and airmen repatriated 
from PNG, search the Defense POW/MIA 
Accounting Agency (DPAA) records available 
at www�dpaa�mil/�
 6� “Pentagon Enlisting Outsiders to Help Search 
for US WWII MIAs,” Chicago Tribune, 19 
September 2015, www�chicagotribune�com/�
 7� See Thomas Shugart, “A Chinese-Built Air-
port Next Door to a Key Australia-US Naval 
Base?,” The Interpreter, 7 August 2020, www 
�lowyinstitute�org/� Manus Island is the largest 
island in what is known as the Admiralty 
Islands�
 8� See Ben Wan Beng Ho, “The Strategic Sig-
nificance of Manus Island for the U�S� Navy,” 
U�S� Naval Institute Proceedings 144/12/1,390 
(December 2018), available at www�usni�org/�
 9� Jonathan Pryke, “The Curious Case of Aid 
Concentration in Papua New Guinea,” The 
Interpreter, 14 February 2019, www�lowy 
institute�org/�
 10� Tess Newton Cain, “With Five Countries Set 
to Quit, Is It Curtains for the Pacific Islands 
Forum?,” The Conversation, 15 February 
2021, theconversation�com/�
 11� Current connectivity is 13 percent� For addi-
tional detail on the AIFFP, see AIFFP, “Papua 
New Guinea Electrification Partnership,” 
media release, 30 June 2020, www�aiffp�gov 
�au/�
 12� For a more detailed look at Chinese involve-
ment in Bougainville, see Rowan Callick, 
“Real Cost of Independence: The Referendum 
in Bougainville Brings Risks and Opportuni-
ties for Australia and China,” The Australian, 
8 December 2019, www�theaustralian�com 
�au/� Bougainville often is seen as a potential 
bellwether; should it achieve independence, 
other provinces in PNG also may seek to se-
cede� Like Bougainville, East New Britain and 
New Ireland have a closer cultural affinity 
to the Solomons than to Papua New Guinea, 
while Enga in the western highlands always 
has had a physical and political remoteness 
from Port Moresby�
 13� In 2018, data from Australia’s Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade showed China as 
the third-largest recipient of PNG exports, 
behind Australia and Singapore, with Japan 
in fourth place� See Australian Government, 
Dept� of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Papua 
New Guinea—Papua New Guinea’s Global 
Merchandise Trade Relationships,” fact sheet, 
dfat�gov�au/�
 14� Graeme Smith, China’s Guide to Investment 
Cooperation in Papua New Guinea, In Brief 
2019/25 (Canberra, ACT: Australian National 
Univ�, n�d�), available at dpa�bellschool�anu 
�edu�au/�
 15� The ADB’s two largest funders since its incep-
tion are Japan and the United States� The 
People’s Republic of China is the third-largest 
contributor to the ADB, with Australia the 
fourth�
 16� Shugart, “A Chinese-Built Airport?”
 17� Bill Bainbridge and Jack Kilbride, “Lombrum 
Naval Base: Manus Governor Slams Australia 
over Plans to Develop Joint Naval Base,” ABC 
News [Australia], 20 November 2018, www 
�abc�net�au/�
 18� The new U�S� embassy will serve Papua New 
Guinea, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands�
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 19� For details on the Global Fragility Strategy, 
see U�S� State Dept�, 2020 United States Strat-
egy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 
(Washington, DC: 2020), available at www 
�state�gov/�
 20� Kuyoun Chung, “Why South Korea Is Balking 
at the Quad,” East Asia Forum, 31 March 
2021, www�eastasiaforum�org/�
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Conceptualizing Maritime & Naval Strategy: Festschrift for 
Captain Peter M. Swartz, United States Navy (Ret.), ed� Se-
bastian Bruns and Sarandis Papadopoulos� Baden-Baden, 
Ger�: Nomos, 2020� 373 pages� €79�
Captain Peter M� Swartz, USN (Ret�), has been a prominent figure in the 
maritime-strategy world since the early 1980s, playing a key role in the develop-
ment and articulation of the noted 1980s Maritime Strategy� After retirement 
from active duty, he joined the staff at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), 
where he became a noted archivist and analyst of USN strategy documents, as 
well as an adviser to many naval officers and academics who dealt with strategy� 
On his retirement from CNA, two academics who had benefited from Swartz’s 
mentorship put together a Festschrift—a volume of essays to honor him and his 
work—in this case, on maritime strategy� As the authors note, a Festschrift is a 
rather rare kind of document, whose purpose for publication is rather narrow�
Published by the German house Nomos as part of the University of Kiel 
Seapower Series, the volume is not likely to elicit wide readership; its hefty price 
tag ($109 on Amazon) and its rather esoteric subject matter likely will deter even 
those otherwise interested in naval affairs� That said, for those who have a deeper 
interest in maritime strategy, especially the process of developing it, the volume 
rewards the money and time put into it� In the interest of full disclosure, I must 
state that I am a longtime colleague and admirer of 
Captain Swartz; but I also have participated in the 
development of maritime strategy (principally the 
2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapow-
er [CS21], but to some extent its 2015 follow-on), 
Robert C. Rubel is a retired Navy captain and profes-
sor emeritus of the Naval War College. At the Col-
lege he served in various positions, retiring in 2014 as 
dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2021, Vol. 74, No. 4
147
Naval War College: Autumn 2021 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
 1 4 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
and so am able to bring to my evaluation of the book a background of experience 
in the subject matter�
It is one thing for navies to develop war plans—perhaps the most notable 
of which was the U�S� Navy’s War Plan ORANGE that underpinned the service’s 
operations in the Pacific during World War II—but quite another to issue a docu-
ment that broadly outlines the service’s strategic concept and utility argument: 
why the nation should invest in it� This idea for what Swartz calls a “capstone 
document” emanated from an article by the political scientist Samuel Huntington 
in the Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine in 1954, in which the author wrote 
that a military service must have a strategic concept if it wishes to obtain public 
support for its claims on the resources of the society� Swartz cataloged the series 
of capstone documents the U�S� Navy has issued from the 1960s forward, provid-
ing a valuable resource for historians and writers�
Perhaps as important as analyzing what such documents say is understanding 
the process that created them� More often than not complex and bureaucratic, 
the developmental effort reveals much about the character of the organization 
that produced such a document, and indeed its relationship to its parent society, 
and helps one to read between the lines of such documents� The title of the book 
indicates, albeit a bit vaguely, that the work focuses on the process of developing 
maritime strategy, which is appropriate, given its nature as a Festschrift honor-
ing an officer whose career was defined principally by working in the trenches of 
strategy development� And in fact, the first seven essays (out of sixteen total) fo-
cus on just that� They offer a fascinating insight not only into the various aspects 
of making U�S� maritime strategy but also, in a similar vein, into the logic and 
process behind German and Polish attempts to create national maritime strate-
gies� The book is worth obtaining simply for those first seven essays�
But then the focus of the book starts to diffuse, process being replaced as a 
subject by substantive issues, such as a historical analysis of national commitment 
to sea power, Indian strategic naval issues, the utility of hospital ships in hu-
manitarian operations, and the role of hydrocarbons in great-power competition�
There exist a couple of thin connecting threads that weave through these latter 
essays—the influence Peter Swartz had on the essays’ authors and the elements 
with which naval strategy must deal—but it appears that the editors either ran out 
of more-focused essays or decided that the aperture of the volume needed to be 
widened a bit� This is not to say that the latter essays are not well written, inter-
esting, and useful; they are� It is perhaps simply that my experience with strategy 
development makes me hypersensitive to such shifts in focus�
There is little point in this review delving into the specifics of each essay; 
suffice it to say that all are authored by people well qualified to engage their sub-
jects� However, several stand out to me in terms of interest� The first to be teed 
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up—“The Accidental Dialectic: The Real World and the Making of Maritime 
Strategy since 1945”—is by Geoffrey Till, who adopts the metaphor of a pinball 
machine to describe the somewhat zigzagging and unpredictable path a nascent 
strategy takes from original conception to eventual execution� Maritime strategy 
clearly is not an engineered concept emanating from a locked room in the Pen-
tagon (although Captain Swartz did spend time in such a room putting pen to 
paper for the ’80s Maritime Strategy); it is instead an iterative, consensus-driven 
product that may or may not receive full acceptance from those tasked to execute 
it� Till strengthens his metaphor by examining both the ’80s strategy and the 2007 
CS21� Steve Wills’s essay, “OPNAV between Strategy, Assessment, and Budget, 
1982–2016,” offers a revealing window into the organizational dynamics within 
the Navy Staff that influenced strategy making—or the lack thereof—in the pe-
riod he covers� The tug-of-war between programmers and strategists is opaque to 
outsiders, but it has defined the Navy’s policies and approach to strategy since at 
least the early ’80s� Anyone who wishes to parse, analyze, or judge any new Navy 
capstone document, such as the recently released Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, 
should read this essay�
I also found both Andrzej Makowski’s and Sebastian Bruns’s essays on Polish 
and German (respectively) maritime strategy development to be enlightening� 
Seeing how geopolitical logic and organizational dynamics collide in the forma-
tion of the maritime strategies of other nations provides useful perspective for 
U�S� planners� U�S� overall policy and strategy (support for the global liberal trad-
ing order) and the maritime component (ringing Eurasia with sea power) have 
been in place for so long that they have become like aquarium water in which U�S� 
strategists have been swimming: invisible, or at least forming an unchallenged 
assumption� These essays give us an overall view of the Polish and German mari-
time aquariums, thus helping us to get outside our own aquarium and actually 
see the water�
For the rest, the essay by Larissa Forster, “The Theoretical Soft Power Cur-
rencies of U�S� Navy Hospital Ship Missions,” stands out for its objective pars-
ing of soft power� The 2007 CS21 came under significant criticism for elevating 
the prominence of humanitarian and disaster-relief missions to the same level 
as traditional war-fighting functions� Forster does not take a position on that 
balance but does go into the benefits and pitfalls of conducting such missions� 
Repeated studies since at least the ’70s have failed to produce hard data on the 
benefits of peacetime naval presence, but Forster at least pulls some threads that 
reveal qualitative factors that should be considered when developing a strategy 
for conducting such missions�
Another attractive aspect of the volume is the diversity of the authors� There 
are several “old hands,” such as John Hattendorf (preface), Geoffrey Till, Eric 
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Thompson, Seth Cropsey, and Martin Murphy, but there also are a number of 
newer voices, such as Larissa Forster and Amund Lundesgaard� There also is 
diversity in authorial nationality, with contributors from Switzerland, Poland, 
and Germany to Australia and Japan, all of which adds richness to the overall 
perspective of the book�
The high price of the volume no doubt will be a deterrent to most potential 
readers; Swartz’s friends likely will be the principal audience� That would be too 
bad, because the essays, especially the first seven, despite their relatively esoteric 
subject matter, constitute useful information for officers who might become en-
gaged in the development of maritime strategy, whether in the United States or 
elsewhere� Libraries should stock this book, not letting its purpose as an edited 
Festschrift hide its utility as an educational reference�
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ADAPTATION AND THE SCHOOL OF WAR
John T. Kuehn
Mars Adapting: Military Change during War, by Frank G� 
Hoffman� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021� 368 
pages� $39�95�
Retired Marine officer and National Defense University research fellow Frank 
Hoffman’s Mars Adapting is, first and foremost, a work of military theory� Hoff-
man initially achieved notoriety for his work and briefs about something he char-
acterized as hybrid or compound warfare, since popularized alongside the rise in 
interest in gray-zone conflict�1 This book’s major contribution is similarly theoreti-
cal, but in the area of institutional learning, not modalities of war� Hoffman argues 
“for greater consideration of Organizational Learning Theory [OLT] to establish 
an analytical framework�” That framework leads to a model presented in chapter 
2 (where most of his theoretical discussion resides) that Hoffman devised to un-
derstand the processes by which military institutions adapt in war (pp� 40–42)�
The book can be broken into three sections� First, Hoffman explains his ap-
proach, then presents his framework and model in the introduction and chap- 
ter 2� Hoffman’s use of OLT results in a model that explains adaptation by orga-
nizations engaged in combat as a learning process� This model, derived from a 
number of social science disciplines, has four steps, with feedback mechanisms, 
that Hoffman labels “inquire,” “interpret,” “investigate,” and “integrate & insti-
tutionalize” (p� 40, table 2�2)� He calls this the Organizational Learning Cycle 
(OLC)� He also identifies four attributes that contribute to something known as 
“Organizational Learning Capacity,” which essentially is the ability of an organi-
zation to learn (or not learn)� The factors are leadership, organizational culture, 
learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms (pp� 44–54)�
The second section of the book consists of four chapters, each of which focuses 
on adaptation in war by organizations and institu-
tions as a means by which to test his model� He 
focuses primarily on armed-service institutions 
as the entities to which he applies his adaptation–
organizational learning model� The cases proceed 
chronologically and cover the following: the U�S� 
Navy and its submarine campaign in the Pacific 
during World War II (chapter 3), the U�S� Air Force 
in the Korean War (chapter 4), Vietnam and the 
John T. Kuehn is a professor of military history at 
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 
and a former Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime 
History with the Hattendorf Historical Center at the 
Naval War College. He retired from the U.S. Navy in 
2004 at the rank of commander after twenty-three 
years of service as a naval f light officer. His latest 
book, with David Holden, is The 100 Worst Military 
Disasters in History (ABC-CLIO, 2020).
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U�S� Army (chapter 5), and finally the Marines in Iraq at the various battles of 
Fallujah (chapter 6)� The final chapter, comprising the third section, presents his 
conclusions, derived from how his model fared in each of these cases and the 
implications raised in the process�
The first case study shows how messy adaptation was for the U�S� Navy and 
its submarine force in the Pacific against Japan� While this campaign often is 
presented as an outstanding success, it got off to a rocky start� As Hoffman notes, 
problems of one kind often masked deeper problems that delayed the campaign 
achieving efficacy, and despite having very good submarines as the basic tool of 
war� This study, especially, supports Hoffman’s contention about bottom-up in-
novation, in this case at the individual submarine crew and leader levels, as being 
critical to successful adaptation in war (pp� 102–103)� The chapter supports as 
well his ideas about Organizational Learning Capacity, at least at the level of the 
submarine community, if not the larger Navy� This first case study also lets the 
reader know that Hoffman’s approach includes a “warts and all” objectivity and 
emphasizes how contingent the adaptation process can be� Another conclusion 
that emerges is that adaptation in war can be not only a messy but a lethal busi-
ness, and one that not always is rewarded�
The second study, on airpower in Korea and the Air Force, brings to the fore 
the problems of culture� At the time of the war’s outbreak, that service’s mind-set 
could be characterized as “bomber culture�” Because this culture left the larger 
Air Force leadership in some sense myopic, Hoffman again finds that adaptation 
tended to bubble up from the bottom, from the fighter and attack pilots in the 
theater� One problem with this chapter is its conflation of airpower with the Air 
Force� This is unfortunate, since both the Marines and the Navy participated 
also, and the chapter might have provided even more grist for Hoffman’s mill if 
it had included a more detailed look at these airpower organizations� Either that, 
or Hoffman might have made clear what was “just Air Force” versus the larger 
joint, and even coalition, air effort� It was not a homogeneous air campaign with 
absolute unity of command, which was indeed what the Air Force had wanted 
ever since 1947� In the end, though, Hoffman—on the basis of very thin evi-
dence—gives the Air Force credit for being more adaptive than the other services 
(p� 152)� This seems odd, given that the air components of the Marines and Navy 
presumably were a part of the success under discussion�
The third case study, on Vietnam, is the most critical, as one would expect� 
Here Hoffman does find the U�S� Army adapting, but to little effect beyond the 
tactical level and far too slowly in relation to the enemy� This case study empha-
sizes the relational dynamic of his model� Military adaptation does not occur in a 
vacuum; as it is often put in U�S� professional military education institutions, “the 
enemy gets a vote�” Thus, this might be characterized as the book’s “failure” case 
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study, illustrating why adaptation can occur but still be insufficient to achieve an 
organization’s objectives� Hoffman finds that the result of the Army’s adaptation 
“went no further than to reinforce the firepower-centric approach favored by the 
operational commander” (p� 196)� Unlike the U�S� Navy’s submarine experience 
in World War II, adaptation did not produce strategic results or lead to success 
in Vietnam for the U�S� Army�
In the final case study Hoffman addresses the Marines in central Iraq around 
Fallujah� Here again he is on solid ground, with his model holding up well in 
its explanatory power and its contention that organizational learning from the 
bottom up can lead to successful systemic adaptation and thereby have an out-
size effect beyond the tactical-level battlefield� Of the four case studies, this one 
comes the closest to supplying what “right” looks like, especially with respect to 
OLC and the Marines’ ability to learn quickly from their mistakes and then dif-
fuse new ways of doing business� However, one would expect the U�S� military 
to have made some progress since the Vietnam War in improving its systems for 
organizational learning and dissemination� That did seem to be the case for the 
Marines in Iraq, despite the Corps suffering from considerable “forgetting” after 
Vietnam and leading up to the events in Iraq after 2003�
Unsurprisingly, Hoffman concludes by offering up the OLC “postulated in 
this book � � � as a useful framework of a complicated heuristic process” (p� 248)� 
The case studies provide considerable support as well for his thesis that OLT is a 
useful approach for studying adaptation in war� Readers of this journal will find 
his implications (pp� 269–270) valuable when they become decision makers and 
leaders of organizations themselves� At that point they will be responsible, for 
example, for creating mechanisms to discover and disseminate new ways of doing 
business that lead to mission success�
The book does have some weaknesses, albeit minor� First, it is a ponderous 
read, especially chapter 2; at times it reads like a social science dissertation� There 
is an odd inconsistency in personal pronoun usage, with Hoffman switching 
from “I” to “we” and “us” for no discernible reason, especially since he is the only 
author� Despite these quibbles, students of military innovation and adaptation 
will find much in the book to appreciate and ponder� Military historians will find 
value in Hoffman’s application of his model to the case studies about adaptation 
in war� Strategists and professional military educators alike will find the conclu-
sions in the final chapter worth—in Hoffman’s phrasing—investigating�
N O T E
 1� See, for example, Frank G� Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arling-
ton, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007)�
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BOOK REVIEWS
MANY WAYS TO SKIN A CAT—SOME BETTER THAN OTHERS
Navies in Multipolar Worlds: From the Age of Sail to the Present, ed� Paul Kennedy and Evan Wilson� 
New York: Routledge, 2020� 278 pages� $128�
As the United States sails further into the 
twenty-first century, strategic discus-
sions have swung toward a realization 
that any view theorizing the “end of 
history” is both ahistorical and a poor 
representation of the world around us� 
In the new book Navies in Multipolar 
Worlds: From the Age of Sail to the 
Present, a group of esteemed historians 
borrows the idea of multipolarity from 
the realms of political science and 
international relations to examine the 
historical role that naval forces have 
played in the interaction between great 
and rising powers� The results are both 
enlightening and strategically valuable 
as the United States approaches what 
the last National Defense Strategy called 
the return of great-power competition�
The effort is led by legendary historian 
Paul M� Kennedy, in partnership with 
Evan Wilson, a rising scholar in the 
field of maritime history� In his preface, 
Kennedy steams unswervingly into the 
question of relevance, directly address-
ing questions posed by former Chief 
of Naval Operations Admiral John M� 
Richardson and illuminating the histori-
cal reality that the affairs of great powers 
and rising powers and their interactions 
with each other on the world oceans 
are not merely a contemporary chal-
lenge, instead forming a major part 
of maritime history across centuries� 
Wilson, in his introduction, picks up on 
Kennedy’s explanation of multipolarity 
as a concept in international-relations 
scholarship but deftly pivots once he 
has borrowed the framing, writing 
that “this book is not concerned with 
resolving the debate about the nature of 
the international system” (p� i)� Instead, 
as they do best, the historians here offer 
their chapters—ranging in temporal 
coverage from the mid-eighteenth to the 
early twenty-first century—to illustrate 
and illuminate the competing dynamics 
of the concept rather than systematizing 
the present or predicting the future�
Across twelve chapters, and an afterword 
that really serves as a thirteenth, Navies 
in Multipolar Worlds ranges widely� 
Alan James examines the French navy 
of Louis XIV and French sea power 
in its interactions with the British and 
Dutch� Brian Chao carries the French 
example into the nineteenth century 
and offers an unexpected and valuable 
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look at what it means to be the world’s 
second-most-powerful navy� Roger 
Knight and Evan Wilson examine the 
Royal Navy toward the end of the 
Napoleonic period, with Wilson’s deep 
dive into British postwar redeployment 
and retrenchment offering a particularly 
relevant bit of history to a U�S� Navy 
that itself has experienced a shrinking of 
capacity since the end of the Cold War� 
The era after the First World War, well 
known for its great-power maneuvering, 
is covered by four authors, each from a 
distinct perspective� With elements of 
the British experience examined by John 
Maurer and G� H� Bennett, the Japanese 
discussed by S� C� M� Paine, and the 
Italians covered by Fabio De Ninno, 
the reader gains enormous insight into 
the truism popularized by James N� 
Mattis: the adversary always gets a vote�
It is not until the ninth chapter that 
the United States and the U�S� Navy 
make their appearance, as Kennedy 
charts the interaction between the 
Americans and the great powers as 
war clouds form and then the Second 
World War crashes across Europe 
and the Pacific� The rise of American 
maritime hegemony by 1945 was neither 
a foregone conclusion nor necessarily a 
surprise, as Kennedy deftly illustrates�
The post–Cold War era is discussed 
skillfully by Tim Choi in his examina-
tion of contemporary Danish naval 
developments in pursuit of Arctic power 
and by Geoffrey Till in his wide-ranging 
look at the multipolarity of the early 
twenty-first century� Finally, the chapter 
by Chinese scholar Hu Bo is a fascinat-
ing examination of how the People’s 
Republic of China views maritime power 
and the history of great-power competi-
tion� While the whole book deserves 
a wide readership, this final chapter 
provides direct contact with today’s mul-
tipolarity and global competition and is 
enormously valuable to any strategist�
Kennedy’s long list of insightful histories 
and Wilson’s numerous books, including 
several edited volumes, speak to the 
pair’s ability to bring deeply researched 
history together with contemporary 
relevance and to package it in a well-
organized and readable collection� 
Edited volumes—particularly those, 
like this one, that include both well-
known scholars and rising stars—are 
notoriously hard to edit in a way that 
holds together both thematically and 
stylistically� Yet the editors of Navies 
in Multipolar Worlds have navigated 
these shoals adroitly to produce an 
enormously valuable collection�
This reviewer has one major complaint, 
although it is not something that the 
editors necessarily could control: the 
price of the book� At $128 a copy, it is 
almost guaranteed that the officers and 
strategists who should be reading these 
chapters will not� For a book that shares 
so many insights and offers today’s 
readers so much valuable context and 
knowledge, it is a shame that it likely will 
find its way onto the shelves of a handful 
of research libraries and go no further�
Political scientists and international- 
relations scholars often tell historians 
that the work the latter do in the 
archives is the foundation of the 
former’s efforts at social science� 
Navies in Multipolar Worlds flips that 
script, not only offering chapters from 
historians who have conducted the deep 
research into their topics necessary to 
relate clearly the complications of the 
past, but also offering key arguments 
and fascinating insights about what 
multipolarity is and how nations 
interact on the world’s oceans� This 
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interaction has happened for centuries, 
and understanding that history will offer 
today’s strategists, officers, and decision 
makers the background they need to 
think deeply about the great-power 
interactions of the twenty-first century�
BENJAMIN ARMSTRONG
Vision or Mirage: Saudi Arabia at the Crossroads, 
by David Rundell� London: Bloomsbury, 2020� 
336 pages� $27�
The active pursuit of knowledge 
through experience, academic study, 
and deep critical thought may define a 
lifelong learner; however, the ability to 
convey that same information to readers 
effectively is no less than a gift� In David 
Rundell’s Vision or Mirage: Saudi Arabia 
at the Crossroads, we find its result: a 
treasure that is no less than a sentinel-
level work on the historic evolution 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia�
It is easy, even natural, for this reviewer 
and other readers to be critical even to 
the point of cynicism when it comes 
to books on geopolitics and history� 
Before reading this work, a colleague 
(who is also a war college graduate) and 
I listened to a virtual presentation by an 
opening commentator and then one by 
the author himself� Both of us ex-
claimed, “This guy is an apologist of the 
current leadership, without question!” 
Had the book not been ordered already, 
I fear I may have skipped it, given the 
opinion I developed that afternoon� 
What a mistake that would have been, 
and how terribly wrong I was in my 
assessment! Rundell is no practitioner 
of apologetics; he is a gifted storyteller 
and writer, and his insights into the 
dynamics of the Middle East and Saudi 
Arabia’s role in it are comprehensive� He 
misses none of the subtle nuances that 
elude some of the best writers� For any 
real student of the subject, this book is 
a treasure to be returned to again and 
again� If one ever has observed a master 
of any craft or profession—surgery, for 
instance—one understands and knows 
the joy of learning from someone 
who is comfortable in his element 
and has progressed through practice, 
experience, failure, and reattempts 
in the pursuit of excellence� This 
certainly is the case with Rundell’s lucid 
explanation of Saudi Arabia’s journey�
Rundell has spent his life preparing 
for or serving within the diplomatic 
sphere, beginning with his education 
in economics at Colgate University and 
MPhil from Oxford in Middle Eastern 
studies� Of his more than thirty years of 
diplomatic experience, half was spent 
in Saudi Arabia itself and the remainder 
in countries in the region or having 
influence in the same� If academic 
preparation and experience are not 
enough to convince, consider critical 
thinking as the third leg in certifying 
Rundell as a subject-matter expert on 
the kingdom� Finally, he is a gifted 
writer, interweaving facts, opinion, 
and external influences into a thesis 
that sticks� His ability to convey the 
complex in a near-layman’s approach 
helps the reader form enlightened 
conclusions rather than being merely 
informed through expert opinion�
Readers will enjoy the format by which 
the writer progresses� The book is 
divided into five near-equal parts, each 
with three to five chapters that are 
easily digestible and leave the consumer 
hungry and expectant� The parts give 
general views on subjects such as nation 
creation, succession management, 
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stakeholder consideration, delivery of 
competent government, and meeting 
of the challenges of the future� There is 
scant evidence of salaciousness or vivid 
tale-telling of critical events merely to 
invoke readers’ interest—for instance, 
there is little coverage of subjects such 
as Jamal Khashoggi and the Ritz-
Carlton affair� Instead, Rundell’s effort 
goes toward providing considerable 
insight and explanation to help readers 
understand the “why,” leaving them to 
draw their own conclusions� In contrast, 
many of the available books out now 
use such particular events to draw 
in readers and keep them interested� 
Rundell uses history to analyze the 
decision-making and actions of Saudi 
rulers, and applies them to current 
events and personalities as a predic-
tor of what the future may hold�
Like many readers, the reviewer picks 
up a new book and ruminates on what 
can be drawn from an initial review 
of the title, cover, and introduction; 
I myself do not even begin to read 
the content until I have considered 
these for a couple of days� Rundell 
gives the initial impression that he 
is looking at Prince Mohammed bin 
Salman (MBS), his “Vision 2030,” and 
whether it can bring the kingdom 
through its current crossroads into 
the future� What Rundell delivers is 
an analysis of how the Al Sauds have 
approached many crossroads in the 
past, to provide a prediction of how 
its current leadership will proceed 
in the future� Readers who study 
this work and the history of Saudi 
Arabia will gain insight on what is to 
come� Regardless of what you think 
or have heard, MBS is right on track 
with the history of his predecessors�
JOHN W� STRAIN
Escaping the Conflict Trap: Toward Ending Civil 
Wars in the Middle East, ed� Paul Salem and Ross 
Harrison� Washington, DC: Middle East Insti-
tute, 2019� 213 pages� $14�95�
Civil war has been a defining reality 
of the Middle East for decades� The 
conflicts in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and 
Yemen are just the latest examples of 
countries squandering their blood and 
treasure while achieving inconclusive 
political ends� Even more troubling, 
civil wars in these countries often lead 
to a “conflict trap”; war devastates 
the economic, political, and social 
fabric of the nation, trapping it in a 
vicious cycle of unending violence�
In Escaping the Conflict Trap, editors 
Paul Salem and Ross Harrison have 
brought together academics and 
practitioners to help shed light on the 
causes of and challenges posed by civil 
wars in the Middle East� The volume is 
written to appeal to a broad audience, 
including academics, practitioners, 
and “interested citizens�” The readings 
offer valuable academic and policy 
insights on specific civil wars while 
remaining accessible to the general 
reader� However, what makes this book 
truly unusual is that it also includes 
potential courses of action that might 
help end a few of the region’s civil wars�
Escaping the Conflict Trap is structured 
to address what the editors assert are 
three “gaps in the existing discourse of 
civil wars in the Middle East” (p� ix)� 
Salem in chapter 1 and Harrison in 
chapter 3 assess the historical and 
geopolitical dynamics, respectively, of 
civil war in the region� Salem sets the 
context for the volume by providing a 
useful synopsis of the “patterns, defini-
tions, and dynamics of civil wars” in 
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the region during the twentieth century 
(p� 1)� Borrowing from the thoughts 
of Carl von Clausewitz that civil war 
too is a continuation of politics by 
other means, Salem asserts that war 
termination is fundamentally a political 
challenge� One could assert that this 
is especially true given the compli-
cated variety of actors involved in the 
conflicts in question, ranging from 
irregular armed groups to regional 
and great powers� For his part, Har-
rison examines the economic, social, 
religious, and political factors that 
drive civil conflicts within and among 
nations in the Middle East� These 
two framing chapters shine a light on 
similarities and differences among 
conflicts in the region and the ebb and 
flow of power and grievances across 
history� Both chapters also provide a 
comparative analytical framework for 
the more detailed historical analyses 
in the remainder of the book�
The volume also directly addresses 
the challenges of ending civil wars� 
Jessica Maves Braithwaite’s chapter 
addresses some causal relationships 
that may lend themselves to a more 
protracted conflict, such as the number 
of warring groups and the existence of 
“spoilers”—extremist organizations that 
marginalize moderate elements—that 
prevent the progress of negotiated 
settlements in protracted conflict� Of 
particular note, she argues that biased 
third-party mediation produces better 
results than that of neutral parties, 
which is counter to conventional 
wisdom� Chester Crocker continues on 
a similar theme toward the end of the 
book in his discussion in the chapter 
titled “Diplomacy of Engagement” 
about strategies to change a “target’s 
behavior towards more cooperative 
and constructive policies” (p� 188)�
The regional-specific chapters are 
written by practitioners with direct 
and indirect experience in specific 
countries; they cover the civil wars 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, 
and Yemen� The chapter on Yemen 
by Gerald Feierstein is a particularly 
welcome inclusion in this type of study 
because it contextualizes current 
complex challenges within a broader 
historical and cultural narrative� The 
chapter also raises the question of how 
power is transferred within societies 
in which the stakes are extremely high 
and within which the settlement of the 
last conflict can resonate and continue 
to undercut the current political status 
quo� This is a good reminder of Clause-
witz’s words that “results of war are 
seldom final,” shifting the discussion 
back to how the conflict-termination 
process shapes the long-term ac-
ceptability of the new status quo�
Moreover, as foreign-policy attention 
shifts to the presence of NATO and 
American troops in Afghanistan and 
Syria, the remaining chapters in this 
edited volume—on Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Syria, and Libya—will become rereads 
for policy makers and their staffs� In 
particular, these chapters provide the op-
portunity to revisit the roles of history, 
culture, sectarianism, and the bitter 
aftertaste of previous conflict-resolution 
experiences and consider how they will 
help to shape expectations and map 
out current challenges� All four of these 
chapters also consider the powerful role 
of external actors in amplifying griev-
ances and accelerating the breakdown 
in existing political settlements�
In 2021, as the spotlight returns to all 
the states examined in this volume, the 
book is a sobering reminder that very 
little success in transitioning to a stable, 
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new political outcome will be found in 
a stand-alone approach that empha-
sizes military solutions to end conflict� 
Moreover, it is perhaps discomforting to 
read that the political-settlement process 
in states that experience civil wars does 
not lend itself to an easily replicated 
road map� Rather, this book provides 
nuanced and thoughtful analytical 
windows into the similarities and 
differences among these civil wars and 
some blunt assessments from experts 
concerning the limitations and pos-
sibilities of war-termination processes�
KURT BUCKENDORF
The Kaiser’s U-boat Assault on America: Ger-
many’s Great War Gamble in the First World War, 
by Hans Joachim Koerver� Philadelphia: Pen and 
Sword, 2020� 360 pages� $34�95�
George M� Cohan’s 1917 patriotic 
anthem “Over There” was written to 
encourage young American men to 
enlist in the military and fight with 
determination in Europe, such that “we 
won’t come back till it’s over, over there�” 
What most Americans did not expect 
was that German forces, specifically 
those of the Kriegsmarine, might seek 
to fight in American waters—“over 
here�” Military historian Hans Joachim 
Koerver’s engaging history of that 
effort affords readers a detailed study 
of an oft-overlooked aspect of the First 
World War� The devastating effects 
of German U-boat technology and 
warfare in the Second World War 
had their genesis in the experience of 
and lessons derived from undersea 
operations of the First World War�
Providing a study of diplomatic and 
economic aspects of the U-boat 
operations against the United States 
as well as the tactical and strategic use 
of the U-boats, Koerver provides a 
volume that is extensively researched 
in primary and secondary sources, 
yet very readable� Numerous charts, 
graphs, and photographs enhance the 
volume� Additionally, four appendices, 
including one providing copies of 
pertinent documents, supply resources 
for those wishing to do further study�
Of particular note to those with an inter-
est in the U�S� Navy in Newport, Rhode 
Island, and the Naval War College is 
Koerver’s presentation of the U-53 in-
cident of 7 October 1916� The day after 
U-53 left Newport, it boarded one U�S� 
merchant vessel, reviewed the cargo list, 
and let the ship pass; however, it then 
sank five non-U�S� ships in the vicinity of 
the U�S� lightship Nantucket (LV 112)—
two of them in the presence of seventeen 
neutral U�S� destroyers from Newport�
In a volume containing much informa-
tion and many details, readers will 
appreciate the presentation of the mate-
rial in fifty-eight short chapters grouped 
into five sections, one for the prewar 
setting and one for each year of the war, 
excluding 1918� The author addresses 
many aspects of the U-boat assault and 
views the ethical and legal dimensions of 
Germany’s unrestricted warfare in 1917, 
as well as a host of other matters, such as 
U-boat construction, manning, arma-
ment, tactics and operations, strategic 
significance, and propaganda� Yet the 
work is balanced and affords readers—
whether they begin with little knowledge 
of U-boat operations or greater knowl-
edge and interest—a very useful volume� 
Ships receiving individual chapters 
pertaining to their destruction are RMS 
Lusitania (7 May 1915), SS Arabic (19 
August 1915), and SS Sussex (24 March 
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1916), aboard each of which U�S� citizens 
died� Each ship was attacked prior to 
America’s entry into the war, and each 
attack initiated diplomatic fervor and 
furor from President Woodrow Wilson 
and the United States� Each attack was 
avoidable, did little to further Germany’s 
war aims, and significantly damaged the 
country’s international reputation and 
image� Yet it was not these three ships 
that Wilson referenced in his 2 April 
1917 war message to Congress; rather, it 
was the sinking of three U�S� merchant 
ships—SS Vigilancia (16 March 1917), 
SS City of Memphis (17 March 1917), 
and the tanker SS Illinois (18 March 
1917)—that became the tipping point 
for America’s entry into the war�
As mentioned, the text is interspersed 
with numerous photographs and charts 
that supplement the content� Readers 
will find the book to be an enjoyable 
and engaging work� The several appen-
dices, whose contents include photo-
graphs of decoded German documents 
from Room 40 within the directorate 
of intelligence of the British Admi-
ralty, enhance the work by providing a 
glimpse of the tedious yet significant 
work of intercepting and decrypting 
German naval and diplomatic traffic, 
including the Zimmermann telegram, to 
which the author devotes several pages� 
The book’s title is somewhat misleading, 
in that out of five sections only one is 
devoted to the U-boat assault on the 
United States� A more detailed index 
would benefit readers� Some readers will 
wish for more details on specific boats 
or incidents, but Koerver states that he 
is writing for a general audience (p� vii)� 
Thus the work should be read by those 
who seek to gain a broader understand-
ing of the First World War at sea and the 
importance of U-boats in that conflict�
TIMOTHY J� DEMY
The American Way of Empire: How America Won 
a World—but Lost Her Way, by James Kurth� 
Washington, DC: Washington Books, 2019� 464 
pages� $30�
In the second year of the Peloponnesian 
War, the Athenian people reproached 
Pericles for bringing invasion, plague, 
and ruin upon them� Pericles warned 
his fellow citizens that Athens pos-
sessed an empire and that, while it 
might have been wrong to take it, it 
would be unsafe to let it go� Persuaded, 
the Athenians persisted with policies 
that made them even more enemies, 
including among erstwhile allies, 
ultimately leading to the dissolution 
of their empire� In The American Way 
of Empire, James Kurth draws on but 
departs from Pericles as he offers his 
own warning: that America no longer 
possesses an empire, and—to those still 
seeking to preserve this fallen empire—it 
would be unsafe not to let it go�
Kurth, a professor emeritus of political 
science at Swarthmore College, is a 
luminary of U�S� foreign policy� A PhD 
from Harvard who studied under Samuel 
P� Huntington, to whom he dedicates the 
book, Kurth is a member of the Council 
on Foreign Relations and a senior fellow 
at the Foreign Policy Research Institute� 
Kurth has authored over 120 articles, and 
he revised some of them to serve as chap-
ters in the book’s five substantive parts, 
which are titled “Hegemony,” “Ideology,” 
“Strategy,” “Insurgency,” and “Political 
Economy�” This composition allows the 
reader to absorb the book in chapters 
or parts or as a whole� That the chapters 
derive from articles originally published 
as early as the 1990s yet address cur-
rent crises so deftly reflects Kurth’s 
prescience and the book’s timeliness�
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With compellingly creative analysis, 
Kurth reveals the causes of the American 
empire’s remarkable rise and abrupt 
fall� After the Second World War, the 
United States cemented three hegemonic 
alliance systems as part of the “American 
way of empire�” However, that empire 
made trade-offs that became time 
bombs� For example, the United States 
opened its market to its East Asian 
allies to keep them out of China’s orbit, 
but in doing so it hollowed out the 
core of American industry� Because of 
these imperial policies, the American 
empire has fractured regionally in 
Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and 
Latin America—and functionally in 
its military, economic, political, and 
ideological dimensions� In the power 
vacuums created by the demise of the 
American empire, states such as China, 
Russia, and Iran now seek their own 
spheres of influence� According to 
Kurth, it did not need to end this way�
Kurth attributes the precipitous decline 
of the American empire to the deliberate 
decisions of its elites� He brings together 
American intellectual history, political 
economy, culture, and even religion to 
explain how this empire lost its way� For 
instance, he describes how the Marshall 
Plan originally joined the Midwest’s 
industry, with its conservative nationalist 
tradition, and the Northeast’s finance, 
with its liberal international tradition, to 
form a grand domestic alliance to pro-
mote international free trade as a pillar of 
empire� However, over time, an insidious 
alliance of ideas and interests coalesced 
among American elites who, like Pericles 
and the Athenian elites before them, 
insisted on defending and extending 
the empire to the point of collapse�
America’s elites ultimately succumbed to 
the tragic flaw of hubris, in the aftermath 
of the Cold War� Thoroughly convinced 
that “American ideas [were] universal 
ideas,” they led the United States on the 
most ambitious and disastrous imperial 
project yet, seeking “to reinvent the 
nations of the globe in [the U�S�] image” 
(p� 262)� American elites ignored not 
only the sensibilities and struggles of 
their fellow citizens—who today distrust 
their leaders, just as the Athenians once 
doubted Pericles—but also the interests 
of other states and the value systems of 
other cultures� They also disregarded 
the exigencies of international relations� 
Faced with the end of the American 
empire, they must come to terms with 
the enduring lesson of history: that 
“power and realities almost always con-
found ideology and visions” (p� xviii)�
The United States can aspire only to 
shape, not to dominate, the twenty-first 
century� America must abandon any 
illusion that it can remake the world in 
its image, particularly given that it has 
lost its image of itself� In fact, Kurth 
quips, if the United States has any hope 
of steering a course toward peace and 
prosperity, “America will have to become 
more American than it has been in 
recent years” by returning to the values 
of the American Creed and the virtues 
of the American republic (p� 394)�
The American Way of Empire gives 
the reader much to ponder, without 
being ponderous� Kurth entertains and 
educates in equal measure, delighting 
the reader with many witticisms and 
turns of phrase, often turning common 
wisdom on its head in the process� In a 
discerning inversion of the well-worn 
American conception of containment 
during the Cold War, Kurth wryly 
observes that “in actuality, the most 
important containment going on had 
been that by the Soviet Union of the 
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United States” (p� 23)� Herein lies an 
admonition for the policy makers and 
national-security professionals who 
should read The American Way of 
Empire: too often America sets forth 
to change the world, without realizing 
that just as often the world changes it�
JEFFREY P� ROGG
Oilcraft: The Myths of Scarcity and Security That 
Haunt U.S. Energy Policy, by Robert Vitalis� Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford Univ� Press, 2020� 224 pages� 
$24�
Energy analysts often gripe that every-
one who drives a car or owns a lightbulb 
thinks this provides sufficient training 
to claim expertise in energy markets� In 
his new book, contrarian University of 
Pennsylvania political scientist Robert 
Vitalis takes to task mainstream experts 
who equate oil with power� At times 
breezily polemical, this concise but 
richly researched foray is a valuable 
contribution to the prolific “geopolitics 
of energy” literature in fashion today�
The incisive commentary begins with 
the title: the word oilcraft is a play on 
witchcraft, not statecraft or tradecraft; it 
is explicitly pejorative, not complimen-
tary� Laying his cynical cards on the table 
from the outset, Vitalis is unrelenting 
in his critique of the “modern-day form 
of magical realism” (p� 6) that presumes 
that oil is the “lifeblood or weapon or 
prize” (p� 23), constituting an axiomatic 
truth that consequently requires a spe-
cial relationship with Persian Gulf na-
tions, military commitments around the 
world, and strategic deal making with 
unsavory regimes� He derides as a perni-
cious myth the “need once to control 
and now secure access, stabilize prices, 
or prevent hostile powers from holding 
the world economy hostage” (p� 122)� 
Vitalis names names and spares none, 
reserving his most incendiary ammuni-
tion not for policy makers, as one might 
expect, but for his fellow academics�
The analytical core of the book compris-
es detailed surveys of energy-security 
discussions in the 1920s and 1970s� In 
the earlier period, policy makers pan-
icked about Britain’s expansive control 
of global oil supplies, which prompted 
the rise, within the burgeoning field of 
international relations, of the so-called 
Columbia School, which dismissed 
great-power competition as an unneces-
sary and counterproductive geopolitical 
framework for consideration� The 
lessons of these debates, Vitalis argues, 
were long forgotten by the time resource 
scarcity again seized the nation’s con-
sciousness� This later period, beginning 
around 1973, is broadly misunderstood� 
For instance, it was a group of Arab 
countries that imposed the infamous 
oil embargo, not the Organization of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries; the 
upward pressure on oil prices—driven 
by a complex host of reasons, includ-
ing turbulent international financial 
conditions—predated the Yom Kippur 
War, and therefore was not caused by it, 
as is sometimes portrayed� One of the 
most interesting points Vitalis makes is 
that the resulting higher oil prices fueled 
greater development of oil resources 
in the United States (e�g�, in Alaska 
and the offshore Gulf of Mexico)�
Other episodes make brief cameos, 
recast in a petroleum-tinted light: the 
so-called Tanker War between Iran and 
Iraq, Operations DESERT STORM and 
IRAQI FREEDOM, the development of the 
Carter Doctrine, the deployment of U�S� 
Marines to Lebanon, and the slew of 
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terrorist attacks that came to character-
ize the American presence in the region�
This historical analysis builds up to the 
political climax of the book� Echo-
ing his previous work on American 
foreign policy in the Middle East, 
Vitalis gleefully dismantles the widely 
accepted assertion that the Roosevelt 
administration and the Saudi royal 
family agreed to a nebulous “oil for 
security” deal during World War II� 
According to folklore—which Vitalis 
skewers—the United States, ever since 
those bygone days, has protected the 
kingdom (including with deadly force) 
in an explicit exchange for petroleum 
access� Instead, Vitalis argues that 
oil markets would function just fine 
regardless of who holds the keys to 
Abqaiq, Ras Tanura, and the rest of the 
Saudi kingdom’s oil bounty� He asserts 
that energy-security concerns are 
employed misleadingly to justify the 
perpetuation of this polarizing alliance, 
about the merits of which he is deeply 
skeptical� The author writes with 
admiration for the similarly skeptical 
scholars of the 1920s and 1970s who 
challenged the conventional wisdom 
about energy security as the basis for 
foreign-policy decisions (particularly 
in terms of military intervention)�
Robert Vitalis makes bold and clear 
claims� One wonders whether a mere 
134 pages of text (before the acknowl-
edgments and endnotes) are enough 
to marshal the necessary evidence 
and argumentation� He succeeds in 
building his case, but the reader is 
left wanting a bit more� The book 
also is peppered with an unfortunate 
and thoroughly unnecessary number 
of typographical errors that detract 
from the cutting prose and punchy 
critiques of the existing literature�
Although mentioned only in passing, 
the twenty-first-century growth in 
domestic U�S� oil production and 
America’s rise to prominence as a 
significant exporter of petroleum 
already are prompting a reevaluation of 
long-standing national-security policy� 
Whether this reevaluation necessarily 
entails a reduction in, realignment of, 
or reckoning with respect to the nation’s 
presence overseas is a contentious 
proposition� Even asking the question is 
enough to raise hackles in Washington, 
where bureaucratic inertia enables the 
circling of wagons with impressive 
speed� The case studies that Vitalis 
presents remind us that these debates are 
not new� Readers may not agree with all 
his conclusions—and certainly not with 
every sarcastic remark he directs toward 
other scholars—but the argument is 
challenging, brisk, and unwavering� It 
warrants close examination by regional 
specialists and global strategists alike, 
and, perhaps, a full-fledged rebuttal 
from the alleged sorcerers of oilcraft�
TRISTAN ABBEY
A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy, by James R� 
Holmes� Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2019� 200 pages� $24�95�
Naval training, by necessity, is anchored 
in developing technical and tactical 
expertise quickly� All newly minted 
officers preparing to serve on, above, 
or below the surface of the ocean are 
assimilating how-to skills� Demands on 
their time do not diminish in their first 
operational command, where training 
continues and expectations increase� 
In this busy and technology-heavy 
environment, there often is little time 
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left for philosophical or historical 
discourse on big-picture topics� For this 
reason, Professor Holmes, who holds the 
J� C� Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy 
at the Naval War College, has written 
A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy to 
expose young officers to the central 
characters, foundational principles, 
and key terms of maritime strategy�
Maritime Strategy is centered primar-
ily on the writings of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, whose theories have influenced 
American policy for more than a 
century� Holmes begins by introducing 
one of Mahan’s bedrock principles: “The 
first law of states” is for a state’s own 
“self-preservation” (p� 2)� To accomplish 
this task, the nation must be equipped 
with the means of producing goods, 
have the ability to ship those goods, and 
then have access to foreign markets� 
These three elements—production, 
shipping, and markets—are the primary 
ingredients of sea power� The major 
content of the book is a primer on 
how a nation generates, maintains, 
and enforces sea power—the “saltwater 
global supply chain” (p� 51)�
Generating sea power has as much to 
do with a nation’s physical qualities 
as it does with human characteristics� 
Geographical features play a central 
role in whether a nation uses the sea 
to its advantage� Countries such as 
Great Britain and the United States are 
fortunate in this regard, having easy 
access to the sea and multiple ports 
for shipping and receiving goods� 
But other factors, such as national 
character, are equally important� Does 
the nation view itself as having a 
“saltwater culture” (p� 38)? Does it 
place value on ingenuity in producing 
and shipping goods? Furthermore, 
does the government promote 
maritime industry through adequate 
laws and the financing needed to 
maintain the shipping enterprise?
Maintaining the virtuous cycle of sea 
power is the subject of the second part 
of the book� Here, Holmes extrapolates 
the need for commercial and naval 
ports in strategic places throughout the 
world� This chapter leads the reader on a 
fascinating historical journey of Mahan’s 
quest for better access to markets in East 
Asia� Mahan’s influence was critical in  
the development of the Panama Canal,  
which he envisioned as the “gateway to  
the Pacific” for American shipping (p� 68)� 
He also foresaw the importance 
of the Hawaiian Islands as a “step-
pingstone” across the Pacific (p� 65)�
The final chapter examines the par-
ticular role of a navy in the exercise of 
national power—enforcement� America 
strives to use the diplomatic process to 
“win without fighting” whenever pos-
sible (p� 116)� However, the U�S� Navy’s 
crucial role is to serve as a “backstop for 
diplomatic efforts” in the quest to “open, 
nourish, and safeguard commercial 
access to important trading theaters such 
as East Asia and Western Europe” (p� 2)�
Maritime Strategy is excellently written� 
In an accessible and nonthreatening 
way, it introduces the reader to critical 
topics addressed by major theorists� 
Comprising only three chapters and a 
total of 150 pages, it easily can be read 
in a short time� Two items are especially 
noteworthy� First, Holmes’s analogy of 
the sea as a maritime commons—a vast 
marketplace where goods are bought 
and sold—is memorable and apt� Unlike 
the commons of colonial New England, 
though, where the local town enforced 
the rules of trade, there is no sovereign 
over the sea� For this reason, nations 
must work together to enforce the law 
of the sea to ensure maritime freedom� 
A second item worth mentioning is 
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the sea’s ability to link us back to our 
forebears� As Professor Holmes states, 
“Seafarers join something larger and 
older when they go down to the sea 
in ships” (p� 14)� Not only does the 
sea connect us as a global community, 
but it also has the ability to connect 
us with our past and with our naval 
and military history and heritage�
Wardrooms and classrooms would do 
well to add Maritime Strategy to their list 
of books to discuss� Training commands 
should consider including this book 
in their curricula for new accessions, 
as it provides a big-picture view of the 
Navy’s place on the national scene�
SCOTT CAUBLE
Coalition of the UnWilling and UnAble: European 
Realignment and the Future of American Geopoli-
tics, by John R� Deni� Ann Arbor: Univ� of Michi-
gan Press, 2021� 274 pages� $75�
In this exceptional and contemporary 
analysis, John R� Deni provides a  
sobering view of the largest U�S�  
European military allies and their 
abilities to function as effective partners� 
In short, the current and future pictures 
are not pretty� As the book’s title 
indicates, whether one considers the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Italy, or Poland, these states suffer from 
considerable—arguably profound—mili-
tary limitations that will circumscribe 
their ability to serve as military partners 
to the United States� Likewise, whether 
one focuses on demographics (declining 
birth rates), national economies that 
cannot support military ambitions, 
the absence of advanced military 
capabilities, or strategic directions 
that do not square well with those of 
the United States, the applicability 
to these allies of all these factors, to 
varying degrees, helps to explain how 
significant the barriers in place are�
Certainly, previous scholarship has 
examined European military shortcom-
ings� Many have written on American 
military preeminence in NATO’s 
operation in Kosovo; others have 
demonstrated the different strategic 
perspectives and European military limi-
tations apparent in NATO’s bombings in 
Libya� Deni provides an updated analysis 
that looks closely at the historical “big 
four” European allies, plus Poland�
For the United Kingdom, Deni 
notes that over the last decade major 
reductions in defense expenditures 
have cut deeply into British military 
capabilities� He also devotes much 
analysis to the British economy, 
noting that Brexit similarly will cut 
deeply into Britain’s tax base, effectively 
preventing the British from investing 
in their military forces, even if they 
had the political desire to do so�
The author’s contrasting analysis of 
Germany is especially perceptive and 
revealing� He makes the case that the 
Germans’ strong and robust economy, 
favorable labor market, and budget 
surpluses provide the potential for them 
to play a far more significant role in 
global security� The German public, 
however, remains generally opposed 
to the projection of German military 
force; opinion polls even indicate that 
Germans are among the least likely, 
compared with respondents from other 
European allies, to express a willingness 
to use force to defend another NATO 
ally if it got into a “serious military 
conflict” with Russia (p� 72)� Political-
elite and youth opinions differ on this 
point, yet the dominant norm remains 
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in place, which has translated into 
“debilitating shortcomings” for German 
military capabilities, despite having 
an economy that truly has prospered 
and will continue to do so (p� 66)�
Deni sees France as the closest U�S� 
ally in terms of strategic outlook; the 
French hold views nearly identical to 
Americans’ in these areas, and their 
perspectives on the role of the military 
as a foreign policy tool are similar 
as well� But the author argues that 
France’s foreign and military visions 
cannot be sustained, owing to the 
country’s inadequate economic growth� 
Moreover, some political-sovereignty 
issues still stand in the way of more-
fruitful interstate dialogue�
Among the allies examined, Italy 
stands out as the one that has fallen the 
furthest� Owing to a deeply troubled 
economy and a backward environment 
on technology and innovation—along 
with the inability of political moderates 
to face these challenges effectively, 
which has resulted in the rise of populist 
politicians—the Italian military is only 
a shadow of what it once was, with the 
likely prospect of additional languish-
ing ahead� With an aging population 
and a military that increasingly is 
used as an internal dual-use security 
force, Italy’s prospects as a meaningful 
military ally continue to shrink�
Deni’s last study is devoted to Poland, 
which, unlike nearly all other European 
countries, has spent consistently and 
meaningfully on defense over the entire 
last decade� Russian military incursions 
into Georgia, Crimea, and eastern 
Ukraine, along with Russian military ac-
tivities in Kaliningrad, build directly on 
Poland’s historical fears of an aggressive 
and expansionist Russia� Yet despite Po-
land’s economic strengths, new military 
capabilities, and legislation that requires 
ongoing defense spending, it suffers a 
severe limitation: its singular focus on 
Russia, with its resultant investments in 
territorial defense� This limits its ability 
to partner with the United States�
The author concludes with several 
recommendations for how to address 
these significant shortcomings� Among 
his proposals is sharing more American 
military intelligence with allies, espe-
cially Germany, in an effort to increase 
transparency on existing global threats 
and challenges� Deni also recom-
mends that the United States fully use 
international organizations, including 
the United Nations and NATO, given 
the high strategic value the allies place 
on them� And he encourages the United 
States to support a strong European 
security identity, which may help trans-
late into greater defense spending, and 
perhaps the development of specified 
niche capabilities among the allies�
This book is impressive� Deni has used 
an extensive body of scholarship and 
data on each of these countries� He also 
conducted a multitude of interviews 
with both American and foreign 
defense officials� While some of his 
policy proposals certainly will generate 
debate, his ideas are welcome, as they 
provide some optimism that positive 
change is possible and that policy 
directions worth pursuing do exist�
RYAN C� HENDRICKSON
Dangerous Narratives: Warfare, Strategy, State-
craft, ed� Ajit K� Maan� Washington, DC: Narra-
tive Strategies Ink, 2020� 188 pages� $45�
This century’s increased social media 
and other forms of technological 
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sophistication has expanded what security 
practitioners consider to be a domain 
of conflict� In Dangerous Narratives, 
Ajit Maan and his coauthors argue that 
the cognitive and narrative domains of 
conflict, if not always strategic centers of 
gravity themselves, certainly have pro-
duced strategic effects on those centers� 
Only recently, though, through a combi-
nation of information operations against 
the United States and recent foreign-
policy failures, has the national-security 
community recognized the growing 
significance of this domain� Professionals, 
researchers, and students interested in 
the strategic, policy, and national-security 
implications of how narratives can create 
meaning will find Dangerous Narratives 
a thought-provoking exploration of what 
the future of conflict will look like�
Dangerous Narratives is a contrib-
uted volume by Dr� Ajit Maan and nine 
additional security practitioners and 
scholars, each of whom contributes a 
chapter that develops Maan’s conceptual 
foundations of “narrative identity theory” 
and “narrative warfare”; together they 
examine these concepts’ application to the 
realms of kinetic warfare, strategy, history, 
education, and law enforcement� Maan, a 
narrative scholar and the chief executive 
officer of Narrative Strategies (NS), a 
consulting firm, introduces us to the 
concept of narrative warfare: a struggle 
not over the truth value of information 
but over the meaning of information� 
Even though research has shown the 
importance of the narrative and cognitive 
spaces in human behavior, Maan argues 
that this knowledge is not being applied to 
its fullest in the field of national security�
In section 1, Dr� Howard Gambrill Clark, 
the president of NS and a counterextrem-
ism specialist, and Lieutenant Colonel 
Brian L� Steed, USA (Ret�), associate 
professor of military history at the U�S� 
Army Command and General Staff 
College, examine the seeming disconnect 
between various narratives and their 
associated kinetic conflicts� Drawing 
on historical conflicts and the relevant 
strategies of past military leaders, Clark 
describes ways in which conflicts have 
been and can be resolved through 
nonkinetic means via narrative-led 
subversion—the advantage of such a 
strategy being that it is limited only by 
an individual’s creativity� Steed artfully 
translates the concept of the narrative 
landscape by comparing it to a physical 
one that can be eroded, controlled, and 
exploited, in this case by actors and crafty 
“narrative entrepreneurs” who use social 
cleavages to gain a narrative advantage�
Section 2 features case studies and 
analyses of weaponized narratives, both 
past and present� Brigadier General Tom 
Drohan, USAF (Ret�), professor emeritus 
at the U�S� Air Force Academy, provides 
two in-depth analyses, of China’s and of 
Russia’s narrative strategies, including 
how a well-designed narrative can target 
opponents using Colonel John Boyd’s 
observe-orient-decide-act (i�e�, OODA) 
loop—to disastrous effect� China’s 
strategic use of information condenses 
the observe and orient steps into one, 
enabling faster decision-making and 
more-predictable actions� Russian 
narratives distort how a target orients 
itself and influence its will and capacity to 
observe, affecting how the target decides 
and acts within the loop� Paul Cobaugh, a 
retired Army warrant officer and special-
operations expert, imparts three insightful 
personal learning experiences from his 
deployments to Afghanistan� He explains 
how identity, content, structure, and story 
create a narrative, and how it can be used 
strategically to advance successful military 
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operations� Dr� Aleksandra Nesic, a visit-
ing faculty member at both the Army’s 
John F� Kennedy Special Warfare Center 
and School and the Joint Special Opera-
tions University, closes out the section 
with a fascinating exercise in historical-
narrative analysis of the 1389 Battle of 
Kosovo, including how political elites in 
Bosnia recontextualize and weaponize it 
in different ways for strategic purposes�
The final section turns toward the 
narrative’s effect on statecraft and stability� 
Colonel Christopher Holshek, USA (Ret�), 
critically assesses U�S� forces’ need to 
institutionalize the effective training and 
deployment of informational power via 
a whole-of-nation strategy, citing the 
success of the Marshall Plan in cultivating 
a durable narrative in Europe against 
the Soviet Union� Dr� Frank G� Straub, 
director of the National Police Founda-
tion’s Center for Mass Violence Response 
Studies, follows with an assessment of 
how narrative can influence police-citizen 
relations� Through neighborhood-level 
efforts at cooperative and community-
involved policing, departments can use 
narrative to build up trust and legitimacy 
to better protect citizens� The book closes 
with a cerebral, future-forward piece on 
the predicted standardization of soft-
power theory through the “noosphere,” 
written by retired RAND political scientist 
Dr� David Ronfeldt and Naval Postgradu-
ate School professor Dr� John Arquilla� 
They argue that true soft power has been 
misconceived and therefore does not have 
the same breadth of theory for application 
as is found for hard power, resulting in 
the former’s underuse� They hypothesize 
that the eventual development of educa-
tion and training in “noopolitik” will be 
critical for the strategists of the future�
Dangerous Narratives is an eclectic work 
that covers a surprising range of topics 
that one might not consider at first glance 
to be connected� The book is a testament 
to the far-reaching interest that the 
psychological and cognitive realms attract 
across the field of national-security policy� 
As I read each chapter, I consistently was 
captivated by the diversity of thought that 
such a specific conceptual framework 
was able to generate� This no doubt was 
because of the skill with which all the  
authors took a deceptively complex 
concept and, in their own terms and 
in the context of their own experi-
ences, described it clearly� The result 
is an excellent introductory handbook 
for the student-practitioner who seeks 
to understand the impacts of narra-
tive on national-security strategy�
NICK OMICHINSKI
Something of Themselves: Kipling, Kingsley, Conan 
Doyle and the Anglo-Boer War, by Sarah LeFanu� 
Oxford, U�K�: Oxford Univ� Press, 2020� 381 pages� 
$29�95�
Today, the Boer War—or, more accurately, 
the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–
1902)—is likely to be viewed as something 
quaint and obsolete, a sepia-toned 
daguerreotype from the waning Victorian 
era� Lacking the gravitas that comes with 
the antiquity of the Peloponnesians, its is-
sues and lessons seem to have been swept 
away by the industrialized, mass-produced 
warfare of the twentieth century and a 
general distaste for the conflicts of empire�
However, in its time the Boer War 
riveted the attention of the British Empire 
and, indeed, the world� Magnet-like, 
the cockpit of conflict drew three very 
different, particular Britons: Arthur 
Conan Doyle, Rudyard Kipling, and 
Mary Kingsley� All enjoyed some level 
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of fame; all were published authors; and 
two were considered scientists� But 
they experienced the conflict from very 
different backgrounds and points of 
view, and they saw the war through very 
different lenses� Kipling and Doyle were 
affected profoundly by their experiences 
in South Africa; Kingsley died there�
Sarah LeFanu deals with each of her 
subjects separately and chronologically, 
devoting the first six chapters of the book 
to examining Doyle, Kingsley, and Kipling 
up to the point when the war broke out� 
This section is essential to placing these 
individuals within the context of their 
times� While each has a compelling 
story, it is hard not to be most engaged 
by the biography of Mary Kingsley� Of 
the three, Kingsley is more likely to be 
unknown, although she should not be�
An autodidact, Kingsley was inspired by 
her father’s tales of wanderlust, and she 
both conformed to and pushed against the 
expectations demanded of the women of 
empire� Although she was desperate for 
adventure, she often had to stay at home 
to care for her brother� When she did get 
an opportunity to explore the rivers of 
West Africa, she did so with a vengeance, 
paddling miles upriver, discovering new 
species of fish, and compiling copious 
notes that formed the basis of her first 
book, Travels in West Africa. Later, 
as a respected authority in her field, 
she engaged in what today would be 
called “flame wars” with other experts 
when it came to Britannia’s African 
trade policies� Yet the fact that Kingsley 
championed the British Empire did not 
make her blind to imperial faults�
In contrast, Kipling and Doyle, although 
well traveled, were more literary men, 
and Doyle was also a licensed physician� 
LeFanu does not shy from covering some 
of the more-difficult aspects of their lives, 
such as Doyle’s illicit affection for and 
rapid marriage to his second wife (after a 
minimal mourning period for his first)� In 
the case of Kipling, LeFanu describes fully, 
but with dignity and compassion, the 
death of his six-year-old daughter and the 
permanent impact it left on the author�
The Boer War did not start well for the 
British, then went from bad to worse� 
Boer forces seized the initiative and 
inflicted powerful opening defeats on 
their enemies� But the British would not 
tolerate a victory by the Boers, especially 
one that left the latter with significant 
diamond mines and the world’s largest 
gold reef� So reinforcements flowed from 
England; Doyle, Kingsley, and Kipling 
followed� Kipling was on a charitable mis-
sion: delivering care packages for British 
troops, especially the sick and wounded� 
He was a celebrity and was treated as such�
Doyle, as a professional medical man, 
took a more direct part in the conflict� 
Having volunteered, he was assigned 
as a doctor to the Royal Army Medical 
Corps at a field hospital� As much a 
well-known celebrity as Kipling, he was 
something of an occasional war tourist 
but diligently tended to the growing 
number of British troops in his care who 
had been struck down by diseases—which 
would kill far more of their companions 
than did Boer bullets� And death did 
come close to Doyle—typhus claimed 
at least one of his attendants�
Kingsley, freed from the responsibility 
of caring for her brother, went to South 
Africa expecting to be able to mount 
yet another journey of exploration 
after the war was over� But, as she had 
volunteered for nursing assignments, 
there were more-immediate duties; she 
was assigned to assist in nursing Boer 
prisoners� As was the case in most prisons 
and hospitals, disease was rampant—the 
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odds of catching a fatal illness were high� 
But Kingsley did her duty, even when she 
probably could have called in favors from 
friends and worked elsewhere� Eventu-
ally, she contracted typhus and died�
In addition to keen-eyed observation of 
her main subjects, LeFanu introduces and 
briefly examines other key players, such as 
General H� Herbert Kitchener and Roger 
D� Casement� Casement, an acquaintance 
of Kingsley, was instrumental in exposing 
the horrors of King Leopold’s Congo 
Free State� Eventually, he was tried for 
treason for his role in the 1916 Easter 
Rising in Dublin and executed�
Something of Themselves is neither a 
standard biography nor a standard history� 
It depicts the Boer War—correctly—as 
a historical and political crossroads, 
one where passed three exceptional 
individuals of their day� Told with 
compassion and accuracy, it provides 
a deeper understanding of Kingsley, 
Kipling, and Doyle and of the time in 
which they lived� It is a worthy read as a 
stand-alone work, and a welcome addition 
to any collection devoted to the study of 
war or any of LeFanu’s three subjects�
RICHARD NORTON
2030: How Today’s Biggest Trends Will Collide and 
Reshape the Future of Everything, by Mauro F� Gui-
llén� New York: St� Martin’s, 2020� 278 pages� $28�99�
Mauro F� Guillén’s latest book, 2030: 
How Today’s Biggest Trends Will Collide 
and Reshape the Future of Everything, is 
a powerful reminder of how the world is 
changing demographically and economi-
cally as the result of technological in-
novations that will rewrite the Western-
centric framework to which many 
Americans are accustomed� The trends 
will reach critical mass within the next 
decade, making Guillén’s well-written 
analysis a timely wake-up call to direct 
our attention to a new world order�
Guillén suggests that in the past, 
Western cultures compartmentalized 
the world in a linear way, thinking about 
trends—regarding new generations of 
people, having fewer children, urban 
lifestyles, and technology—separately� 
This approach blinds us to the new 
nature of reality� To put it colloquially, 
so much of the world is changing that 
when we focus on the trees we miss 
the forest� Guillén is not the first to 
point out how global change will 
challenge Western perceptions of the 
world� Many of the transformations he 
references began over the past decade� 
What is novel is his holistic review of 
the data and a shift away from linear 
thinking toward a “peripheral vision�”
For twenty-five years, Guillén was on 
the faculty at the Wharton School, 
where he earned multiple teaching 
awards; recently, he became director of 
the Cambridge Judge Business School 
and a fellow of Queen’s College at the 
University of Cambridge� He divides 
2030 into eight chapters, each of which 
focuses on a segment of demographics, 
from population growth to the real-
ity of a population living longer—and 
therefore more concentrated in the 
over-fifty bracket—along with the shift 
toward a world in which women will 
hold 55 percent of global wealth�
The introduction to 2030 places the 
reader ten years in the future� It depicts 
a warmer average temperature, using 
vignettes of Rehema, a woman from 
Nairobi who lives in Britain, and Angel, 
a woman originally from the Philippines  
living in Los Angeles� Angel reads 
newspaper headlines indicating that 
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American women have overtaken men 
in terms of their percentage of wealth 
ownership, while older Americans 
are “under the care of robots for their 
basic needs, [and] are renting out spare 
rooms in their homes to make ends 
meet, especially since their pensions 
are no longer providing the financial 
safety net they expected” (p� 2)�
These images underscore the growing 
importance of Asia and Africa, which, 
according to UN projections, will 
remain the most populous areas on the 
planet, with 4�6 and 1�68 billion people, 
respectively� The chapter titled “Imagine 
No Possessions” pulls the intellectual rug 
out from under standard conceptions of 
wealth and traditional notions of prop-
erty, exemplified in capitalistic ventures 
such as Uber and Airbnb, while China 
leads a shift to a cashless society that 
the rest of the world is sure to follow�
Guillén also dispels myths that are 
ubiquitous in America, such as that 
immigrants steal jobs, when the reality 
is that 23 percent of firms in high-tech 
industries are founded by immigrants; the 
numbers are 40 percent in California, 42 
percent in Massachusetts, and 45 percent 
in New Jersey (p� 33)� Another important 
fact is that even many illegal immigrants 
pay Social Security payroll taxes—an 
estimated $13 billion as of 2016 (pp� 
36–37)� The media and popular culture 
often overlook this reality, focusing on the 
jobs immigrants do take and the services 
they use� A new world dominated by 
Asia and Africa will demand a new way 
of thinking, because much of the world 
will be growing older, while these regions 
will have younger, robust populations�
Chapter 3 is a thought-provoking review 
of the growing middle class, aptly titled 
“Keeping Up with the Singhs and the 
Wangs�” The world is changing quickly, 
and our notion of “the West and the 
rest” is no longer valid� The fact is, 85 
percent of the world fits neatly inside 
the “developed world” box, while 6 
percent represents the developing 
world, and 9 percent falls somewhere 
in between� This growing middle class 
largely will reside in Asia and Africa, 
and its numbers will hit a staggering 
4�9 billion people by 2030� An example 
from India captures a distinguishing 
characteristic of the new demographic� 
In 2009, India’s Tata Motors produced 
a car available for the equivalent of two 
thousand dollars, supposedly offering 
a quality-of-life improvement to many 
Indians; yet the car was a bust� Why? 
It seems that even Indians who were 
still merely aspirational were embar-
rassed to be seen driving “the world’s 
cheapest car�” Understanding these 
emerging middle-class consumers in 
Asia and Africa will present challenges 
to retailers accustomed to the prefer-
ences of U�S� and European markets�
Guillén is a gifted writer, and the num-
bers he cites paint an intellectually stag-
gering picture� It is an understatement 
to claim that the book is a must-read 
for everyone seeking to grasp truly the 
significance of the next decade and how 
the individual will be transformed by the 
world around him or her� Reading this 
book will prepare everyone better for the 
reality of a world that soon will resemble 
little the one from their childhoods� The 
book is a unique contribution to the 
globalization discourse and especially 
important for the international-relations 
specialists, sociologists, military prac-
titioners, and national-security experts 
who will be forced to resolve complex 
policy issues over the next few decades�
GERALD J� KRIEGER
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program  
Manager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading  
Program.
 The purpose of the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP) is to encourage sailors of all ranks and specialties to use profes-
sional reading as a tool for personal and professional growth� This is the fifty-
second article in the Reflections on Reading series for the Naval War College 
Review, and in virtually every one of those articles we have highlighted specific 
books or addressed larger issues related to professional development in the mari-
time services� In this installment, we will suggest that you do something you may 
find difficult or unappealing: reading something you don’t want to read! We are 
including books, magazines, newspapers, and Internet websites within the scope 
of this discussion� Let me explain what we are suggesting�
The United Nations estimates that 2�2 million books are published globally 
each year, and 1,279 daily newspapers and 7,357 magazines are published regu-
larly in the United States� As for electronic forms of information distribution, 
there are 1�7 billion websites available worldwide� Information is available at rates 
and through means that were unimaginable only fifty years ago� By some mea-
sures, this abundance of information creates a higher level of knowledge among 
readers, which can be a good thing�
A more critical view, however, suggests that the overwhelming volume of data 
creates an information overload that forces readers to pick and choose which 
portions of the “data buffet” they will consume� Research on reading habits has 
shown that readers tend to seek out sources of information that reinforce their 
preconceived notions, an effect known as confirmation bias: accepting only 
evidence that confirms what someone already believes� Tom Nichols’s widely 
read—and hotly debated—book The Death of Expertise: The Campaign against 
Established Knowledge and Why It Matters dedicates a full chapter to his notion 
that “unlimited information is making us dumber�”
How should we improve the “informational diet” we consume each day? 
Nichols notes: “For nearly thirty years, I’ve opened almost every class I teach 
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at the college and graduate level by telling my students that no matter what else 
they do, they should consume a balanced daily diet of news� I tell them to follow 
the major newspapers; to watch at least two networks; [and] to subscribe (online 
or otherwise) to at least one journal with which they consistently disagree�” The 
CNO-PRP does not recommend any specific newspapers, magazines, or broad-
cast outlets, but its managers maintain that readers should choose information 
sources that span a wide spectrum of opinions�
The current version of the CNO-PRP features seventy-four books, many of 
which deal with issues related to warfare, leadership, and strategy, and I suspect 
that many sailors naturally will seek books from within these genres� However, 
in the opening paragraphs we challenged you to seek out other books: those 
that address topics with which you are less comfortable� The list includes books 
about sexual, racial, and ethnological subjects that, for many sailors, fall outside 
their “mainstream�” All readers should feel empowered to read such books to 
understand the issues better and ensure they are equipped to share the privilege 
of maritime service with crewmates and teammates who subscribe to practices 
and beliefs that may be at odds with those of the majority�
Navy policy states as follows: “No matter your background, lifestyle, gender, 
sexuality, or religious beliefs, there is a place for you in the Navy� Here, all are wel-
come and have a part to play� We believe that when a diverse group of individuals 
come together to do a job, they can do it better because of their differences�” And 
the Secretary of Defense defines the overarching intent of the Department of 
Defense as follows: “The Department will lead with our values, building diversity, 
equity, and inclusion into all aspects of our work and in everything we do�” In 
the final analysis, the Navy’s focus is on deterring wars if possible and winning 
wars when necessary� A diverse and inclusive naval force will execute the Navy’s 
mission, which is “to recruit, train, equip, and organize to deliver combat-ready 
forces to win conflicts and wars while maintaining security and deterrence 
through sustained forward presence� We are an integrated Naval force that will 
provide maritime dominance for the Nation�”
The motto of the CNO-PRP is Read Well to Lead Well� As part of reading 
well, all of us should read (in hard copy, digital, and other forms) materials that 
challenge our assumptions instead of simply and blindly confirming them� You 
could summarize this notion as “read to learn, not to confirm”!
JOHN E� JACKSON
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